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Message-ID: <84d46fb108f6ce2a322b6486529fc6dd0f8deea5.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2023 16:35:33 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
"herbert@...dor.apana.org.au" <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com" <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
"paul@...l-moore.com" <paul@...l-moore.com>,
"jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"serge@...lyn.com" <serge@...lyn.com>,
"pvorel@...e.cz" <pvorel@...e.cz>,
Kanth Ghatraju <kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com>,
Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
"erpalmer@...ux.vnet.ibm.com" <erpalmer@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"coxu@...hat.com" <coxu@...hat.com>,
"keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 5/6] KEYS: CA link restriction
On Mon, 2023-03-20 at 20:28 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 05:35:05PM +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >
> >
> > > On Mar 11, 2023, at 3:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 11:46:51AM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > >> Add a new link restriction. Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
> > >> based on the key to be added being a CA.
> > >>
> > >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
> > >> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> > >> ---
> > >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > >> include/crypto/public_key.h | 15 ++++++++++++
> > >> 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
> > >>
> > >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > >> index 6b1ac5f5896a..48457c6f33f9 100644
> > >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > >> @@ -108,6 +108,44 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
> > >> return ret;
> > >> }
> > >>
> > >> +/**
> > >> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
> > >> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
> > >> + * @type: The type of key being added.
> > >> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
> > >> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
> > >> + *
> > >> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
> > >> + * certificate as being ok to link.
> > >> + *
> > >> + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
> > >> + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
> > >> + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
> > >> + * the signature check cannot be performed.
> > >> + */
> > >> +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> > >> + const struct key_type *type,
> > >> + const union key_payload *payload,
> > >> + struct key *trust_keyring)
> > >> +{
> > >> + const struct public_key *pkey;
> > >> +
> > >> + if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
> > >> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > >> +
> > >> + pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
> > >> + if (!pkey)
> > >> + return -ENOPKG;
> > >> + if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > >> + return -ENOKEY;
> > >> + if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > >> + return -ENOKEY;
> > >> + if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > >> + return -ENOKEY;
> > >
> > > nit: would be more readable, if conditions were separated by
> > > empty lines.
> >
> > Ok, I will make this change in the next round. Thanks.
>
> Cool! Mimi have you tested these patches with IMA applied?
Yes, it's working as expected.
--
Mimi
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