linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] ptp: kvm: Use decrypted memory in confidential guest on x86

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Message-ID: <20230227154021.259cce7b@kernel.org>
Date:   Mon, 27 Feb 2023 15:40:21 -0800
From:   Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
To:     Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@...ux.microsoft.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        Richard Cochran <richardcochran@...il.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] ptp: kvm: Use decrypted memory in confidential guest
 on x86

On Mon, 27 Feb 2023 15:58:19 +0000 Jeremi Piotrowski wrote:
> KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING currently fails inside SEV-SNP guests because the
> guest passes an address to static data to the host. In confidential
> computing the host can't access arbitrary guest memory so handling the
> hypercall runs into an "rmpfault". To make the hypercall work, the guest
> needs to explicitly mark the memory as decrypted. Do that in
> kvm_arch_ptp_init(), but retain the previous behavior for
> non-confidential guests to save us from having to allocate memory.
> 
> Add a new arch-specific function (kvm_arch_ptp_exit()) to free the
> allocation and mark the memory as encrypted again.

# Form letter - net-next is closed

The merge window for v6.3 has begun and therefore net-next is closed
for new drivers, features, code refactoring and optimizations.
We are currently accepting bug fixes only.

Please repost when net-next reopens after Mar 6th.

RFC patches sent for review only are obviously welcome at any time.