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Message-ID: <5d8d802a-7664-fdf0-52ef-5817634d870d@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 18:01:03 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>
Cc: mark@...heh.com, jlbec@...lplan.org, joseph.qi@...ux.alibaba.com,
zohar@...ux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
serge@...lyn.com, stephen.smalley.work@...il.com,
eparis@...isplace.org, ocfs2-devel@....oracle.com,
reiserfs-devel@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keescook@...omium.org,
nicolas.bouchinet@...p-os.org,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 4/6] security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for
inode_init_security hook
On 3/23/2023 5:09 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 14, 2023 at 4:19 AM Roberto Sassu
> <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com> wrote:
>> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
>>
>> Currently, security_inode_init_security() supports only one LSM providing
>> an xattr and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode
>> metadata.
>>
>> Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security
>> blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr field of the
>> lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it
>> needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should
>> allocate.
>>
>> Dynamically allocate the xattrs array to be populated by LSMs with the
>> inode_init_security hook, and pass it to the latter instead of the
>> name/value/len triple. Update the documentation accordingly, and fix the
>> description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore.
>>
>> Since the LSM infrastructure, at initialization time, updates the number of
>> the requested xattrs provided by each LSM with a corresponding offset in
>> the security blob (in this case the xattr array), it makes straightforward
>> for an LSM to access the right position in the xattr array.
>>
>> There is still the issue that an LSM might not fill the xattr, even if it
>> requests it (legitimate case, for example it might have been loaded but not
>> initialized with a policy). Since users of the xattr array (e.g. the
>> initxattrs() callbacks) detect the end of the xattr array by checking if
>> the xattr name is NULL, not filling an xattr would cause those users to
>> stop scanning xattrs prematurely.
>>
>> Solve that issue by introducing security_check_compact_filled_xattrs(),
>> which does a basic check of the xattr array (if the xattr name is filled,
>> the xattr value should be too, and viceversa), and compacts the xattr array
>> by removing the holes.
>>
>> An alternative solution would be to let users of the xattr array know the
>> number of elements of that array, so that they don't have to check the
>> termination. However, this seems more invasive, compared to a simple move
>> of few array elements.
>>
>> security_check_compact_filled_xattrs() also determines how many xattrs in
>> the xattr array have been filled. If there is none, skip
>> evm_inode_init_security() and initxattrs(). Skipping the former also avoids
>> EVM to crash the kernel, as it is expecting a filled xattr.
>>
>> Finally, adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the
>> inode_init_security hook, and to correctly fill the designated slots in the
>> xattr array. For Smack, reserve space for the other defined xattrs although
>> they are not set yet in smack_inode_init_security().
>>
>> Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@...p-os.org> (EVM crash)
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/
>> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 +-
>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
>> security/security.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 19 ++++--
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 33 ++++++----
>> 5 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>> index 6bb55e61e8e..b814955ae70 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>> @@ -112,8 +112,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_notify, const struct path *path, u64 mask,
>> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_alloc_security, struct inode *inode)
>> LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_free_security, struct inode *inode)
>> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode,
>> - struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
>> - void **value, size_t *len)
>> + struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs)
>> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode,
>> const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode)
>> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> index c2be66c669a..75a2f85b49d 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
>> int lbs_ipc;
>> int lbs_msg_msg;
>> int lbs_task;
>> + int lbs_xattr; /* number of xattr slots in new_xattrs array */
> No need for the comment, we don't do it for the other fields.
I asked for the comment. lbs_xattr is the number of entries, which is
different from the other fields. The other fields contain blob sizes in
bytes. Inconsistent behavior should be noted.
>
>> };
>>
>> /*
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index f4170efcddd..f1f5f62f7fa 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -1579,6 +1579,52 @@ int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
>>
>> +/**
>> + * security_check_compact_filled_xattrs - check xattrs and make array contiguous
>> + * @xattrs: xattr array filled by LSMs
>> + * @num_xattrs: length of xattr array
>> + * @num_filled_xattrs: number of already processed xattrs
>> + *
>> + * Ensure that each xattr slot is correctly filled and close the gaps in the
>> + * xattr array if an LSM didn't provide an xattr for which it asked space
>> + * (legitimate case, it might have been loaded but not initialized). An LSM
>> + * might request space in the xattr array for one or multiple xattrs. The LSM
>> + * infrastructure ensures that all requests by LSMs are satisfied.
>> + *
>> + * Track the number of filled xattrs in @num_filled_xattrs, so that it is easy
>> + * to determine whether the currently processed xattr is fine in its position
>> + * (if all previous xattrs were filled) or it should be moved after the last
>> + * filled xattr.
>> + *
>> + * Return: zero if all xattrs are valid, -EINVAL otherwise.
>> + */
>> +static int security_check_compact_filled_xattrs(struct xattr *xattrs,
>> + int num_xattrs,
>> + int *num_filled_xattrs)
> That is one long name :)
>
> Since you're making some other changes to this patch, can you rename
> this to security_xattr_compact() or something like that?
>
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = *num_filled_xattrs; i < num_xattrs; i++) {
>> + if ((!xattrs[i].name && xattrs[i].value) ||
>> + (xattrs[i].name && !xattrs[i].value))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + if (!xattrs[i].name)
>> + continue;
>> +
>> + if (i == *num_filled_xattrs) {
>> + (*num_filled_xattrs)++;
>> + continue;
>> + }
>> +
>> + memcpy(xattrs + (*num_filled_xattrs)++, xattrs + i,
>> + sizeof(*xattrs));
>> + memset(xattrs + i, 0, sizeof(*xattrs));
>> + }
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> /**
>> * security_inode_init_security() - Initialize an inode's LSM context
>> * @inode: the inode
>> @@ -1591,9 +1637,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
>> * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. This
>> * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and
>> * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/...
>> - * hooks called by the VFS. The hook function is expected to allocate the name
>> - * and value via kmalloc, with the caller being responsible for calling kfree
>> - * after using them. If the security module does not use security attributes
>> + * hooks called by the VFS. The hook function is expected to populate the
>> + * @xattrs array, depending on how many xattrs have been specified by the
>> + * security module in the lbs_xattr field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. For
>> + * each array element, the hook function is expected to set ->name to the
>> + * attribute name suffix (e.g. selinux), to allocate ->value (will be freed by
>> + * the caller) and set it to the attribute value, to set ->value_len to the
>> + * length of the value. If the security module does not use security attributes
>> * or does not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode, then
>> * it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing.
>> *
>> @@ -1604,33 +1654,66 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>> const struct qstr *qstr,
>> const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
>> {
>> - struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1];
>> - struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
>> - int ret;
>> + struct security_hook_list *P;
>> + struct xattr *new_xattrs;
>> + struct xattr *xattr;
>> + int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP, num_filled_xattrs = 0;
>>
>> if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
>> return 0;
>>
>> + if (!blob_sizes.lbs_xattr)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> if (!initxattrs)
>> return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode,
>> - dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL);
>> - memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
>> - lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
>> - ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
>> - &lsm_xattr->name,
>> - &lsm_xattr->value,
>> - &lsm_xattr->value_len);
>> - if (ret)
>> + dir, qstr, NULL);
>> + /* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */
>> + new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr + 2, sizeof(*new_xattrs),
>> + GFP_NOFS);
>> + if (!new_xattrs)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> +
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security,
>> + list) {
>> + ret = P->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs);
>> + if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
>> + goto out;
>> + /*
>> + * As documented in lsm_hooks.h, -EOPNOTSUPP in this context
>> + * means that the LSM is not willing to provide an xattr, not
>> + * that it wants to signal an error. Thus, continue to invoke
>> + * the remaining LSMs.
>> + */
>> + if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
>> + continue;
>> + /*
>> + * As the number of xattrs reserved by LSMs is not directly
>> + * available, directly use the total number blob_sizes.lbs_xattr
>> + * to keep the code simple, while being not the most efficient
>> + * way.
>> + */
> Is there a good reason why the LSM can't return the number of xattrs
> it is adding to the xattr array? It seems like it should be fairly
> trivial for the individual LSMs to determine and it could save a lot
> of work. However, given we're at v8 on this patchset I'm sure I'm
> missing something obvious, can you help me understand why the idea
> above is crazy stupid? ;)
>
>> + ret = security_check_compact_filled_xattrs(new_xattrs,
>> + blob_sizes.lbs_xattr,
>> + &num_filled_xattrs);
>> + if (ret < 0) {
>> + ret = -ENOMEM;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (!num_filled_xattrs)
>> goto out;
>>
>> - evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
>> - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
>> + ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs,
>> + new_xattrs + num_filled_xattrs);
>> if (ret)
>> goto out;
>> ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
>> out:
>> for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++)
>> kfree(xattr->value);
>> + kfree(new_xattrs);
>> return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> index 9a5bdfc2131..3e4308dd336 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> @@ -104,6 +104,8 @@
>> #include "audit.h"
>> #include "avc_ss.h"
>>
>> +#define SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 1
>> +
>> struct selinux_state selinux_state;
>>
>> /* SECMARK reference count */
>> @@ -2868,11 +2870,11 @@ static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
>>
>> static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>> const struct qstr *qstr,
>> - const char **name,
>> - void **value, size_t *len)
>> + struct xattr *xattrs)
>> {
>> const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
>> struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
>> + struct xattr *xattr = NULL;
>> u32 newsid, clen;
>> int rc;
>> char *context;
>> @@ -2899,16 +2901,18 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>> !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>
>> - if (name)
>> - *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
>> + if (xattrs)
>> + xattr = xattrs + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_xattr;
> Please abstract that away to an inline function similar to
> selinux_cred(), selinux_file(), selinux_inode(), etc.
>
>> + if (xattr) {
>> + xattr->name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
> I'm guessing the xattr->name assignment is always done, regardless of
> if security_sid_to_context_force() is successful, due to the -EINVAL
> check in security_check_compact_filled_xattrs()? If yes, it would be
> good to make note of that here in the code. If not, it would be nice
> to move this down the function to go with the other xattr->XXX
> assignments, unless there is another reason for its placement that I'm
> missing.
>
>> - if (value && len) {
>> rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
>> &context, &clen);
>> if (rc)
>> return rc;
>> - *value = context;
>> - *len = clen;
>> + xattr->value = context;
>> + xattr->value_len = clen;
>> }
>>
>> return 0;
>> @@ -6918,6 +6922,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
>> .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
>> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
>> + .lbs_xattr = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
>> };
>>
>> #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> index cfcbb748da2..c8cf8df268b 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> @@ -52,6 +52,15 @@
>> #define SMK_RECEIVING 1
>> #define SMK_SENDING 2
>>
>> +/*
>> + * Smack uses multiple xattrs.
>> + * SMACK64 - for access control, SMACK64EXEC - label for the program,
>> + * SMACK64MMAP - controls library loading,
>> + * SMACK64TRANSMUTE - label initialization,
>> + * Not saved on files - SMACK64IPIN and SMACK64IPOUT
>> + */
>> +#define SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 4
>> +
>> #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
>> static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock);
>> static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
>> @@ -939,26 +948,27 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
>> * @inode: the newly created inode
>> * @dir: containing directory object
>> * @qstr: unused
>> - * @name: where to put the attribute name
>> - * @value: where to put the attribute value
>> - * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
>> + * @xattrs: where to put the attributes
>> *
>> * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
>> */
>> static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>> - const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
>> - void **value, size_t *len)
>> + const struct qstr *qstr,
>> + struct xattr *xattrs)
>> {
>> struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
>> struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
>> struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
>> struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
>> + struct xattr *xattr = NULL;
>> int may;
>>
>> - if (name)
>> - *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
>> + if (xattrs)
>> + xattr = xattrs + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_xattr;
>> +
>> + if (xattr) {
>> + xattr->name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
>>
>> - if (value && len) {
>> rcu_read_lock();
>> may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
>> &skp->smk_rules);
>> @@ -976,11 +986,11 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>> issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
>> }
>>
>> - *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
>> - if (*value == NULL)
>> + xattr->value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
>> + if (xattr->value == NULL)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> - *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
>> + xattr->value_len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
>> }
>>
>> return 0;
>> @@ -4854,6 +4864,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
>> .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
>> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
>> + .lbs_xattr = SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
>> };
>>
>> static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> --
>> 2.25.1
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