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Message-ID: <9e341f7d-b7b6-0237-2a2d-8395eef8ca04@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2023 13:19:44 +0400
From: Ivan Orlov <ivan.orlov0322@...il.com>
To: ericvh@...il.com, lucho@...kov.net, asmadeus@...ewreck.org,
linux_oss@...debyte.com
Cc: v9fs-developer@...ts.sourceforge.net, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
skhan@...uxfoundation.org, himadrispandya@...il.com,
syzbot+cb1d16facb3cc90de5fb@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] 9P FS: Fix wild-memory-access write in v9fs_get_acl
On 3/11/23 10:34, Ivan Orlov wrote:
> KASAN reported the following issue:
> [ 36.825817][ T5923] BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in v9fs_get_acl+0x1a4/0x390
> [ 36.827479][ T5923] Write of size 4 at addr 9fffeb37f97f1c00 by task syz-executor798/5923
> [ 36.829303][ T5923]
> [ 36.829846][ T5923] CPU: 0 PID: 5923 Comm: syz-executor798 Not tainted 6.2.0-syzkaller-18302-g596b6b709632 #0
> [ 36.832110][ T5923] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/21/2023
> [ 36.834464][ T5923] Call trace:
> [ 36.835196][ T5923] dump_backtrace+0x1c8/0x1f4
> [ 36.836229][ T5923] show_stack+0x2c/0x3c
> [ 36.837100][ T5923] dump_stack_lvl+0xd0/0x124
> [ 36.838103][ T5923] print_report+0xe4/0x4c0
> [ 36.839068][ T5923] kasan_report+0xd4/0x130
> [ 36.840052][ T5923] kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2a4
> [ 36.841199][ T5923] __kasan_check_write+0x2c/0x3c
> [ 36.842216][ T5923] v9fs_get_acl+0x1a4/0x390
> [ 36.843232][ T5923] v9fs_mount+0x77c/0xa5c
> [ 36.844163][ T5923] legacy_get_tree+0xd4/0x16c
> [ 36.845173][ T5923] vfs_get_tree+0x90/0x274
> [ 36.846137][ T5923] do_new_mount+0x25c/0x8c8
> [ 36.847066][ T5923] path_mount+0x590/0xe58
> [ 36.848147][ T5923] __arm64_sys_mount+0x45c/0x594
> [ 36.849273][ T5923] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0
> [ 36.850421][ T5923] el0_svc_common+0x138/0x258
> [ 36.851397][ T5923] do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198
> [ 36.852398][ T5923] el0_svc+0x58/0x168
> [ 36.853224][ T5923] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0
> [ 36.854293][ T5923] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
>
> Calling '__v9fs_get_acl' method in 'v9fs_get_acl' creates the
> following chain of function calls:
>
> __v9fs_get_acl
> v9fs_fid_get_acl
> v9fs_fid_xattr_get
> p9_client_xattrwalk
>
> Function p9_client_xattrwalk accepts a pointer to u64-typed
> variable attr_size and puts some u64 value into it. However,
> after the executing the p9_client_xattrwalk, in some circumstances
> we assign the value of u64-typed variable 'attr_size' to the
> variable 'retval', which we will return. However, the type of
> 'retval' is ssize_t, and if the value of attr_size is larger
> than SSIZE_MAX, we will face the signed type overflow. If the
> overflow occurs, the result of v9fs_fid_xattr_get may be
> negative, but not classified as an error. When we try to allocate
> an acl with 'broken' size we receive an error, but don't process
> it. When we try to free this acl, we face the 'wild-memory-access'
> error (because it wasn't allocated).
>
> This patch will add new condition to the 'v9fs_fid_xattr_get'
> function, so it will return an EOVERFLOW error if the 'attr_size'
> is larger than SSIZE_MAX.
>
> In this version of the patch I removed explicit type conversion and
> added separate condition to check the possible overflow and return
> an error (in v1 version I've just modified the existing condition).
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+cb1d16facb3cc90de5fb@...kaller.appspotmail.com
> Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=fbbef66d9e4d096242f3617de5d14d12705b4659
> Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <ivan.orlov0322@...il.com>
> ---
> fs/9p/xattr.c | 10 +++++++---
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/9p/xattr.c b/fs/9p/xattr.c
> index 50f7f3f6b55e..6affd6b3f5e6 100644
> --- a/fs/9p/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/9p/xattr.c
> @@ -35,10 +35,14 @@ ssize_t v9fs_fid_xattr_get(struct p9_fid *fid, const char *name,
> return retval;
> }
> if (attr_size > buffer_size) {
> - if (!buffer_size) /* request to get the attr_size */
> - retval = attr_size;
> - else
> + if (!buffer_size) {/* request to get the attr_size */
> + if (attr_size > SSIZE_MAX)
> + retval = -EOVERFLOW;
> + else
> + retval = attr_size;
> + } else {
> retval = -ERANGE;
> + }
> } else {
> iov_iter_truncate(&to, attr_size);
> retval = p9_client_read(attr_fid, 0, &to, &err);
Tested via syzkaller, this patch fixes the bug (see patch testing requests):
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=fbbef66d9e4d096242f3617de5d14d12705b4659
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