Message-ID: <fb12a7efba525bbae26113666fc4418a10ee5adf.camel@intel.com>
Date:   Fri, 10 Mar 2023 21:43:03 +0000
From:   "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 33/41] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall

On Fri, 2023-03-10 at 13:00 -0800, Deepak Gupta wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 10, 2023 at 12:14:01AM +0000, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> > On Thu, 2023-03-09 at 13:08 -0800, Deepak Gupta wrote:
> > > On Thu, Mar 09, 2023 at 07:39:41PM +0000, Edgecombe, Rick P
> > > wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 2023-03-09 at 10:55 -0800, Deepak Gupta wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 05:22:07PM +0000, Szabolcs Nagy
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > The 02/27/2023 14:29, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> > > > > > > Previously, a new PROT_SHADOW_STACK was attempted,
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > ...
> > > > > > > So rather than repurpose two existing syscalls (mmap,
> > > > > > > madvise)
> > > > > > > that don't
> > > > > > > quite fit, just implement a new map_shadow_stack syscall
> > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > allow
> > > > > > > userspace to map and setup new shadow stacks in one step.
> > > > > > > While
> > > > > > > ucontext
> > > > > > > is the primary motivator, userspace may have other
> > > > > > > unforeseen
> > > > > > > reasons to
> > > > > > > setup it's own shadow stacks using the WRSS instruction.
> > > > > > > Towards
> > > > > > > this
> > > > > > > provide a flag so that stacks can be optionally setup
> > > > > > > securely
> > > > > > > for the
> > > > > > > common case of ucontext without enabling WRSS. Or
> > > > > > > potentially
> > > > > > > have the
> > > > > > > kernel set up the shadow stack in some new way.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > ...
> > > > > > > The following example demonstrates how to create a new
> > > > > > > shadow
> > > > > > > stack with
> > > > > > > map_shadow_stack:
> > > > > > > void *shstk = map_shadow_stack(addr, stack_size,
> > > > > > > SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN);
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > i think
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > mmap(addr, size, PROT_READ, MAP_ANON|MAP_SHADOW_STACK, -1,
> > > > > > 0);
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > could do the same with less disruption to users (new
> > > > > > syscalls
> > > > > > are harder to deal with than new flags). it would do the
> > > > > > guard page and initial token setup too (there is no flag
> > > > > > for
> > > > > > it but could be squeezed in).
> > > > > 
> > > > > Discussion on this topic in v6
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > 
> > 
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230223000340.GB945966@debug.ba.rivosinc.com/
> > > > > 
> > > > > Again I know earlier CET patches had protection flag and
> > > > > somehow
> > > > > due
> > > > > to pushback
> > > > > on mailing list,
> > > > >  it was adopted to go for special syscall because no one else
> > > > > had shadow stack.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Seeing a response from Szabolcs, I am assuming arm4 would
> > > > > also
> > > > > want
> > > > > to follow
> > > > > using mmap to manufacture shadow stack. For reference RFC
> > > > > patches
> > > > > for
> > > > > risc-v shadow stack,
> > > > > use a new protection flag = PROT_SHADOWSTACK.
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > 
> > 
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230213045351.3945824-1-debug@rivosinc.com/
> > > > > 
> > > > > I know earlier discussion had been that we let this go and do
> > > > > a
> > > > > re-
> > > > > factor later as other
> > > > > arch support trickle in. But as I thought more on this and I
> > > > > think it
> > > > > may just be
> > > > > messy from user mode point of view as well to have cognition
> > > > > of
> > > > > two
> > > > > different ways of
> > > > > creating shadow stack. One would be special syscall (in
> > > > > current
> > > > > libc)
> > > > > and another `mmap`
> > > > > (whenever future re-factor happens)
> > > > > 
> > > > > If it's not too late, it would be more wise to take `mmap`
> > > > > approach rather than special `syscall` approach.
> > > > 
> > > > There is sort of two things intermixed here when we talk about
> > > > a
> > > > PROT_SHADOW_STACK.
> > > > 
> > > > One is: what is the interface for specifying how the shadow
> > > > stack
> > > > should be provisioned with data? Right now there are two ways
> > > > supported, all zero or with an X86 shadow stack restore token
> > > > at
> > > > the
> > > > end. Then there was already some conversation about a third
> > > > type.
> > > > In
> > > > which case the question would be is using mmap MAP_ flags the
> > > > right
> > > > place for this? How many types of initialization will be needed
> > > > in
> > > > the
> > > > end and what is the overlap between the architectures?
> > > 
> > > First of all, arches can choose to have token at the bottom or
> > > not.
> > > 
> > > Token serve following purposes
> > >   - It allows one to put desired value in shadow stack pointer in
> > > safe/secure manner.
> > >     Note: x86 doesn't provide any opcode encoding to value in SSP
> > > register. So having
> > >     a token is kind of a necessity because x86 doesn't easily
> > > allow
> > > writing shadow stack.
> > > 
> > >   - A token at the bottom acts marker / barrier and can be useful
> > > in
> > > debugging
> > > 
> > >   - If (and a big *if*) we ever reach a point in future where
> > > return
> > > address is only pushed
> > >     on shadow stack (x86 should have motivation to do this
> > > because
> > > less uops on call/ret),
> > >     a token at the bottom (bottom means lower address) is
> > > ensuring
> > > sure shot way of getting
> > >     a fault when exhausted.
> > > 
> > > Current RISCV zisslpcfi proposal doesn't define CPU based tokens
> > > because it's RISC.
> > > It allows mechanisms using which software can define formatting
> > > of
> > > token for itself.
> > > Not sure of what ARM is doing.
> > 
> > Ok, so riscv doesn't need to have the kernel write the token, but
> > x86
> > does.
> > 
> > > 
> > > Now coming to the point of all zero v/s shadow stack token.
> > > Why not always have token at the bottom?
> > 
> > With WRSS you can setup the shadow stack however you want. So the
> > user
> > would then have to take care to erase the token if they didn't want
> > it.
> > Not the end of the world, but kind of clunky if there is no reason
> > for
> > it.
> 
> Yes but kernel always assumes the user is going to use the token. It'
> upto the user
> to decide whether they want to use the restore token or not. If
> they've WRSS capability
> security posture is anyways diluted. An attacker who would be clever
> enough to
> re-use `RSTORSSP` present in address space to restore using kernel
> prepared token, should
> anyways can be clever enough to use WRSS as well.
> 
> It kind of makes shadow stack creation simpler for kernel to always
> place the token.
> This point is irrespective of whether to use system call or mmap.

Think about like CRIU restoring the shadow stack, or other special
cases like that. Userspace can always overwrite the token, but this
involves some amount of extra work (extra writes, earlier faulting in
the page, etc). It is clunky and very negligibly worse.

> 
> > 
> > > 
> > > In case of x86, Why need for two ways and why not always have a
> > > token
> > > at the bottom.
> > > The way x86 is going, user mode is responsible for establishing
> > > shadow stack and thus
> > > whenever shadow stack is created then if x86 kernel
> > > implementation
> > > always place a token
> > > at the base/bottom.
> > 
> > There was also some discussion recently of adding a token AND an
> > end of
> > stack marker, as a potential solution for backtracing in ucontext
> > stacks. In this case it could cause an ABI break to just start
> > adding
> > the end of stack marker where the token was, and so would require a
> > new
> > map_shadow_stack flag.
> 
> Was this discussed why restore token itself can't be used as marker
> for
> end of stack (if we assume there is always going to be one at the
> bottom).
> It's a unique value. An address pointing to itself.

I thought the same thing at first, but it gets clobbered during the
pivot and push.

> 
> > 
> > > 
> > > Now user mode can do following:--
> > >   - If it has access to WRSS, it can sure go ahead and create a
> > > token
> > > of its choosing and
> > >     overwrite kernel created token. and then do RSTORSSP on it's
> > > own
> > > created token.
> > > 
> > >   - If it doesn't have access to WRSS (and dont need to create
> > > its
> > > own token), it can do
> > >     RSTORSSP on this. As soon as it does, no other thread in
> > > process
> > > can restore to it.
> > >     On `fork`, you get the same un-restorable token.
> > > 
> > > So why not always have a token at the bottom.
> > > This is my plan for riscv implementation as well (to have a token
> > > at
> > > the bottom)
> > > 
> > > > 
> > > > The other thing is: should shadow stack memory creation be
> > > > tightly
> > > > controlled? For example in x86 we limit this to anonymous
> > > > memory,
> > > > etc.
> > > > Some reasons for this are x86 specific, but some are not. So if
> > > > we
> > > > disallow most of the options why allow the interface to take
> > > > them?
> > > > And
> > > > then you are in the position of carefully maintaining a list of
> > > > not-
> > > > allowed options instead letting a list of allowed options sit
> > > > there.
> > > 
> > > I am new to linux kernel and thus may be not able to follow the
> > > argument of
> > > limiting to anonymous memory.
> > > 
> > > Why is limiting it to anonymous memory a problem. IIRC, ARM's
> > > PROT_MTE is applicable
> > > only to anonymous memory. I can probably find few more examples.
> > 
> > Oh I see, they have a special arch VMA flag VM_MTE_ALLOWED that
> > only
> > gets set if all the rules are followed. Then PROT_MTE can only be
> > set
> > on that to set VM_MTE. That is kind of nice because certain other
> > special situations can choose to support it.
> 
> That's because MTE is different. It allows to assign tags to existing
> virtual memory. So one need to know whether a memory can have tags
> assigned.
> 
> > 
> > It does take another arch vma flag though. For x86 I guess I would
> > need
> > to figure out how to squeeze VM_SHADOW_STACK into other flags to
> > have a
> > free flag to use the same method. It also only supports mprotect()
> > and
> > shadow stack would only want to support mmap(). And you still have
> > the
> > initialization stuff to plumb through. Yea, I think the PROT_MTE is
> > a
> > good thing to consider, but it's not super obvious to me how
> > similar
> > the logic would be for shadow stack.
> 
> I dont think you need another VMA flag. Memory tagging allows adding
> tags
> to existing virtual memory.

...need another VMA flag to use the existing mmap arch breakouts in the
same way as VM_MTE. Of course changing mmap makes other solutions
possible.

>  That's why having `mprotect` makes sense for MTE.
> In shadow stack case, there is no requirement of changing a shadow
> stack
> to regular memory or vice-versa. 

uffd needs mprotect internals. You might take a look at it in regards
to your VM_WRITE/mprotect blocking approach for riscv. I was imagining,
even if mmap was the syscall, mprotect() would not be blocked in the
x86 case at least. The mprotect() blocking is a separate thing than the
syscall, right?

> 
> All that's needed to change is `mmap`. `mprotect` should fail.
> Syscall
> approach gives that benefit by default because there is no protection
> flag
> for shadow stack.
> 
> I was giving example that any feature which gives new meaning to
> virtual memory
> has been able to work with existing memory mapping APIs without the
> need of new
> system call (including whether you're dealing with anonymous memory).
> 
> > 
> > The question I'm asking though is, not "can mmap code and rules be
> > changed to enforce the required limitations?". I think it is yes.
> > But
> > the question is "why is that plumbing better than a new syscall?".
> > I
> > guess to get a better idea, the mmap solution would need to get
> > POCed.
> > I had half done this at one point, but abandoned the approach.
> > 
> > For your question about why limit it, the special x86 case is the
> > Dirty=1,Write=0 PTE bit combination for shadow stacks. So for
> > shadow
> > stack you could have some confusion about whether a PTE is actually
> > dirty for writeback, etc. I wouldn't say it's known to be
> > impossible to
> > do MAP_SHARED, but it has not been fully analyzed enough to know
> > what
> > the changes would be. There were some solvable concrete issues that
> > tipped the scale as well. It was also not expected to be a common
> > usage, if at all.
> 
> I am not sure how confusion of D=1,W=0 is not completely taken away
> by
> syscall approach. It'll always be there. One can only do things to
> minimize
> the chances.
> 
> In case of syscall approach, syscall makes sure that 
> 
> `flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ABOVE4G`
> 
> This can be easily checked in arch specific landing function for
> mmap.

Right, this is why I listed two types of things in the mix here. The
memory features supported, and what the syscall is. You asked why limit
the memory features, so that is the explanation.

> 
> 
> Additionally, If you always have the token at base, you don't need
> that ABI
> between user and kernel.
> 
> 
> > 
> > The non-x86, general reasons for it, are for a smaller benefit. It
> > blocks a lot of ways shadow stack memory could be written to. Like
> > say
> > you have a memory mapped writable file, and you also map it shadow
> > stack. So it has better security properties depending on what your
> > threat model is.
> 
> I wouldn't say any architecture should allow such primitives. It kind
> of defeats
> the purpose for shadow stack. Yes if some sort of secure memory is
> needed, there may
> be new ISA extensions for that.

Yea, seems reasonable to prevent this regardless of the extra x86
reasons, if that is what you are saying. It depends on people's threat
models (as always in security).

> 
> > 
> > > 
> > > Eventually syscall will also go ahead and use memory management
> > > code
> > > to
> > > perform mapping. So I didn't understand the reasoning here. The
> > > way
> > > syscall
> > > can limit it to anonymous memory, why mmap can't do the same if
> > > it
> > > sees
> > > PROT_SHADOWSTACK.
> > > 
> > > > 
> > > > The only benefit I've heard is that it saves creating a new
> > > > syscall,
> > > > but it also saves several MAP_ flags. That, and that the RFC
> > > > for
> > > > riscv
> > > > did a PROT_SHADOW_STACK to start. So, yes, two people asked the
> > > > same
> > > > question, but I'm still not seeing any benefits. Can you give
> > > > the
> > > > pros
> > > > and cons please?
> > > 
> > > Again the way syscall will limit it to anonymous memory, Why mmap
> > > can't do same?
> > > There is precedence for it (like PROT_MTE is applicable only to
> > > anonymous memory)
> > > 
> > > So if it can be done, then why introduce a new syscall?
> > > 
> > > > 
> > > > BTW, in glibc map_shadow_stack is called from arch code. So I
> > > > think
> > > > userspace wise, for this to affect other architectures there
> > > > would
> > > > need
> > > > to be some code that could do things generically, with somehow
> > > > the
> > > > shadow stack pivot abstracted but the shadow stack allocation
> > > > not.
> > > 
> > > Agreed, yes it can be done in a way where it won't put tax on
> > > other
> > > architectures.
> > > 
> > > But what about fragmentation within x86. Will x86 always choose
> > > to
> > > use system call
> > > method map shadow stack. If future re-factor results in x86 also
> > > use
> > > `mmap` method.
> > > Isn't it a mess for x86 glibc to figure out what to do; whether
> > > to
> > > use system call
> > > or `mmap`?
> > > 
> > 
> > Ok, so this is the downside I guess. What happens if we want to
> > support
> > the other types of memory in the future and end up using mmap for
> > this?
> > Then we have 15-20 lines of extra syscall wrapping code to maintain
> > to
> > support legacy.
> > 
> > For the mmap solution, we have the downside of using extra MAP_
> > flags,
> > and *some* amount of currently unknown vm_flag and address range
> > logic,
> > plus mmap arch breakouts to add to core MM. Like I said earlier,
> > you
> > would need to POC it out to see how bad that looks and get some
> > core MM
> > feedback on the new type of MAP flag usage. But, syscalls being
> > pretty
> > straightforward, it would probably be *some* amount of added
> > complexity
> > _now_ to support something that might happen in the future. I'm not
> > seeing either one as a landslide win.
> > 
> > It's kind of an eternal software design philosophical question,
> > isn't
> > it? How much work should you do to prepare for things that might be
> > needed in the future? From what I've seen the balance in the kernel
> > seems to be to try not to paint yourself in to an ABI corner, but
> > otherwise let the kernel evolve naturally in response to real
> > usages.
> > If anyone wants to correct this, please do. But otherwise I think
> > the
> > new syscall is aligned with that.
> > 
> > TBH, you are making me wonder if I'm missing something. It seems
> > you
> > strongly don't prefer this approach, but I'm not hearing any huge
> > potential negative impacts. And you also say it won't tax the riscv
> > implementation. Is this just something just smells bad here? Or it
> > would shrink the riscv series?
> 
> No you're not missing anything. It's just wierdness of adding a
> system call
> which enforces certain MAP_XX flags and pretty much mapping API.
> And difference between architectures on how they will create shadow
> stack. + 
> if x86 chooses to use `mmap` in future, then there is ugliness in
> user mode to
> decide which method to choose.

Ok, I think I will leave it given it's entirely in arch/x86. It just
got some special error codes in the other thread today too.

> 
> And yes you got it right, to some extent there is my own selfishness
> playing out
> as well here to reduce riscv patches.
> 

Feel free to join the map_shadow_stack party. :)

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