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Message-ID: <ZAWLWWofpqKtH3CT@kroah.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 07:42:33 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Amit Shah <aams@...zon.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@...nel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Thorsten Leemhuis <linux@...mhuis.info>,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] Documentation/security-bugs: overhaul
On Mon, Mar 06, 2023 at 07:35:34AM +0100, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 06, 2023 at 07:02:14AM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > Secondly, and the bigger one, I think we should just drop all of the
> > references to linux-distros and oss-security entirely, as those are
> > groups that are outside of our control and interaction and have
> > different rules that we might not agree with. They also just a tiny
> > subset of Linux users and companies and as such do not really reflect
> > the majority of where Linux is used anymore.
>
> I'm wondering if instead they shouldn't just be mentioned as a warning
> about the risk of leak or forced disclosure. We know that reporters may
> find the address from various places, including various sites that may
> enumerate the long list of potential contacts, and not just this doc.
> It can be useful to have just a paragraph warning about the fact that
> oss-sec is public and that linux-distros has this strict disclosure
> policy without consideration for the availability of a fix, in order
> to warn them to only contact such lists once the fix is available and
> tested if they want to, but never before. Anything we can do to help
> serious reporters (i.e. those who are really embarrassed with a bug,
> not those who seek a Curiculum Vitae Enhancer) should be done. It's
> always a stressful moment to report a security issue on a project,
> you always fear that you might be doing an irreversible mistake, so
> whatever info we can pass about the risks (or lack of) should be
> welcome I guess.
That's a good idea, if it can be worded in a way that reflects that is
is not any sort of requirement or that it is normal part of our
development process.
thanks,
greg k-h
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