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Message-ID: <f1ced48fad10e11e1623aeefbcd446d4af142010.camel@huaweicloud.com>
Date: Tue, 07 Mar 2023 17:57:24 +0100
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
chuck.lever@...cle.com, jlayton@...nel.org, zohar@...ux.ibm.com,
dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
serge@...lyn.com, dhowells@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
brauner@...nel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
stefanb@...ux.ibm.com, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 26/28] evm: Move to LSM infrastructure
On Tue, 2023-03-07 at 08:54 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 3/6/2023 1:21 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > On Sat, 2023-03-04 at 13:36 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > > On 3/3/2023 10:26 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> > > >
> > > > As for IMA, remove hardcoded EVM function calls from the LSM infrastructure
> > > > and the VFS. Make EVM functions as static (except for
> > > > evm_inode_init_security(), which is exported), and register them as hook
> > > > implementations in init_evm_lsm(), called from integrity_lsm_init().
> > > >
> > > > Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, by
> > > > setting the lbs_xattr field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure, and
> > > > consequently decrement the number of xattrs to allocate in
> > > > security_inode_init_security().
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> > > > ---
> > > > fs/attr.c | 2 -
> > > > fs/posix_acl.c | 3 -
> > > > fs/xattr.c | 2 -
> > > > include/linux/evm.h | 116 ------------------------------
> > > > security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> > > > security/integrity/iint.c | 7 ++
> > > > security/integrity/integrity.h | 9 +++
> > > > security/security.c | 41 +++--------
> > > > 8 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 171 deletions(-)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
> > > > index 406d782dfab..1b911a627fe 100644
> > > > --- a/fs/attr.c
> > > > +++ b/fs/attr.c
> > > > @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
> > > > #include <linux/fcntl.h>
> > > > #include <linux/filelock.h>
> > > > #include <linux/security.h>
> > > > -#include <linux/evm.h>
> > > >
> > > > #include "internal.h"
> > > >
> > > > @@ -485,7 +484,6 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > if (!error) {
> > > > fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
> > > > security_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
> > > > - evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > return error;
> > > > diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
> > > > index 5b8c92fce0c..608cb0a9f84 100644
> > > > --- a/fs/posix_acl.c
> > > > +++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
> > > > @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
> > > > #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
> > > > #include <linux/iversion.h>
> > > > #include <linux/security.h>
> > > > -#include <linux/evm.h>
> > > > #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
> > > > #include <linux/filelock.h>
> > > >
> > > > @@ -1103,7 +1102,6 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > if (!error) {
> > > > fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
> > > > security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
> > > > - evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > out_inode_unlock:
> > > > @@ -1214,7 +1212,6 @@ int vfs_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > if (!error) {
> > > > fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
> > > > security_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
> > > > - evm_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > out_inode_unlock:
> > > > diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
> > > > index 10c959d9fc6..7708ffdacca 100644
> > > > --- a/fs/xattr.c
> > > > +++ b/fs/xattr.c
> > > > @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
> > > > #include <linux/mount.h>
> > > > #include <linux/namei.h>
> > > > #include <linux/security.h>
> > > > -#include <linux/evm.h>
> > > > #include <linux/syscalls.h>
> > > > #include <linux/export.h>
> > > > #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
> > > > @@ -535,7 +534,6 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > if (!error) {
> > > > fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
> > > > security_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
> > > > - evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > out:
> > > > diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
> > > > index 8c043273552..61794299f09 100644
> > > > --- a/include/linux/evm.h
> > > > +++ b/include/linux/evm.h
> > > > @@ -21,46 +21,6 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > void *xattr_value,
> > > > size_t xattr_value_len,
> > > > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint);
> > > > -extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
> > > > -extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid);
> > > > -extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> > > > - const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
> > > > -extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - const char *xattr_name,
> > > > - const void *xattr_value,
> > > > - size_t xattr_value_len,
> > > > - int flags);
> > > > -extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
> > > > -extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - const char *xattr_name);
> > > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - const char *acl_name)
> > > > -{
> > > > - evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name);
> > > > -}
> > > > -extern int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
> > > > - struct posix_acl *kacl);
> > > > -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - const char *acl_name)
> > > > -{
> > > > - return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
> > > > -}
> > > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - const char *acl_name,
> > > > - struct posix_acl *kacl)
> > > > -{
> > > > - return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0);
> > > > -}
> > > > -extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> > > > - const struct qstr *qstr,
> > > > - struct xattr *xattrs);
> > > > extern bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name);
> > > > extern int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name);
> > > > extern int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
> > > > @@ -92,82 +52,6 @@ static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > }
> > > > #endif
> > > >
> > > > -static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
> > > > -{
> > > > - return 0;
> > > > -}
> > > > -
> > > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
> > > > -{
> > > > - return;
> > > > -}
> > > > -
> > > > -static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> > > > - const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
> > > > -{
> > > > - return 0;
> > > > -}
> > > > -
> > > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - const char *xattr_name,
> > > > - const void *xattr_value,
> > > > - size_t xattr_value_len,
> > > > - int flags)
> > > > -{
> > > > - return;
> > > > -}
> > > > -
> > > > -static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - const char *xattr_name)
> > > > -{
> > > > - return 0;
> > > > -}
> > > > -
> > > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - const char *xattr_name)
> > > > -{
> > > > - return;
> > > > -}
> > > > -
> > > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - const char *acl_name)
> > > > -{
> > > > - return;
> > > > -}
> > > > -
> > > > -static inline int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
> > > > - struct posix_acl *kacl)
> > > > -{
> > > > - return 0;
> > > > -}
> > > > -
> > > > -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - const char *acl_name)
> > > > -{
> > > > - return 0;
> > > > -}
> > > > -
> > > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - const char *acl_name,
> > > > - struct posix_acl *kacl)
> > > > -{
> > > > - return;
> > > > -}
> > > > -
> > > > -static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> > > > - const struct qstr *qstr,
> > > > - struct xattr *xattrs)
> > > > -{
> > > > - return 0;
> > > > -}
> > > > -
> > > > static inline bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
> > > > {
> > > > return false;
> > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > > index 8b5c472f78b..c45bc97277c 100644
> > > > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > > @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
> > > > #include <linux/xattr.h>
> > > > #include <linux/integrity.h>
> > > > #include <linux/evm.h>
> > > > +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> > > > #include <linux/magic.h>
> > > > #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
> > > >
> > > > @@ -566,9 +567,9 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires
> > > > * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
> > > > */
> > > > -int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
> > > > - size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
> > > > +static int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > + const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
> > > > + size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
> > > > {
> > > > const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
> > > >
> > > > @@ -598,8 +599,8 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
> > > > * the current value is valid.
> > > > */
> > > > -int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
> > > > +static int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > + const char *xattr_name)
> > > > {
> > > > /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
> > > > * there's no HMAC key loaded
> > > > @@ -649,9 +650,11 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > * Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
> > > > * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
> > > > * valid.
> > > > + *
> > > > + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
> > > > */
> > > > -int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
> > > > +static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > + const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
> > > > {
> > > > enum integrity_status evm_status;
> > > >
> > > > @@ -690,6 +693,24 @@ int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > return -EPERM;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > +/**
> > > > + * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
> > > > + * @idmap: idmap of the mount
> > > > + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
> > > > + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
> > > > + *
> > > > + * Prevent removing posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
> > > > + * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
> > > > + * valid.
> > > > + *
> > > > + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
> > > > + */
> > > > +static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > + const char *acl_name)
> > > > +{
> > > > + return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
> > > > +}
> > > > +
> > > > static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
> > > > {
> > > > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
> > > > @@ -738,9 +759,11 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
> > > > * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's
> > > > * i_mutex lock.
> > > > */
> > > > -void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
> > > > - const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
> > > > - int flags)
> > > > +static void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > + const char *xattr_name,
> > > > + const void *xattr_value,
> > > > + size_t xattr_value_len,
> > > > + int flags)
> > > > {
> > > > if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
> > > > return;
> > > > @@ -756,6 +779,21 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
> > > > evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > +/**
> > > > + * evm_inode_post_set_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
> > > > + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
> > > > + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
> > > > + * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls
> > > > + *
> > > > + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after setting
> > > > + * posix acls.
> > > > + */
> > > > +static void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
> > > > + struct posix_acl *kacl)
> > > > +{
> > > > + return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0);
> > > > +}
> > > > +
> > > > /**
> > > > * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
> > > > * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
> > > > @@ -766,7 +804,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
> > > > * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
> > > > * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
> > > > */
> > > > -void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
> > > > +static void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > + const char *xattr_name)
> > > > {
> > > > if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
> > > > return;
> > > > @@ -782,6 +821,22 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
> > > > evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > +/**
> > > > + * evm_inode_post_remove_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
> > > > + * @idmap: idmap of the mount
> > > > + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
> > > > + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
> > > > + *
> > > > + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after
> > > > + * removing posix acls.
> > > > + */
> > > > +static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > + struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > + const char *acl_name)
> > > > +{
> > > > + evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name);
> > > > +}
> > > > +
> > > > static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
> > > > {
> > > > @@ -805,8 +860,8 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
> > > > * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
> > > > */
> > > > -int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - struct iattr *attr)
> > > > +static int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > + struct iattr *attr)
> > > > {
> > > > unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
> > > > enum integrity_status evm_status;
> > > > @@ -853,8 +908,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
> > > > * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
> > > > */
> > > > -void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > - int ia_valid)
> > > > +static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > + struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
> > > > {
> > > > if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL))
> > > > return;
> > > > @@ -892,7 +947,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> > > > if (!evm_protected_xattrs)
> > > > return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > > >
> > > > - evm_xattr = xattr;
> > > > + evm_xattr = xattrs + integrity_blob_sizes.lbs_xattr;
> > > Please don't do this inline. Convention is to use a function,
> > > intergrity_xattrs() for this.
> > Ok.
> >
> > > >
> > > > xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
> > > > if (!xattr_data)
> > > > @@ -952,4 +1007,23 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
> > > > return error;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > +static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> > > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr),
> > > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr),
> > > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr),
> > > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl),
> > > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl),
> > > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl),
> > > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl),
> > > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr),
> > > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr),
> > > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr),
> > > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security),
> > > > +};
> > > > +
> > > > +void __init init_evm_lsm(void)
> > > > +{
> > > > + security_add_hooks(evm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(evm_hooks), "integrity");
> > > > +}
> > > > +
> > > > late_initcall(init_evm);
> > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
> > > > index bbadf974b31..952d5ea4e18 100644
> > > > --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
> > > > +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
> > > > @@ -179,12 +179,19 @@ static int __init integrity_lsm_init(void)
> > > > 0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
> > > >
> > > > init_ima_lsm();
> > > > + init_evm_lsm();
> > > > return 0;
> > > > }
> > > > +
> > > > +struct lsm_blob_sizes integrity_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> > > > + .lbs_xattr = 1,
> > > Really? 1 byte? Don't even think of storing number of elements in lbs_xattr.
> > > The linux_blob_size structure contains sizes of blobs, not number of elements.
> > Oh, I see it can be confusing.
> >
> > However, lbs_xattr does not help to position in the security blob but
> > in the new_xattrs array, allocated in security_inode_init_security()
> > (see below). Any suggestion on how to make this part better?
>
> On further review, your current use is perfectly reasonable.
> The patch that introduces lbs_xattr (not in this set, I see)
> needs to document the use so other LSMs can use is correctly.
Ok, will add it.
So far, Paul's review should be the last.
Thanks
Roberto
> > Thanks
> >
> > Roberto
> >
> > > > +};
> > > > +
> > > > DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = {
> > > > .name = "integrity",
> > > > .init = integrity_lsm_init,
> > > > .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
> > > > + .blobs = &integrity_blob_sizes,
> > > > };
> > > >
> > > > /*
> > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> > > > index c72d375a356..76e7eda6651 100644
> > > > --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> > > > +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> > > > @@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
> > > > #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX 4
> > > >
> > > > extern struct dentry *integrity_dir;
> > > > +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes integrity_blob_sizes;
> > > >
> > > > struct modsig;
> > > >
> > > > @@ -199,6 +200,14 @@ static inline void __init init_ima_lsm(void)
> > > > }
> > > > #endif
> > > >
> > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_EVM
> > > > +void __init init_evm_lsm(void);
> > > > +#else
> > > > +static inline void __init init_evm_lsm(void)
> > > > +{
> > > > +}
> > > > +#endif
> > > > +
> > > > #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
> > > >
> > > > int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
> > > > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> > > > index 9bc6a4ef758..74abf04feef 100644
> > > > --- a/security/security.c
> > > > +++ b/security/security.c
> > > > @@ -20,13 +20,13 @@
> > > > #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
> > > > #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> > > > #include <linux/integrity.h>
> > > > -#include <linux/evm.h>
> > > > #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
> > > > #include <linux/mman.h>
> > > > #include <linux/mount.h>
> > > > #include <linux/personality.h>
> > > > #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
> > > > #include <linux/string.h>
> > > > +#include <linux/xattr.h>
> > > > #include <linux/msg.h>
> > > > #include <net/flow.h>
> > > >
> > > > @@ -1662,8 +1662,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> > > > if (!initxattrs)
> > > > return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode,
> > > > dir, qstr, NULL);
> > > > - /* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */
> > > > - new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr + 2, sizeof(*new_xattrs),
> > > > + /* Allocate +1 for terminator. */
> > > > + new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr + 1, sizeof(*new_xattrs),
> > > > GFP_NOFS);
> > > > if (!new_xattrs)
> > > > return -ENOMEM;
> > > > @@ -1699,9 +1699,6 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> > > > if (!num_filled_xattrs)
> > > > goto out;
> > > >
> > > > - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs);
> > > > - if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
> > > > - goto out;
> > > > ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
> > > > out:
> > > > for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++)
> > > > @@ -2201,14 +2198,9 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
> > > > int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
> > > > {
> > > > - int ret;
> > > > -
> > > > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> > > > return 0;
> > > > - ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr);
> > > > - if (ret)
> > > > - return ret;
> > > > - return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr);
> > > > + return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr);
> > > > }
> > > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
> > > >
> > > > @@ -2272,9 +2264,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > >
> > > > if (ret == 1)
> > > > ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
> > > > - if (ret)
> > > > - return ret;
> > > > - return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
> > > > + return ret;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > /**
> > > > @@ -2293,15 +2283,10 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
> > > > struct posix_acl *kacl)
> > > > {
> > > > - int ret;
> > > > -
> > > > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> > > > return 0;
> > > > - ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name,
> > > > - kacl);
> > > > - if (ret)
> > > > - return ret;
> > > > - return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
> > > > + return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name,
> > > > + kacl);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > /**
> > > > @@ -2354,14 +2339,9 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
> > > > {
> > > > - int ret;
> > > > -
> > > > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> > > > return 0;
> > > > - ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
> > > > - if (ret)
> > > > - return ret;
> > > > - return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
> > > > + return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > /**
> > > > @@ -2397,7 +2377,6 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> > > > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> > > > return;
> > > > call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
> > > > - evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > /**
> > > > @@ -2458,9 +2437,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > > ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name);
> > > > if (ret == 1)
> > > > ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
> > > > - if (ret)
> > > > - return ret;
> > > > - return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
> > > > + return ret;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > /**
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