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Message-ID: <20230322224735.GAZBuFh9ld6FuYEyoH@fat_crate.local>
Date:   Wed, 22 Mar 2023 23:47:35 +0100
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To:     Usama Arif <usama.arif@...edance.com>
Cc:     dwmw2@...radead.org, tglx@...utronix.de, kim.phillips@....com,
        brgerst@...il.com, piotrgorski@...hyos.org,
        oleksandr@...alenko.name, arjan@...ux.intel.com, mingo@...hat.com,
        dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, hpa@...or.com, x86@...nel.org,
        pbonzini@...hat.com, paulmck@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        rcu@...r.kernel.org, mimoja@...oja.de, hewenliang4@...wei.com,
        thomas.lendacky@....com, seanjc@...gle.com, pmenzel@...gen.mpg.de,
        fam.zheng@...edance.com, punit.agrawal@...edance.com,
        simon.evans@...edance.com, liangma@...ngbit.com,
        gpiccoli@...lia.com, David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Sabin Rapan <sabrapan@...zon.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 8/8] x86/smpboot: Allow parallel bringup for SEV-ES

On Tue, Mar 21, 2023 at 07:40:08PM +0000, Usama Arif wrote:
> From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
> 
> Enable parallel bringup for SEV-ES guests. The APs can't actually
> execute the CPUID instruction directly during early startup, but they
> can make the GHCB call directly instead, just as the VC trap handler
> would do.
> 
> Thanks to Sabin for talking me through the way this works.
> 
> Suggested-by: Sabin Rapan <sabrapan@...zon.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
> Signed-off-by: Usama Arif <usama.arif@...edance.com>
> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/coco/core.c              |  5 ++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h       |  1 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h |  3 +++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h        |  5 +++-
>  arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S         | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c         | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  6 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

How's the below (totally untested yet but it builds) instead after
applying those two prerequisites:

https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230318115634.9392-1-bp@alien8.de

---
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
index b63be696b776..0abf8a39cee1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
 	/* GHCBData[63:12] */				\
 	(((u64)(v) & GENMASK_ULL(63, 12)) >> 12)
 
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 /*
  * SNP Page State Change Operation
  *
@@ -161,6 +162,8 @@ struct snp_psc_desc {
 
 #define GHCB_RESP_CODE(v)		((v) & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK)
 
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
 /*
  * Error codes related to GHCB input that can be communicated back to the guest
  * by setting the lower 32-bits of the GHCB SW_EXITINFO1 field to 2.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 1335781e4976..516bcb4f0719 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void);
 bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp);
 void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void);
 int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, unsigned long *fw_err);
+u32 sev_get_cpuid_0b(void);
 #else
 static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
 static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
@@ -224,6 +225,7 @@ static inline int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *in
 {
 	return -ENOTTY;
 }
+static inline u32 sev_get_cpuid_0b(void) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
index defe76ee9e64..1584f04a7007 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
@@ -204,7 +204,10 @@ extern unsigned int smpboot_control;
 /* Control bits for startup_64 */
 #define STARTUP_APICID_CPUID_0B	0x80000000
 #define STARTUP_APICID_CPUID_01	0x40000000
+#define STARTUP_APICID_SEV_ES	0x20000000
 
-#define STARTUP_PARALLEL_MASK (STARTUP_APICID_CPUID_01 | STARTUP_APICID_CPUID_0B)
+#define STARTUP_PARALLEL_MASK (STARTUP_APICID_CPUID_01 | \
+			       STARTUP_APICID_CPUID_0B | \
+			       STARTUP_APICID_SEV_ES)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_SMP_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index ff3a5f008d8a..574bd56288bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
 #include <asm/smp.h>
+#include <asm/sev-common.h>
 
 /*
  * We are not able to switch in one step to the final KERNEL ADDRESS SPACE
@@ -242,6 +243,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	 *
 	 * Bit 31	STARTUP_APICID_CPUID_0B flag (use CPUID 0x0b)
 	 * Bit 30	STARTUP_APICID_CPUID_01 flag (use CPUID 0x01)
+	 * Bit 29	STARTUP_APICID_SEV_ES flag (CPUID 0x0b via GHCB MSR)
 	 * Bit 0-24	CPU# if STARTUP_APICID_CPUID_xx flags are not set
 	 */
 	movl	smpboot_control(%rip), %ecx
@@ -249,6 +251,10 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	jnz	.Luse_cpuid_0b
 	testl	$STARTUP_APICID_CPUID_01, %ecx
 	jnz	.Luse_cpuid_01
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	testl	$STARTUP_APICID_SEV_ES, %ecx
+	jnz	.Luse_sev_cpuid_0b
+#endif
 	andl	$0x0FFFFFFF, %ecx
 	jmp	.Lsetup_cpu
 
@@ -259,6 +265,13 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	shr	$24, %edx
 	jmp	.Lsetup_AP
 
+.Luse_sev_cpuid_0b:
+	call sev_get_cpuid_0b
+	test %eax, %eax
+	jz 1f
+	movl %eax, %edx
+	jmp .Lsetup_AP
+
 .Luse_cpuid_0b:
 	mov	$0x0B, %eax
 	xorl	%ecx, %ecx
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index ce371f62167b..96ff63cb5622 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -1142,6 +1142,24 @@ void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void)
 	apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu = wakeup_cpu_via_vmgexit;
 }
 
+u32 sev_get_cpuid_0b(void)
+{
+	u32 eax, edx;
+
+	/* Request CPUID 0xB_EDX through GHCB protocol */
+	native_wrmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB,
+		     (GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EDX << 30) | GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REQ,
+		     0xb);
+	VMGEXIT();
+
+	native_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB, eax, edx);
+
+	if ((eax & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK) == GHCB_MSR_CPUID_RESP)
+		return edx;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int __init sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh)
 {
 	u16 startup_cs, startup_ip;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index 0dba5c247be0..6734c26ad848 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
 #include <asm/hw_irq.h>
 #include <asm/stackprotector.h>
 #include <asm/sev.h>
+#include <asm/coco.h>
 
 /* representing HT siblings of each logical CPU */
 DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(cpumask_var_t, cpu_sibling_map);
@@ -1513,15 +1514,36 @@ void __init smp_prepare_cpus_common(void)
  * We can do 64-bit AP bringup in parallel if the CPU reports its APIC
  * ID in CPUID (either leaf 0x0B if we need the full APIC ID in X2APIC
  * mode, or leaf 0x01 if 8 bits are sufficient). Otherwise it's too
- * hard. And not for SEV-ES guests because they can't use CPUID that
- * early.
+ * hard.
  */
 static bool prepare_parallel_bringup(void)
 {
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) || cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT))
+	bool has_sev_es = false;
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
 		return false;
 
-	if (x2apic_mode) {
+	/*
+	 * Encrypted guests other than SEV-ES (in the future) will need to
+	 * implement an early way of finding the APIC ID, since they will
+	 * presumably block direct CPUID too. Be kind to our future selves
+	 * by warning here instead of just letting them break. Parallel
+	 * startup doesn't have to be in the first round of enabling patches
+	 * for any such technology.
+	 */
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) {
+		switch (cc_vendor) {
+		case CC_VENDOR_AMD:
+			has_sev_es = true;
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			pr_info("Disabling parallel bringup due to guest state encryption\n");
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (x2apic_mode || has_sev_es) {
 		if (boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level < 0x0b)
 			return false;
 
@@ -1530,8 +1552,13 @@ static bool prepare_parallel_bringup(void)
 			return false;
 		}
 
-		pr_debug("Using CPUID 0xb for parallel CPU startup\n");
-		smpboot_control = STARTUP_APICID_CPUID_0B;
+		if (has_sev_es) {
+			pr_debug("Using SEV-ES CPUID 0xb for parallel CPU startup\n");
+			smpboot_control = STARTUP_APICID_SEV_ES;
+		} else {
+			pr_debug("Using CPUID 0xb for parallel CPU startup\n");
+			smpboot_control = STARTUP_APICID_CPUID_0B;
+		}
 	} else {
 		/* Without X2APIC, what's in CPUID 0x01 should suffice. */
 		if (boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level < 0x01)



-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

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