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Message-ID: <CAEivzxcbp61xdDL6mfoMBu4t5C3auyDO_-ec7wHu0EbN=zh2WQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2023 12:06:46 +0100
From: Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@...onical.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: davem@...emloft.net, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>, jmorris@...ei.org,
serge@...lyn.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v2] scm: fix MSG_CTRUNC setting condition for SO_PASSSEC
On Mon, Mar 13, 2023 at 9:43 PM Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Mar 13, 2023 at 7:40 AM Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
> <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@...onical.com> wrote:
> >
> > +CC security subsystem folks
> >
> > On Mon, Mar 13, 2023 at 12:32 PM Alexander Mikhalitsyn
> > <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@...onical.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Currently, kernel would set MSG_CTRUNC flag if msg_control buffer
> > > wasn't provided and SO_PASSCRED was set or if there was pending SCM_RIGHTS.
> > >
> > > For some reason we have no corresponding check for SO_PASSSEC.
> > >
> > > In the recvmsg(2) doc we have:
> > > MSG_CTRUNC
> > > indicates that some control data was discarded due to lack
> > > of space in the buffer for ancillary data.
> > >
> > > So, we need to set MSG_CTRUNC flag for all types of SCM.
> > >
> > > This change can break applications those don't check MSG_CTRUNC flag.
>
> Unless I'm missing something I don't think this will actually result
> in a userspace visible change as put_cmsg() already has a number of
> checks which set the MSG_CTRUNC flag if necessary (including if no
> control buffer is passed, e.g. msg_control == NULL).
Yes you are right. I found this check suspicious while working on
SCM_PIDFD (which is not yet submitted to LKML),
I think it is worth fixing that check anyway just for consistency reasons.
>
> Regardless, it looks fine to me.
>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Thanks, Paul!
Regards,
Alex
>
> > > Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
> > > Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
> > > Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
> > > Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
> > > Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>
> > > Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
> > > Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@...onical.com>
> > >
> > > v2:
> > > - commit message was rewritten according to Eric's suggestion
> > > ---
> > > include/net/scm.h | 13 ++++++++++++-
> > > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> > > index 1ce365f4c256..585adc1346bd 100644
> > > --- a/include/net/scm.h
> > > +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> > > @@ -105,16 +105,27 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
> > > }
> > > }
> > > }
> > > +
> > > +static inline bool scm_has_secdata(struct socket *sock)
> > > +{
> > > + return test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
> > > +}
> > > #else
> > > static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> > > { }
> > > +
> > > +static inline bool scm_has_secdata(struct socket *sock)
> > > +{
> > > + return false;
> > > +}
> > > #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
> > >
> > > static __inline__ void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
> > > struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
> > > {
> > > if (!msg->msg_control) {
> > > - if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) || scm->fp)
> > > + if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) || scm->fp ||
> > > + scm_has_secdata(sock))
> > > msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
> > > scm_destroy(scm);
> > > return;
> > > --
> > > 2.34.1
>
> --
> paul-moore.com
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