linux-kernel - [PATCH v12 059/106] KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD

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Message-Id: <cadd0436dbd5a64ed561fbd9b4e4c0f61f46a9e3.1677484918.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Date:   Mon, 27 Feb 2023 00:22:58 -0800
From:   isaku.yamahata@...el.com
To:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     isaku.yamahata@...el.com, isaku.yamahata@...il.com,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, erdemaktas@...gle.com,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Sagi Shahar <sagis@...gle.com>,
        David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>,
        Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>,
        Zhi Wang <zhi.wang.linux@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH v12 059/106] KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD

From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>

On exiting from the guest TD, xsave state is clobbered.  Restore xsave
state on TD exit.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 734925d3a5c0..dee63c3931c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/mmu_context.h>
 
+#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
 #include <asm/tdx.h>
 
 #include "capabilities.h"
@@ -505,6 +506,22 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 	return;
 }
 
+static void tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+	    host_xcr0 != (kvm_tdx->xfam & kvm_caps.supported_xcr0))
+		xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, host_xcr0);
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+	    /* PT can be exposed to TD guest regardless of KVM's XSS support */
+	    host_xss != (kvm_tdx->xfam & (kvm_caps.supported_xss | XFEATURE_MASK_PT)))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, host_xss);
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
+	    (kvm_tdx->xfam & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU))
+		write_pkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);
+}
+
 u64 __tdx_vcpu_run(hpa_t tdvpr, void *regs, u32 regs_mask);
 
 static noinstr void tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -528,6 +545,7 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, tdx);
 
+	tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
 	tdx->host_state_need_restore = true;
 
 	vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
-- 
2.25.1