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Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 18:04:37 +0530
From: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
To: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke@...omium.org>
Cc: op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org,
Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke@...gle.com>,
Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] tee: optee: Add SMC for loading OP-TEE image
On Fri, 3 Mar 2023 at 01:37, Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke@...omium.org> wrote:
>
> Adds an SMC call that will pass an OP-TEE binary image to EL3 and
> instruct it to load it as the BL32 payload. This works in conjunction
> with a feature added to Trusted Firmware for ARM that supports this.
s/Trusted Firmware for ARM/Trusted Firmware for Armv8 and above architectures/
This commit description tells me what you have implemented but not
why? The motivation for this change should be included here along with
security implications.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke@...omium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke@...gle.com>
> ---
>
> Changes in v3:
> - Removed state tracking for driver reload
> - Check UID of service to verify it needs image load
>
> Changes in v2:
> - Fixed compile issue when feature is disabled
> - Addressed minor comments
> - Added state tracking for driver reload
>
> drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig | 10 ++++
> drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 12 +++++
> drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 24 +++++++++
> drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 142 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
> index f121c224e682..f0f12b146add 100644
> --- a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
> @@ -7,3 +7,13 @@ config OPTEE
> help
> This implements the OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
> driver.
> +
> +config OPTEE_LOAD_IMAGE
Given the warning text attached to this config option, this should be
renamed as OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE. Also, the help text should be
updated to reflect the security implication of this.
I would also like to see documentation updates regarding how your
platform is mitigating potential threats in order to enable this
option. It would enable others to make a concious decision if their
threat model allows this option.
> + bool "Load OP-TEE image as firmware"
> + default n
> + depends on OPTEE
IIRC, from earlier review threads you mentioned that this option is
enabled when OP-TEE driver is built-in rather than loadable. Shouldn't
we make that dependency explicit?
Also, this option only makes sense for ARM64 as in case of ARM the
secure monitor is bundled into OP-TEE image and hence can't be loaded
dynamically. We should make that dependency explicit too.
> + help
> + This loads the BL32 image for OP-TEE as firmware when the driver is probed.
> + This returns -EPROBE_DEFER until the firmware is loadable from the
> + filesystem which is determined by checking the system_state until it is in
> + SYSTEM_RUNNING.
> diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h
> index 70e9cc2ee96b..237d6fa9a6e8 100644
> --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h
> +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h
> @@ -241,11 +241,23 @@ struct optee_msg_arg {
> * 384fb3e0-e7f8-11e3-af63-0002a5d5c51b.
> * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_UID_0, OPTEE_MSG_UID_1,
> * OPTEE_MSG_UID_2, OPTEE_MSG_UID_3.
> + *
> + * In the case where the OP-TEE image is loaded by the kernel, this will
> + * initially return an alternate UID to reflect that we are communicating with
> + * the TF-A image loading service at that time instead of OP-TEE. That UID is:
> + * a3fbeab1-1246-315d-c7c4-06b9c03cbea4.
> + * Represetned in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0,
s/Represetned/Represented/
> + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1, OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2,
> + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3.
> */
> #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_0 0x384fb3e0
> #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_1 0xe7f811e3
> #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_2 0xaf630002
> #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_3 0xa5d5c51b
> +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 0xa3fbeab1
> +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 0x1246315d
> +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 0xc7c406b9
> +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3 0xc03cbea4
> #define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_CALLS_UID 0xFF01
>
> /*
> diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
> index 73b5e7760d10..7d9fa426505b 100644
> --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
> +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
> @@ -104,6 +104,30 @@ struct optee_smc_call_get_os_revision_result {
> unsigned long reserved1;
> };
>
> +/*
> + * Load Trusted OS from optee/tee.bin in the Linux firmware.
> + *
> + * WARNING: Use this cautiously as it could lead to insecure loading of the
> + * Trusted OS.
> + * This SMC instructs EL3 to load a binary and execute it as the Trusted OS.
> + *
> + * Call register usage:
> + * a0 SMC Function ID, OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE
> + * a1 Upper 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload
> + * a2 Lower 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload
> + * a3 Upper 32bit of the physical address for the payload
> + * a4 Lower 32bit of the physical address for the payload
> + *
> + * The payload is in the OP-TEE image format.
> + *
> + * Returns result in a0, 0 on success and an error code otherwise.
> + */
> +#define OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE 2
> +#define OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE \
> + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \
> + ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS_END, \
> + OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE)
> +
> /*
> * Call with struct optee_msg_arg as argument
> *
> diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
> index a1c1fa1a9c28..14612edef8f2 100644
> --- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
> +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
> @@ -8,9 +8,11 @@
>
> #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
> #include <linux/errno.h>
> +#include <linux/firmware.h>
> #include <linux/interrupt.h>
> #include <linux/io.h>
> #include <linux/irqdomain.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> #include <linux/mm.h>
> #include <linux/module.h>
> #include <linux/of.h>
> @@ -1149,6 +1151,22 @@ static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
> return false;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_LOAD_IMAGE
> +static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
> +{
> + struct arm_smccc_res res;
> +
> + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALLS_UID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res);
> +
> + if (res.a0 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 &&
> + res.a1 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 &&
> + res.a2 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 &&
> + res.a3 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3)
> + return true;
> + return false;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> static void optee_msg_get_os_revision(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
> {
> union {
> @@ -1354,6 +1372,80 @@ static void optee_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev)
> optee_disable_shm_cache(optee);
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_LOAD_IMAGE
> +
> +#define OPTEE_FW_IMAGE "optee/tee.bin"
> +
> +static int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev,
> + optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
> +{
> + const struct firmware *fw = NULL;
> + struct arm_smccc_res res;
> + phys_addr_t data_pa;
> + u8 *data_buf = NULL;
> + u64 data_size;
> + u32 data_pa_high, data_pa_low;
> + u32 data_size_high, data_size_low;
> + int rc;
> +
> + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(invoke_fn))
> + return 0;
> +
> + rc = request_firmware(&fw, OPTEE_FW_IMAGE, &pdev->dev);
> + if (rc) {
> + /*
> + * The firmware in the rootfs will not be accessible until we
> + * are in the SYSTEM_RUNNING state, so return EPROBE_DEFER until
> + * that point.
> + */
> + if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING)
> + return -EPROBE_DEFER;
> + goto fw_err;
> + }
> +
> + data_size = fw->size;
> + /*
> + * This uses the GFP_DMA flag to ensure we are allocated memory in the
> + * 32-bit space since TF-A cannot map memory beyond the 32-bit boundary.
> + */
> + data_buf = kmalloc(fw->size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> + if (!data_buf) {
> + rc = -ENOMEM;
> + goto fw_err;
> + }
> + memcpy(data_buf, fw->data, fw->size);
> + data_pa = virt_to_phys(data_buf);
> + reg_pair_from_64(&data_pa_high, &data_pa_low, data_pa);
> + reg_pair_from_64(&data_size_high, &data_size_low, data_size);
> + goto fw_load;
> +
> +fw_err:
> + pr_warn("image loading failed\n");
> + data_pa_high = data_pa_low = data_size_high = data_size_low = 0;
> +
> +fw_load:
> + /*
> + * Always invoke the SMC, even if loading the image fails, to indicate
> + * to EL3 that we have passed the point where it should allow invoking
> + * this SMC.
> + */
> + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE, data_size_high, data_size_low,
> + data_pa_high, data_pa_low, 0, 0, 0, &res);
> + if (!rc)
> + rc = res.a0;
> + if (fw)
> + release_firmware(fw);
> + kfree(data_buf);
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
> +#else
> +static inline int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *__unused1,
> + optee_invoke_fn *__unused2) {
> + return 0;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> {
> optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn;
> @@ -1372,6 +1464,10 @@ static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> if (IS_ERR(invoke_fn))
> return PTR_ERR(invoke_fn);
>
> + rc = optee_load_fw(pdev, invoke_fn);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(invoke_fn)) {
> pr_warn("api uid mismatch\n");
> return -EINVAL;
> --
> 2.40.0.rc0.216.gc4246ad0f0-goog
>
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