linux-kernel - [tip: x86/shstk] x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace

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Message-ID: <167933036208.5837.13674378381944912365.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date:   Mon, 20 Mar 2023 16:39:22 -0000
From:   "tip-bot2 for Rick Edgecombe" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To:     linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@...nel.org>,
        Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>,
        John Allen <john.allen@....com>, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/shstk] x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace

The following commit has been merged into the x86/shstk branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     44600eec3f2b708c711e811339e1034d9f0d0680
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/44600eec3f2b708c711e811339e1034d9f0d0680
Author:        Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
AuthorDate:    Sat, 18 Mar 2023 17:15:29 -07:00
Committer:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
CommitterDate: Mon, 20 Mar 2023 09:01:12 -07:00

x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace

For the current shadow stack implementation, shadow stacks contents can't
easily be provisioned with arbitrary data. This property helps apps
protect themselves better, but also restricts any potential apps that may
want to do exotic things at the expense of a little security.

The x86 shadow stack feature introduces a new instruction, WRSS, which
can be enabled to write directly to shadow stack memory from userspace.
Allow it to get enabled via the prctl interface.

Only enable the userspace WRSS instruction, which allows writes to
userspace shadow stacks from userspace. Do not allow it to be enabled
independently of shadow stack, as HW does not support using WRSS when
shadow stack is disabled.

>>From a fault handler perspective, WRSS will behave very similar to WRUSS,
which is treated like a user access from a #PF err code perspective.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@...nel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@....com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230319001535.23210-35-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h |  1 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c           | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
index 7dfd9dc..e314956 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
@@ -28,5 +28,6 @@
 
 /* ARCH_SHSTK_ features bits */
 #define ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK		(1ULL <<  0)
+#define ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS			(1ULL <<  1)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index 6d2531c..01b4566 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -360,6 +360,47 @@ void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	unmap_shadow_stack(shstk->base, shstk->size);
 }
 
+static int wrss_control(bool enable)
+{
+	u64 msrval;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/*
+	 * Only enable WRSS if shadow stack is enabled. If shadow stack is not
+	 * enabled, WRSS will already be disabled, so don't bother clearing it
+	 * when disabling.
+	 */
+	if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* Already enabled/disabled? */
+	if (features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS) == enable)
+		return 0;
+
+	fpregs_lock_and_load();
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval);
+
+	if (enable) {
+		features_set(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS);
+		msrval |= CET_WRSS_EN;
+	} else {
+		features_clr(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS);
+		if (!(msrval & CET_WRSS_EN))
+			goto unlock;
+
+		msrval &= ~CET_WRSS_EN;
+	}
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval);
+
+unlock:
+	fpregs_unlock();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int shstk_disable(void)
 {
 	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
@@ -376,7 +417,7 @@ static int shstk_disable(void)
 	fpregs_unlock();
 
 	shstk_free(current);
-	features_clr(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+	features_clr(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK | ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS);
 
 	return 0;
 }