linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set

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Message-ID: <20230225013202.g7tibykvylprsxs5@treble>
Date:   Fri, 24 Feb 2023 17:32:02 -0800
From:   Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
To:     Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com>, x86@...nel.org,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@...cle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set

On Fri, Feb 24, 2023 at 04:52:21PM -0800, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 25, 2023 at 01:20:24AM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 24, 2023 at 04:09:31PM -0800, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > > Ah, I had to stare it that for a bit to figure out how it works.
> > 
> > Yeah, it is a bit "hidden". :)
> > 
> > > setup_real_mode() reads MSR_EFER from the boot CPU and stores it in
> > > trampoline_header->efer.  Then the other CPUs read that stored value in
> > > startup_32() and write it into their MSR.
> > 
> > Exactly.
> > 
> > > Yeah, I think that would be good.  Otherwise it's rather magical.
> > 
> > Yap, see below.
> > 
> > > That EFER MSR is a surprising place to put that bit.
> > 
> > That MSR is very important on AMD. Consider it AMD's CR4. :-)
> > 
> > Thx.
> > 
> > ---
> > From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>
> > Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2023 01:11:31 +0100
> > Subject: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
> > 
> > The AutoIBRS bit gets set only on the BSP as part of determining which
> > mitigation to enable on AMD. Setting on the APs relies on the
> > circumstance that the APs get booted through the trampoline and EFER
> > - the MSR which contains that bit - gets replicated on every AP from the
> > BSP.
> > 
> > However, this can change in the future and considering the security
> > implications of this bit not being set on every CPU, make sure it is set
> > by verifying EFER later in the boot process and on every AP.
> > 
> > Reported-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230224185257.o3mcmloei5zqu7wa@treble
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 10 ++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> > index 380753b14cab..de624c1442c2 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> > @@ -996,6 +996,16 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> >  		msr_set_bit(MSR_K7_HWCR, MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT);
> >  
> >  	check_null_seg_clears_base(c);
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Make sure EFER[AIBRSE - Automatic IBRS Enable] is set. The APs are brought up
> > +	 * using the trampoline code and as part of it, EFER gets prepared there in order
> > +	 * to be replicated onto them. Regardless, set it here again, if not set, to protect
> > +	 * against any future refactoring/code reorganization which might miss setting
> > +	 * this important bit.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))
> > +		msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS);
> 
> Is it intended to be set regardless of the spectre_v2 mitigation status?

Right, it needs to check spectre_v2_enabled.

Also, this code might be a better fit in identify_secondary_cpu() with
the other MSR-writing bug-related code.

-- 
Josh