linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/1] x86/hyperv: Block root partition functionality in a Confidential VM

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Date:   Fri, 17 Mar 2023 10:57:59 +0000
From:   Wei Liu <wei.liu@...nel.org>
To:     Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>
Cc:     kys@...rosoft.com, wei.liu@...nel.org, decui@...rosoft.com,
        tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de,
        dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, hpa@...or.com, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] x86/hyperv: Block root partition functionality in a
 Confidential VM

On Wed, Mar 15, 2023 at 08:34:13AM -0700, Michael Kelley wrote:
> Hyper-V should never specify a VM that is a Confidential VM and also
> running in the root partition.  Nonetheless, explicitly block such a
> combination to guard against a compromised Hyper-V maliciously trying to
> exploit root partition functionality in a Confidential VM to expose
> Confidential VM secrets. No known bug is being fixed, but the attack
> surface for Confidential VMs on Hyper-V is reduced.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>

Applied to hyperv-fixes. Thanks.

> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 12 ++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
> index ff348eb..ac630ec 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
> @@ -356,12 +356,16 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)
>  	 * To mirror what Windows does we should extract CPU management
>  	 * features and use the ReservedIdentityBit to detect if Linux is the
>  	 * root partition. But that requires negotiating CPU management
> -	 * interface (a process to be finalized).
> +	 * interface (a process to be finalized). For now, use the privilege
> +	 * flag as the indicator for running as root.
>  	 *
> -	 * For now, use the privilege flag as the indicator for running as
> -	 * root.
> +	 * Hyper-V should never specify running as root and as a Confidential
> +	 * VM. But to protect against a compromised/malicious Hyper-V trying
> +	 * to exploit root behavior to expose Confidential VM memory, ignore
> +	 * the root partition setting if also a Confidential VM.
>  	 */
> -	if (cpuid_ebx(HYPERV_CPUID_FEATURES) & HV_CPU_MANAGEMENT) {
> +	if ((ms_hyperv.priv_high & HV_CPU_MANAGEMENT) &&
> +	    !(ms_hyperv.priv_high & HV_ISOLATION)) {
>  		hv_root_partition = true;
>  		pr_info("Hyper-V: running as root partition\n");
>  	}
> -- 
> 1.8.3.1
>