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Message-ID: <CAKwvOdkfCQJcpx3zh0pwHfnBP2v2ieqxqTUzOUyW14s3Xsaf-w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2023 15:21:11 -0800
From: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Andy Shevchenko <andy@...nel.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
Nicolas Schier <nicolas@...sle.eu>, Tom Rix <trix@...hat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Miroslav Benes <mbenes@...e.cz>,
Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@...aro.org>,
Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@...el.com>,
Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>, Puyou Lu <puyou.lu@...il.com>,
linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org,
llvm@...ts.linux.dev, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fortify: Improve buffer overflow reporting
On Thu, Mar 2, 2023 at 2:58 PM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/fortify-string.h b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
> index c9de1f59ee80..981e2838f99a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fortify-string.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
> @@ -170,11 +170,13 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcat, 1, 2)
> char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q)
> {
> size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
> + size_t size;
>
> if (p_size == SIZE_MAX)
> return __underlying_strcat(p, q);
> - if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
> - fortify_panic(__func__);
> + size = strlcat(p, q, p_size);
> + if (p_size < size)
What happens when they're equal? I think this patch changes
behavior...? Intentional?
Did flipping this conditional drop what should be `<=`?
Was there an off by one, or is this version of this patch potentially
introducing one? Or am I misremembering my boolean algebra?
> + fortify_panic(__func__, 1, p_size, size);
> return p;
> }
>
> @@ -205,7 +207,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size
> /* Do not check characters beyond the end of p. */
> ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
> if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
> - fortify_panic(__func__);
> + fortify_panic(__func__, 1, p_size, ret);
> return ret;
> }
>
> @@ -241,7 +243,7 @@ __kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p)
> return __underlying_strlen(p);
> ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
> if (p_size <= ret)
> - fortify_panic(__func__);
> + fortify_panic(__func__, 1, p_size, ret);
> return ret;
> }
>
> @@ -282,8 +284,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, si
> __write_overflow();
> }
> if (size) {
> - if (len >= p_size)
> - fortify_panic(__func__);
> + if (p_size < len)
`<=` ? (This used to panic when they were equal)
> + fortify_panic(__func__, 1, p_size, len);
> __underlying_memcpy(p, q, len);
> p[len] = '\0';
> }
--
Thanks,
~Nick Desaulniers
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