linux-kernel - [tip: x86/urgent] x86/mm: Do not shuffle CPU entry areas without KASLR

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Date:   Wed, 22 Mar 2023 18:01:28 -0000
From:   tip-bot2 for Michal Koutný 
        <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To:     linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     mkoutny@...e.com, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/urgent] x86/mm: Do not shuffle CPU entry areas without KASLR

The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     a3f547addcaa10df5a226526bc9e2d9a94542344
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/a3f547addcaa10df5a226526bc9e2d9a94542344
Author:        Michal Koutný <mkoutny@...e.com>
AuthorDate:    Mon, 06 Mar 2023 20:31:44 +01:00
Committer:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
CommitterDate: Wed, 22 Mar 2023 10:42:47 -07:00

x86/mm: Do not shuffle CPU entry areas without KASLR

The commit 97e3d26b5e5f ("x86/mm: Randomize per-cpu entry area") fixed
an omission of KASLR on CPU entry areas. It doesn't take into account
KASLR switches though, which may result in unintended non-determinism
when a user wants to avoid it (e.g. debugging, benchmarking).

Generate only a single combination of CPU entry areas offsets -- the
linear array that existed prior randomization when KASLR is turned off.

Since we have 3f148f331814 ("x86/kasan: Map shadow for percpu pages on
demand") and followups, we can use the more relaxed guard
kasrl_enabled() (in contrast to kaslr_memory_enabled()).

Fixes: 97e3d26b5e5f ("x86/mm: Randomize per-cpu entry area")
Signed-off-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@...e.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230306193144.24605-1-mkoutny%40suse.com
---
 arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
index 7316a82..e91500a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
 #include <asm/desc.h>
 #include <asm/kasan.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct entry_stack_page, entry_stack_storage);
 
@@ -29,6 +30,12 @@ static __init void init_cea_offsets(void)
 	unsigned int max_cea;
 	unsigned int i, j;
 
+	if (!kaslr_enabled()) {
+		for_each_possible_cpu(i)
+			per_cpu(_cea_offset, i) = i;
+		return;
+	}
+
 	max_cea = (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE) / CPU_ENTRY_AREA_SIZE;
 
 	/* O(sodding terrible) */