linux-kernel - [tip: x86/urgent] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS

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Message-ID: <167752794021.5837.7575103462334259742.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date:   Mon, 27 Feb 2023 19:59:00 -0000
From:   "tip-bot2 for KP Singh" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To:     linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     joseloliveira11@...il.com,
        Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo@...nelhacking.com>,
        KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
        "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>, stable@...r.kernel.org,
        x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/urgent] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS

The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     6921ed9049bc7457f66c1596c5b78aec0dae4a9d
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/6921ed9049bc7457f66c1596c5b78aec0dae4a9d
Author:        KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>
AuthorDate:    Mon, 27 Feb 2023 07:05:40 +01:00
Committer:     Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
CommitterDate: Mon, 27 Feb 2023 18:57:09 +01:00

x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS

When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed.

The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target
injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on
returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace
threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which
STIBP protects.

Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for
enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if
selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter).

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
Reported-by: José Oliveira <joseloliveira11@...il.com>
Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo@...nelhacking.com>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230221184908.2349578-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index cf81848..f9d060e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1133,14 +1133,18 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
 	return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
 }
 
-static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
 {
-	return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
-	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+	return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
 	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
 	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
 }
 
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+	return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+}
+
 static void __init
 spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
 {
@@ -1203,12 +1207,19 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible,
-	 * STIBP is not required.
+	 * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP
+	 * is not required.
+	 *
+	 * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target
+	 * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which
+	 * implicitly enables cross-thread protections.  However, in legacy IBRS
+	 * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return
+	 * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection,
+	 * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case.
 	 */
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
 	    !smt_possible ||
-	    spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+	    spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
 		return;
 
 	/*
@@ -2340,7 +2351,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
 
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
-	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
 		return "";
 
 	switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {