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Message-ID: <CALCETrViDpTbuBk+9wQa-PNzKZerwk=4MmKMXw2v3Ysxuv2k3A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 10:15:13 -0800
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 24/41] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory
On Mon, Mar 6, 2023 at 5:10 AM Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Feb 27, 2023 at 02:29:40PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> > The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
> > type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
> > unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
> > properly.
> >
> > Shadow stack memory is writable only in very specific, controlled ways.
> > However, since it is writable, the kernel treats it as such. As a result
> ^
> ,
>
> > there remain many ways for userspace to trigger the kernel to write to
> > shadow stack's via get_user_pages(, FOLL_WRITE) operations. To make this a
Is there an alternate mechanism, or do we still want to allow
FOLL_FORCE so that debuggers can write it?
--Andy
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