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Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 22:47:30 +0200
From: Zhi Wang <zhi.wang.linux@...il.com>
To: Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
<linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, <x86@...nel.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <tglx@...utronix.de>,
<mingo@...hat.com>, <jroedel@...e.de>, <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
<hpa@...or.com>, <ardb@...nel.org>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
<seanjc@...gle.com>, <vkuznets@...hat.com>, <jmattson@...gle.com>,
<luto@...nel.org>, <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <slp@...hat.com>,
<pgonda@...gle.com>, <peterz@...radead.org>,
<srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>, <rientjes@...gle.com>,
<dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>, <tobin@....com>, <bp@...en8.de>,
<vbabka@...e.cz>, <kirill@...temov.name>, <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
<tony.luck@...el.com>, <marcorr@...gle.com>,
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
<alpergun@...gle.com>, <dgilbert@...hat.com>, <jarkko@...nel.org>,
<ashish.kalra@....com>, <nikunj.dadhania@....com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v8 47/56] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE
event
On Fri, 24 Feb 2023 13:37:48 +0100
Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com> wrote:
>
> On 20.02.23 19:38, Michael Roth wrote:
> > From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> >
> > Add support for the SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event. This allows SEV-SNP
> > guests to alter the register state of the APs on their own. This allows
> > the guest a way of simulating INIT-SIPI.
> >
> > A new event, KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE, is created and used
> > so as to avoid updating the VMSA pointer while the vCPU is running.
> >
> > For CREATE
> > The guest supplies the GPA of the VMSA to be used for the vCPU with
> > the specified APIC ID. The GPA is saved in the svm struct of the
> > target vCPU, the KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE event is added
> > to the vCPU and then the vCPU is kicked.
> >
> > For CREATE_ON_INIT:
> > The guest supplies the GPA of the VMSA to be used for the vCPU with
> > the specified APIC ID the next time an INIT is performed. The GPA is
> > saved in the svm struct of the target vCPU.
> >
> > For DESTROY:
> > The guest indicates it wishes to stop the vCPU. The GPA is cleared
> > from the svm struct, the KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE event is
> > added to vCPU and then the vCPU is kicked.
> >
> > The KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE event handler will be invoked
> > as a result of the event or as a result of an INIT. The handler sets the
> > vCPU to the KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED state, so that any errors will
> > leave the vCPU as not runnable. Any previous VMSA pages that were
> > installed as part of an SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event are un-pinned. If
> > a new VMSA is to be installed, the VMSA guest page is pinned and set as
> > the VMSA in the vCPU VMCB and the vCPU state is set to
> > KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE. If a new VMSA is not to be installed, the VMSA is
> > cleared in the vCPU VMCB and the vCPU state is left as
> > KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED to prevent it from being run.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
> > [mdr: add handling for restrictedmem]
> > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
>
>
> What is the intended boot sequence for SEV-SNP guests? FWIW with this
> interface in place, guests will typically use in-guest VMSA pages to
> hold secondary vcpu state. But that means we're now allocating 4kb of
> memory for every vcpu that we create that will be for most of the
> guest's lifetime superfluous.
>
> Wouldn't it make more sense to have a model where we only allocate the
> VMSA for the boot CPU and leave secondary allocation to the guest? We
> already need firmware changes for SEV-SNP - may as well make this one more.
>
> [...]
>
> > +
> > +static int sev_snp_ap_creation(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info;
> > + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> > + struct kvm_vcpu *target_vcpu;
> > + struct vcpu_svm *target_svm;
> > + unsigned int request;
> > + unsigned int apic_id;
> > + bool kick;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + request = lower_32_bits(svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1);
> > + apic_id = upper_32_bits(svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1);
> > +
> > + /* Validate the APIC ID */
> > + target_vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(vcpu->kvm, apic_id);
>
>
> Out of curiosity: The target CPU can be my own vCPU, right?
>
>
> > + if (!target_vcpu) {
> > + vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: invalid AP APIC ID [%#x] from guest\n",
> > + apic_id);
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + ret = 0;
> > +
> > + target_svm = to_svm(target_vcpu);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * The target vCPU is valid, so the vCPU will be kicked unless the
> > + * request is for CREATE_ON_INIT. For any errors at this stage, the
> > + * kick will place the vCPU in an non-runnable state.
> > + */
> > + kick = true;
> > +
> > + mutex_lock(&target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_mutex);
> > +
> > + target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
> > + target_svm->sev_es.snp_ap_create = true;
> > +
> > + /* Interrupt injection mode shouldn't change for AP creation */
> > + if (request < SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY) {
> > + u64 sev_features;
> > +
> > + sev_features = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
> > + sev_features ^= sev->sev_features;
> > + if (sev_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_INT_INJ_MODES) {
> > + vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: invalid AP injection mode [%#lx] from guest\n",
> > + vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]);
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + switch (request) {
> > + case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE_ON_INIT:
> > + kick = false;
> > + fallthrough;
> > + case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE:
> > + if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2)) {
> > + vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: invalid AP VMSA address [%#llx] from guest\n",
> > + svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2);
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Malicious guest can RMPADJUST a large page into VMSA which
> > + * will hit the SNP erratum where the CPU will incorrectly signal
> > + * an RMP violation #PF if a hugepage collides with the RMP entry
> > + * of VMSA page, reject the AP CREATE request if VMSA address from
> > + * guest is 2M aligned.
>
>
> This will break genuine current Linux kernels that just happen to
> allocate a guest page, no? In fact, given enough vCPUs you're almost
> guaranteed to hit an aligned structure somewhere. What is the guest
> supposed to do in that situation?
>
>
> > + */
> > + if (IS_ALIGNED(svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2, PMD_SIZE)) {
> > + vcpu_unimpl(vcpu,
> > + "vmgexit: AP VMSA address [%llx] from guest is unsafe as it is 2M aligned\n",
> > + svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2);
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
> > + break;
> > + case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY:
>
>
> I don't understand the destroy path. Why does this case destroy anything?
>
>
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: invalid AP creation request [%#x] from guest\n",
> > + request);
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > +out:
> > + if (kick) {
> > + if (target_vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED)
> > + target_vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
>
>
> What if the guest AP goes through a create -> destroy -> create cycle?
> Will it stay runnable while destroyed?
The code is not very straightforward.
1) target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa is set as INVALID_PAGE in the beginning of this function.
2) If a DESTROY is hit in this function, target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa will be
left as INVALID_PAGE.
3) At the end of this function, it calls kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE).
4) In the vcpu_enter_guest(), the kvm_vcpu_reset()->sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state()
->__sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state() is called.
5) The mp_state is set to KVM_MP_STATE_STOPPED by default and the runtime VMSA is
cleared. Then the it will be initialized according to the guest's
configuration.
6) As the snp_vmsa_gpa is set as INVALID_PAGE in 1, the mp_state will be left as
KVM_MP_STATE_STOPPED.
7) With this code piece:
+ kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, true);
+ if (vcpu->arch.mp_state != KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE)
+ goto out;
vcpu_enter_guest() bails out.
>
>
> Alex
>
> > +
> > + kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE, target_vcpu);
> > + kvm_vcpu_kick(target_vcpu);
> > + }
> > +
> > + mutex_unlock(&target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_mutex);
> > +
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > static int sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> > {
> > struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
>
>
>
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> 10117 Berlin
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>
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