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Message-ID: <60788e5d-5c7c-1142-e554-c21d709acfd9@linaro.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 11:02:50 +0000
From: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@...aro.org>
To: Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>
Cc: syzbot <syzbot+8785e41224a3afd04321@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
adilger.kernel@...ger.ca, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, llvm@...ts.linux.dev,
nathan@...nel.org, ndesaulniers@...gle.com,
syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com, trix@...hat.com, tytso@....edu,
Lee Jones <joneslee@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [ext4?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in
ext4_group_desc_csum
On 3/7/23 10:39, Jan Kara wrote:
> Hi!
Hi!
Thanks for taking the time to review the proposal!
>
> On Wed 01-03-23 12:13:51, Tudor Ambarus wrote:
>> On 2/13/23 15:56, syzbot wrote:
>>> syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on:
>>>
>>> HEAD commit: ceaa837f96ad Linux 6.2-rc8
>>> git tree: upstream
>>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=11727cc7480000
>>> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=42ba4da8e1e6af9f
>>> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=8785e41224a3afd04321
>>> compiler: Debian clang version 15.0.7, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
>>> syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=14392a4f480000
>>>
>>> Downloadable assets:
>>> disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/88042f9b5fc8/disk-ceaa837f.raw.xz
>>> vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/9945b57ec9ee/vmlinux-ceaa837f.xz
>>> kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/72ff118ed96b/bzImage-ceaa837f.xz
>>> mounted in repro: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/dabec17b2679/mount_0.gz
>>>
>>> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
>>> Reported-by: syzbot+8785e41224a3afd04321@...kaller.appspotmail.com
>>>
>>> ==================================================================
>>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in crc16+0x1fb/0x280 lib/crc16.c:58
>>> Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807de00000 by task syz-executor.1/5339
>>>
>>> CPU: 1 PID: 5339 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc8-syzkaller #0
>>> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/21/2023
>>> Call Trace:
>>> <TASK>
>>> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
>>> dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
>>> print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline]
>>> print_report+0x163/0x4f0 mm/kasan/report.c:417
>>> kasan_report+0x13a/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:517
>>> crc16+0x1fb/0x280 lib/crc16.c:58
>>> ext4_group_desc_csum+0x90f/0xc50 fs/ext4/super.c:3187
>>> ext4_group_desc_csum_set+0x19b/0x240 fs/ext4/super.c:3210
>>> ext4_mb_clear_bb fs/ext4/mballoc.c:6027 [inline]
>>> ext4_free_blocks+0x1c57/0x3010 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:6173
>>> ext4_remove_blocks fs/ext4/extents.c:2527 [inline]
>>> ext4_ext_rm_leaf fs/ext4/extents.c:2710 [inline]
>>> ext4_ext_remove_space+0x289e/0x5270 fs/ext4/extents.c:2958
>>> ext4_ext_truncate+0x176/0x210 fs/ext4/extents.c:4416
>>> ext4_truncate+0xafa/0x1450 fs/ext4/inode.c:4342
>>> ext4_evict_inode+0xc40/0x1230 fs/ext4/inode.c:286
>>> evict+0x2a4/0x620 fs/inode.c:664
>>> do_unlinkat+0x4f1/0x930 fs/namei.c:4327
>>> __do_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4368 [inline]
>>> __se_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4366 [inline]
>>> __x64_sys_unlink+0x49/0x50 fs/namei.c:4366
>>> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
>>> do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
>>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
>>> RIP: 0033:0x7fbc85a8c0f9
>>> Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
>>> RSP: 002b:00007fbc86838168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000057
>>> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fbc85babf80 RCX: 00007fbc85a8c0f9
>>> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000000
>>> RBP: 00007fbc85ae7ae9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
>>> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
>>> R13: 00007ffd5743beaf R14: 00007fbc86838300 R15: 0000000000022000
>>> </TASK>
>>>
>>> The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
>>> page:ffffea0001f78000 refcount:0 mapcount:-128 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x7de00
>>> flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
>>> raw: 00fff00000000000 ffffea0001f86008 ffffea0001db2a08 0000000000000000
>>> raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
>>> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
>>> page_owner tracks the page as freed
>>> page last allocated via order 1, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 4855, tgid 4855 (sshd), ts 43553490210, free_ts 58249059760
>>> prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2531 [inline]
>>> get_page_from_freelist+0x3449/0x35c0 mm/page_alloc.c:4283
>>> __alloc_pages+0x291/0x7e0 mm/page_alloc.c:5549
>>> alloc_slab_page+0x6a/0x160 mm/slub.c:1851
>>> allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1998 [inline]
>>> new_slab+0x84/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2051
>>> ___slab_alloc+0xa85/0x10a0 mm/slub.c:3193
>>> __kmem_cache_alloc_bulk mm/slub.c:3951 [inline]
>>> kmem_cache_alloc_bulk+0x160/0x430 mm/slub.c:4026
>>> mt_alloc_bulk lib/maple_tree.c:157 [inline]
>>> mas_alloc_nodes+0x381/0x640 lib/maple_tree.c:1257
>>> mas_node_count_gfp lib/maple_tree.c:1316 [inline]
>>> mas_preallocate+0x131/0x350 lib/maple_tree.c:5724
>>> vma_expand+0x277/0x850 mm/mmap.c:541
>>> mmap_region+0xc43/0x1fb0 mm/mmap.c:2592
>>> do_mmap+0x8c9/0xf70 mm/mmap.c:1411
>>> vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1ce/0x2e0 mm/util.c:520
>>> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
>>> do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
>>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
>>> page last free stack trace:
>>> reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
>>> free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1446 [inline]
>>> free_pcp_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1496 [inline]
>>> free_unref_page_prepare+0xf3a/0x1040 mm/page_alloc.c:3369
>>> free_unref_page+0x37/0x3f0 mm/page_alloc.c:3464
>>> qlist_free_all+0x22/0x60 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:187
>>> kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x15a/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:294
>>> __kasan_slab_alloc+0x23/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:302
>>> kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
>>> slab_post_alloc_hook+0x68/0x390 mm/slab.h:761
>>> slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3452 [inline]
>>> kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x158/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:3497
>>> __alloc_skb+0xd6/0x2d0 net/core/skbuff.c:552
>>> alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1270 [inline]
>>> alloc_skb_with_frags+0xa8/0x750 net/core/skbuff.c:6194
>>> sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x919/0xa50 net/core/sock.c:2743
>>> unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x5b5/0x2050 net/unix/af_unix.c:1943
>>> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
>>> sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
>>> __sys_sendto+0x475/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2117
>>> __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2129 [inline]
>>> __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2125 [inline]
>>> __x64_sys_sendto+0xde/0xf0 net/socket.c:2125
>>> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
>>> do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
>>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
>>>
>>> Memory state around the buggy address:
>>> ffff88807ddfff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>>> ffff88807ddfff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>>>> ffff88807de00000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>>> ^
>>> ffff88807de00080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>>> ffff88807de00100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>>> ==================================================================
>>>
>>
>>
>> I think the patch from below should fix it.
>>
>> I printed le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_desc_size) and it was greater than
>> EXT4_MAX_DESC_SIZE. What I think it happens is that the contents of the
>> super block in the buffer get corrupted sometime after the .get_tree
>> (which eventually calls __ext4_fill_super()) is called. So instead of
>> relying on the contents of the buffer, we should instead rely on the
>> s_desc_size initialized at the __ext4_fill_super() time.
>>
>> If someone finds this good (or bad), or has a more in depth explanation,
>> please let me know, it will help me better understand the subsystem. In
>> the meantime I'll continue to investigate this and prepare a patch for
>> it.
>
> If there's something corrupting the superblock while the filesystem is
> mounted, we need to find what is corrupting the SB and fix *that*. Not try
> to paper over the problem by not using the on-disk data... Maybe journal
> replay is corrupting the value or something like that?
>
> Honza
>
Ok, I agree. First thing would be to understand the reproducer and to
simplify it if possible. I haven't yet decoded what the syz repro is
doing at
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproSyz&x=16ce3de4c80000
Will reply to this email thread once I understand what's happening. If
you or someone else can decode the syz repro faster than me, shoot.
Cheers,
ta
>> index 260c1b3e3ef2..91d41e84da32 100644
>> --- a/fs/ext4/super.c
>> +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
>> @@ -3182,11 +3182,9 @@ static __le16 ext4_group_desc_csum(struct super_block
>> *sb, __u32 block_group,
>> crc = crc16(crc, (__u8 *)gdp, offset);
>> offset += sizeof(gdp->bg_checksum); /* skip checksum */
>> /* for checksum of struct ext4_group_desc do the rest...*/
>> - if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb) &&
>> - offset < le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_desc_size))
>> + if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb) && offset < sbi->s_desc_size)
>> crc = crc16(crc, (__u8 *)gdp + offset,
>> - le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_desc_size) -
>> - offset);
>> + sbi->s_desc_size - offset);
>>
>> out:
>> return cpu_to_le16(crc);
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