linux-kernel - [PATCH 1/1] tee: amdtee: fix race condition in amdtee_open

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Message-ID: <5bf4f1d679e2f80814d07937309602877afd02c6.1677577036.git.Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com>
Date:   Tue, 28 Feb 2023 15:11:20 +0530
From:   Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@....com>
To:     Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>,
        Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
        lm0963 <lm0963hack@...il.com>
CC:     Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@....com>,
        Mythri PK <Mythri.Pandeshwarakrishna@....com>,
        Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@....com>,
        <security@...nel.org>, Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        <op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] tee: amdtee: fix race condition in amdtee_open_session

There is a potential race condition in amdtee_open_session that may
lead to use-after-free. For instance, in amdtee_open_session() after
sess->sess_mask is set, and before setting:

    sess->session_info[i] = session_info;

if amdtee_close_session() closes this same session, then 'sess' data
structure will be released, causing kernel panic when 'sess' is
accessed within amdtee_open_session().

The solution is to set the bit sess->sess_mask as the last step in
amdtee_open_session().

Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver")
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@....com>
---
 drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 29 ++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c
index 297dc62bca29..372d64756ed6 100644
--- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c
+++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c
@@ -267,35 +267,34 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/* Open session with loaded TA */
+	handle_open_session(arg, &session_info, param);
+	if (arg->ret != TEEC_SUCCESS) {
+		pr_err("open_session failed %d\n", arg->ret);
+		handle_unload_ta(ta_handle);
+		kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	/* Find an empty session index for the given TA */
 	spin_lock(&sess->lock);
 	i = find_first_zero_bit(sess->sess_mask, TEE_NUM_SESSIONS);
-	if (i < TEE_NUM_SESSIONS)
+	if (i < TEE_NUM_SESSIONS) {
+		sess->session_info[i] = session_info;
+		set_session_id(ta_handle, i, &arg->session);
 		set_bit(i, sess->sess_mask);
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&sess->lock);
 
 	if (i >= TEE_NUM_SESSIONS) {
 		pr_err("reached maximum session count %d\n", TEE_NUM_SESSIONS);
+		handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info);
 		handle_unload_ta(ta_handle);
 		kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session);
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	/* Open session with loaded TA */
-	handle_open_session(arg, &session_info, param);
-	if (arg->ret != TEEC_SUCCESS) {
-		pr_err("open_session failed %d\n", arg->ret);
-		spin_lock(&sess->lock);
-		clear_bit(i, sess->sess_mask);
-		spin_unlock(&sess->lock);
-		handle_unload_ta(ta_handle);
-		kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session);
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	sess->session_info[i] = session_info;
-	set_session_id(ta_handle, i, &arg->session);
 out:
 	free_pages((u64)ta, get_order(ta_size));
 	return rc;
-- 
2.25.1