linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v19 0/4] overlayfs override

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Message-ID: <CAOQ4uxgH905R1dkQy5=tuG4nnB-p2XUWcf91vvYbfu2DyftzPw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 22 Mar 2023 14:48:29 +0200
From:   Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>
To:     Johannes Segitz <jsegitz@...e.com>
Cc:     Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
        Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
        David Anderson <dvander@...gle.com>,
        Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        overlayfs <linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        kernel-team <kernel-team@...roid.com>, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
        paulmoore@...rosoft.com, luca.boccassi@...rosoft.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix

On Wed, Mar 22, 2023 at 9:28 AM Johannes Segitz <jsegitz@...e.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Mar 11, 2022 at 03:52:54PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Fri, Mar 11, 2022 at 9:01 AM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com> wrote:
> > > Agreed. After going through the patch set, I was wondering what's the
> > > overall security model and how to visualize that.
> > >
> > > So probably there needs to be a documentation patch which explains
> > > what's the new security model and how does it work.
> >
> > Yes, of course.  I'll be sure to add a section to the existing docs.
> >
> > > Also think both in terms of DAC and MAC. (Instead of just focussing too
> > > hard on SELinux).
> >
> > Definitely.  Most of what I've been thinking about the past day or so
> > has been how to properly handle some of the DAC/capability issues; I
> > have yet to start playing with the code, but for the most part I think
> > the MAC/SELinux bits are already working properly.
> >
> > > My understanding is that in current model, some of the overlayfs
> > > operations require priviliges. So mounter is supposed to be priviliged
> > > and does the operation on underlying layers.
> > >
> > > Now in this new model, there will be two levels of check. Both overlay
> > > level and underlying layer checks will happen in the context of task
> > > which is doing the operation. So first of all, all tasks will need
> > > to have enough priviliges to be able to perform various operations
> > > on lower layer.
> > >
> > > If we do checks at both the levels in with the creds of calling task,
> > > I guess that probably is fine. (But will require a closer code inspection
> > > to make sure there is no privilege escalation both for mounter as well
> > > calling task).
> >
> > I have thoughts on this, but I don't think I'm yet in a position to
> > debate this in depth just yet; I still need to finish poking around
> > the code and playing with a few things :)
> >
> > It may take some time before I'm back with patches, but I appreciate
> > all of the tips and insight - thank you!
>
> Let me resurrect this discussion. With
> https://github.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/1e8688ea694393c9d918939322b72dfb44a01792
> the Fedora policy changed kernel_t to a confined domain. This means that
> many overlayfs setups that are created in initrd will now run into issues,
> as it will have kernel_t as part of the saved credentials. So while the
> original use case that inspired the patch set was probably not very common
> that now changed.

I don't remember anyone rejecting the patches on the account that
the Android use case is not important. It was never the issue.

>
> It's tricky to work around this. Loading a policy in initrd causes a lot of
> issues now that kernel_t isn't unconfined anymore. Once the policy is
> loaded by systemd changing the mounts is tough since we use it for /etc and
> at this time systemd already has open file handles for policy files in
> /etc.
>

I've already explained several times on this thread what needs to be
done in order to move forward - express the security model and
explain why it is safe.

If the security guys are going to be in LSS in Vancouver, perhaps
we can have a meetup with overlayfs developers on the overlap
day with LSFMM (May 10) to try and figure out a path forward.

Thanks,
Amir.