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Message-ID: <ZByO9RP4IkEshOqJ@google.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 10:40:05 -0700
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH kernel v4] KVM: SEV: Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES
On Fri, Feb 03, 2023, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> While at this, move set_/clr_dr_intercepts to .c and move #DB intercept
> next to DR7 intercept.
Please do non-trivial code movement in separate patches unless the functional change
is trivial. Moving and changing at the same time makes the patch difficult to review.
> @@ -52,9 +53,14 @@ module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
> /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
> static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
> module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
> +
> +/* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
> +static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
> +module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0644);
Needs to be 0444, otherwise userspace can turn on the knob after KVM is loaded,
which would allow enabling the feature on unsupported platforms, amongst many
other problems.
> void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 60c7c880266b..f8e222bee22a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -671,6 +671,65 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
>
> }
>
> +static void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> + struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
> + bool intercept;
> +
> + if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
> + }
> +
> + if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
> + struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
> +
> + intercept = !(save->sev_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP);
Blech, the VMCB vs. SEV and SEV-ES code is a mess. E.g. init_vmcb() does
/*
* Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
* trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
* We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
* as VMware does. Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests as KVM can't
* decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
*/
if (enable_vmware_backdoor && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
but then sev_es_init_vmcb() also does:
/* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */
clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
DR interception is a similar trainwreck. svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs() bails if
guest_state_protected is true, i.e. is a nop for SEV-ES guests, but only after
the vCPU has done LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA. IIUC, that's nonsensical because even before
guest state is encrypted, #DB will be reflected as #VC into the guest. And, again
IIUC, except for DR7, DRs are never intercepted for SEV-ES guests and so trying
to debug from the host is futile as the guest can clobber DRs at any time.
Similarly, flowing into dr_interception() on an SEV-ES VMGEXITis just dumb. KVM
_knows_ it can't give the guest control of DR7, but it mucks with the intercepts
anyways. That the GHCB spec even allows SVM_EXIT_{READ,WRITE}_DR7 is just asinine,
but that's a moot point. Anyways, the GHCB spec's "suggestion" effectively says
KVM's responsibility is purely to make a read of DR7 return the last written value.
And of course KVM's disaster of a flow doesn't even do that unless the host is
debugging the guest.
Currently, hardware debug traps aren’t supported for an SEV-ES guest. The hypervisor
must set the intercept for both read and write of the debug control register (DR7).
With the intercepts in place, the #VC handler will be invoked when the guest accesses
DR7. For a write to DR7, the #VC handler should perform Standard VMGExit processing.
The #VC handler must not update the actual DR7 register, but rather it should cache
the DR7 value being written.
I bring this up because of the subtle dependency that checking SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP
creates: set_dr_intercepts() needs to be called after sev_init_vmcb(). I believe
this approach also fails to handle intrahost migration; at the very least, what
exactly will happen when sev_migrate_from() invokes sev_init_vmcb() is unclear.
And I really don't want to pile even more gunk on top of the existing mess.
So, can you (and by "you" I really mean "the folks at AMD working on SEV stuff")
start with the below diff (not intended to be a single patch), disallow
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug() entirely for SEV-ES guests (will likely
take some back and forth to figure out how we want to do this), and then fill
in the blanks? I.e. get KVM to a state where all the intercept shenanigans for
SEV and SEV-ES are reasonably contained in sev.c, and then enable the debug_swap
stuff on top?
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index c25aeb550cd9..ff7a4d68731c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -2968,8 +2968,7 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR4_WRITE);
svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
- /* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */
- clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+ <debug register stuff goes here>
/* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
@@ -2996,6 +2995,12 @@ void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
clr_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
+ /*
+ * Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests, e.g. for the VMware backdoor, as
+ * KVM can't decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
+ */
+ clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+
if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
sev_es_init_vmcb(svm);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index e0ec95f1f068..89753d7fd821 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1209,10 +1209,9 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
* trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
* We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
- * as VMware does. Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests as KVM can't
- * decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
+ * as VMware does.
*/
- if (enable_vmware_backdoor && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
@@ -1950,7 +1949,7 @@ static void svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)))
return;
get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
@@ -2681,7 +2680,7 @@ static int dr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
unsigned long val;
int err = 0;
- if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) {
+ if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0 && !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
/*
* No more DR vmexits; force a reload of the debug registers
* and reenter on this instruction. The next vmexit will
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index f44751dd8d5d..7c99a7d55476 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -409,23 +409,25 @@ static inline void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
- if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
+ if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(svm->vcpu.arch.last_vmentry_cpu != -1);
+ return;
}
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
@@ -436,13 +438,13 @@ static inline void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)))
+ return;
+
vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
- /* DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest */
- if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
- }
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
recalc_intercepts(svm);
}
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