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Message-ID: <CAHUa44HL2JGWcx_Wy5LOi6tA4_aVqMU-kOEdk3JZ8bmR_4ZPRQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2023 14:37:41 +0200
From: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>
To: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke@...gle.com>
Cc: op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11] tee: optee: Add SMC for loading OP-TEE image
Hi Jeffrey,
On Thu, Mar 23, 2023 at 7:48 PM Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> What's the next steps on getting this approved for merge?
I was just about to pick up this when I noticed this when running
checkpatch --strict:
CHECK: Alignment should match open parenthesis
#196: FILE: drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c:1163:
+ if (res.a0 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 &&
+ res.a1 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 &&
CHECK: multiple assignments should be avoided
#276: FILE: drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c:1441:
+ data_pa_high = data_pa_low = data_size_high = data_size_low = 0;
total: 0 errors, 0 warnings, 2 checks, 282 lines checked
Generally, it's always a good idea to make sure that checkpatch is happy
before posting a patch to avoid unnecessary comments or delays. I'm
fixing up the patch as:
--- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
+++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
@@ -1160,9 +1160,9 @@ static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALLS_UID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res);
if (res.a0 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 &&
- res.a1 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 &&
- res.a2 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 &&
- res.a3 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3)
+ res.a1 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 &&
+ res.a2 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 &&
+ res.a3 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3)
return true;
return false;
}
@@ -1438,7 +1438,10 @@ static int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev,
fw_err:
pr_warn("image loading failed\n");
- data_pa_high = data_pa_low = data_size_high = data_size_low = 0;
+ data_pa_high = 0;
+ data_pa_low = 0;
+ data_size_high = 0;
+ data_size_low = 0;
fw_load:
/*
I'm also waiting for
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/19834 to
be merged.
Thanks,
Jens
>
> On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 9:41 AM Jeffrey Kardatzke
> <jkardatzke@...omium.org> wrote:
> >
> > Adds an SMC call that will pass an OP-TEE binary image to EL3 and
> > instruct it to load it as the BL32 payload. This works in conjunction
> > with a feature added to Trusted Firmware for ARMv8 and above
> > architectures that supports this.
> >
> > The main purpose of this change is to facilitate updating the OP-TEE
> > component on devices via a rootfs change rather than having to do a
> > firmware update. Further details are linked to in the Kconfig file.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke@...omium.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke@...gle.com>
> > ---
> >
> > Changes in v11:
> > - Fixed typo in tee.rst documentation
> >
> > Changes in v10:
> > - Fixed tee.rst documentation formatting
> >
> > Changes in v9:
> > - Add CPU hotplug callback to init on all cores at startup
> >
> > Changes in v8:
> > - Renamed params and fixed alignment issue
> >
> > Changes in v7:
> > - Added documentation to Documentation/staging/tee.rst
> >
> > Changes in v6:
> > - Expanded Kconfig documentation
> >
> > Changes in v5:
> > - Renamed config option
> > - Added runtime warning when config is used
> >
> > Changes in v4:
> > - Update commit message
> > - Added more documentation
> > - Renamed config option, added ARM64 dependency
> >
> > Changes in v3:
> > - Removed state tracking for driver reload
> > - Check UID of service to verify it needs image load
> >
> > Changes in v2:
> > - Fixed compile issue when feature is disabled
> > - Addressed minor comments
> > - Added state tracking for driver reload
> >
> > Documentation/staging/tee.rst | 41 +++++++++++
> > drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig | 17 +++++
> > drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 12 +++
> > drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 24 ++++++
> > drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 5 files changed, 228 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/staging/tee.rst b/Documentation/staging/tee.rst
> > index 498343c7ab08..b11e9053bc99 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/staging/tee.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/staging/tee.rst
> > @@ -214,6 +214,47 @@ call is done from the thread assisting the interrupt handler. This is a
> > building block for OP-TEE OS in secure world to implement the top half and
> > bottom half style of device drivers.
> >
> > +OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE Kconfig option
> > +----------------------------------------
> > +
> > +The OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE Kconfig option enables the ability to load the
> > +BL32 OP-TEE image from the kernel after the kernel boots, rather than loading
> > +it from the firmware before the kernel boots. This also requires enabling the
> > +corresponding option in Trusted Firmware for Arm. The documentation there
> > +explains the security threat associated with enabling this as well as
> > +mitigations at the firmware and platform level.
> > +https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_model.html
> > +
> > +There are additional attack vectors/mitigations for the kernel that should be
> > +addressed when using this option.
> > +
> > +1. Boot chain security.
> > + Attack vector: Replace the OP-TEE OS image in the rootfs to gain control of
> > + the system.
> > + Mitigation: There must be boot chain security that verifies the kernel and
> > + rootfs, otherwise an attacker can modify the loaded OP-TEE binary by
> > + modifying it in the rootfs.
> > +2. Alternate boot modes.
> > + Attack vector: Using an alternate boot mode (i.e. recovery mode), the OP-TEE
> > + driver isn't loaded, leaving the SMC hole open.
> > + Mitigation: If there are alternate methods of booting the device, such as a
> > + recovery mode, it should be ensured that the same mitigations are applied in
> > + that mode.
> > +3. Attacks prior to SMC invocation.
> > + Attack vector: Code that is executed prior to issuing the SMC call to load
> > + OP-TEE can be exploited to then load an alternate OS image.
> > + Mitigation: The OP-TEE driver must be loaded before any potential attack
> > + vectors are opened up. This should include mounting of any modifiable
> > + filesystems, opening of network ports or communicating with external devices
> > + (e.g. USB).
> > +4. Blocking SMC call to load OP-TEE.
> > + Attack vector: Prevent the driver from being probed, so the SMC call to load
> > + OP-TEE isn't executed when desired, leaving it open to being executed later
> > + and loading a modified OS.
> > + Mitigation: It is recommended to build the OP-TEE driver as an included
> > + driver rather than a module to prevent exploits that may cause the module to
> > + not be loaded.
> > +
> > AMD-TEE driver
> > ==============
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
> > index f121c224e682..70898bbd5809 100644
> > --- a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
> > +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
> > @@ -7,3 +7,20 @@ config OPTEE
> > help
> > This implements the OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
> > driver.
> > +
> > +config OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE
> > + bool "Load OP-TEE image as firmware"
> > + default n
> > + depends on OPTEE && ARM64
> > + help
> > + This loads the BL32 image for OP-TEE as firmware when the driver is
> > + probed. This returns -EPROBE_DEFER until the firmware is loadable from
> > + the filesystem which is determined by checking the system_state until
> > + it is in SYSTEM_RUNNING. This also requires enabling the corresponding
> > + option in Trusted Firmware for Arm. The documentation there explains
> > + the security threat associated with enabling this as well as
> > + mitigations at the firmware and platform level.
> > + https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_model.html
> > +
> > + Additional documentation on kernel security risks are at
> > + Documentation/staging/tee.rst.
> > diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h
> > index 70e9cc2ee96b..e8840a82b983 100644
> > --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h
> > +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h
> > @@ -241,11 +241,23 @@ struct optee_msg_arg {
> > * 384fb3e0-e7f8-11e3-af63-0002a5d5c51b.
> > * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_UID_0, OPTEE_MSG_UID_1,
> > * OPTEE_MSG_UID_2, OPTEE_MSG_UID_3.
> > + *
> > + * In the case where the OP-TEE image is loaded by the kernel, this will
> > + * initially return an alternate UID to reflect that we are communicating with
> > + * the TF-A image loading service at that time instead of OP-TEE. That UID is:
> > + * a3fbeab1-1246-315d-c7c4-06b9c03cbea4.
> > + * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0,
> > + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1, OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2,
> > + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3.
> > */
> > #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_0 0x384fb3e0
> > #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_1 0xe7f811e3
> > #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_2 0xaf630002
> > #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_3 0xa5d5c51b
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 0xa3fbeab1
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 0x1246315d
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 0xc7c406b9
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3 0xc03cbea4
> > #define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_CALLS_UID 0xFF01
> >
> > /*
> > diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
> > index 73b5e7760d10..7d9fa426505b 100644
> > --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
> > +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
> > @@ -104,6 +104,30 @@ struct optee_smc_call_get_os_revision_result {
> > unsigned long reserved1;
> > };
> >
> > +/*
> > + * Load Trusted OS from optee/tee.bin in the Linux firmware.
> > + *
> > + * WARNING: Use this cautiously as it could lead to insecure loading of the
> > + * Trusted OS.
> > + * This SMC instructs EL3 to load a binary and execute it as the Trusted OS.
> > + *
> > + * Call register usage:
> > + * a0 SMC Function ID, OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE
> > + * a1 Upper 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload
> > + * a2 Lower 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload
> > + * a3 Upper 32bit of the physical address for the payload
> > + * a4 Lower 32bit of the physical address for the payload
> > + *
> > + * The payload is in the OP-TEE image format.
> > + *
> > + * Returns result in a0, 0 on success and an error code otherwise.
> > + */
> > +#define OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE 2
> > +#define OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE \
> > + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \
> > + ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS_END, \
> > + OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE)
> > +
> > /*
> > * Call with struct optee_msg_arg as argument
> > *
> > diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
> > index a1c1fa1a9c28..fcbcd0c0c3aa 100644
> > --- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
> > +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
> > @@ -7,10 +7,13 @@
> > #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
> >
> > #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
> > +#include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
> > #include <linux/errno.h>
> > +#include <linux/firmware.h>
> > #include <linux/interrupt.h>
> > #include <linux/io.h>
> > #include <linux/irqdomain.h>
> > +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> > #include <linux/mm.h>
> > #include <linux/module.h>
> > #include <linux/of.h>
> > @@ -1149,6 +1152,22 @@ static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
> > return false;
> > }
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE
> > +static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
> > +{
> > + struct arm_smccc_res res;
> > +
> > + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALLS_UID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res);
> > +
> > + if (res.a0 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 &&
> > + res.a1 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 &&
> > + res.a2 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 &&
> > + res.a3 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3)
> > + return true;
> > + return false;
> > +}
> > +#endif
> > +
> > static void optee_msg_get_os_revision(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
> > {
> > union {
> > @@ -1354,6 +1373,117 @@ static void optee_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev)
> > optee_disable_shm_cache(optee);
> > }
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE
> > +
> > +#define OPTEE_FW_IMAGE "optee/tee.bin"
> > +
> > +static optee_invoke_fn *cpuhp_invoke_fn;
> > +
> > +static int optee_cpuhp_probe(unsigned int cpu)
> > +{
> > + /*
> > + * Invoking a call on a CPU will cause OP-TEE to perform the required
> > + * setup for that CPU. Just invoke the call to get the UID since that
> > + * has no side effects.
> > + */
> > + if (optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(cpuhp_invoke_fn))
> > + return 0;
> > + else
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev,
> > + optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
> > +{
> > + const struct firmware *fw = NULL;
> > + struct arm_smccc_res res;
> > + phys_addr_t data_pa;
> > + u8 *data_buf = NULL;
> > + u64 data_size;
> > + u32 data_pa_high, data_pa_low;
> > + u32 data_size_high, data_size_low;
> > + int rc;
> > + int hp_state;
> > +
> > + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(invoke_fn))
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + rc = request_firmware(&fw, OPTEE_FW_IMAGE, &pdev->dev);
> > + if (rc) {
> > + /*
> > + * The firmware in the rootfs will not be accessible until we
> > + * are in the SYSTEM_RUNNING state, so return EPROBE_DEFER until
> > + * that point.
> > + */
> > + if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING)
> > + return -EPROBE_DEFER;
> > + goto fw_err;
> > + }
> > +
> > + data_size = fw->size;
> > + /*
> > + * This uses the GFP_DMA flag to ensure we are allocated memory in the
> > + * 32-bit space since TF-A cannot map memory beyond the 32-bit boundary.
> > + */
> > + data_buf = kmalloc(fw->size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> > + if (!data_buf) {
> > + rc = -ENOMEM;
> > + goto fw_err;
> > + }
> > + memcpy(data_buf, fw->data, fw->size);
> > + data_pa = virt_to_phys(data_buf);
> > + reg_pair_from_64(&data_pa_high, &data_pa_low, data_pa);
> > + reg_pair_from_64(&data_size_high, &data_size_low, data_size);
> > + goto fw_load;
> > +
> > +fw_err:
> > + pr_warn("image loading failed\n");
> > + data_pa_high = data_pa_low = data_size_high = data_size_low = 0;
> > +
> > +fw_load:
> > + /*
> > + * Always invoke the SMC, even if loading the image fails, to indicate
> > + * to EL3 that we have passed the point where it should allow invoking
> > + * this SMC.
> > + */
> > + pr_warn("OP-TEE image loaded from kernel, this can be insecure");
> > + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE, data_size_high, data_size_low,
> > + data_pa_high, data_pa_low, 0, 0, 0, &res);
> > + if (!rc)
> > + rc = res.a0;
> > + if (fw)
> > + release_firmware(fw);
> > + kfree(data_buf);
> > +
> > + if (!rc) {
> > + /*
> > + * We need to initialize OP-TEE on all other running cores as
> > + * well. Any cores that aren't running yet will get initialized
> > + * when they are brought up by the power management functions in
> > + * TF-A which are registered by the OP-TEE SPD. Due to that we
> > + * can un-register the callback right after registering it.
> > + */
> > + cpuhp_invoke_fn = invoke_fn;
> > + hp_state = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "optee:probe",
> > + optee_cpuhp_probe, NULL);
> > + if (hp_state < 0) {
> > + pr_warn("Failed with CPU hotplug setup for OP-TEE");
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > + cpuhp_remove_state(hp_state);
> > + cpuhp_invoke_fn = NULL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return rc;
> > +}
> > +#else
> > +static inline int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev,
> > + optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +#endif
> > +
> > static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> > {
> > optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn;
> > @@ -1372,6 +1502,10 @@ static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> > if (IS_ERR(invoke_fn))
> > return PTR_ERR(invoke_fn);
> >
> > + rc = optee_load_fw(pdev, invoke_fn);
> > + if (rc)
> > + return rc;
> > +
> > if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(invoke_fn)) {
> > pr_warn("api uid mismatch\n");
> > return -EINVAL;
> > --
> > 2.40.0.rc1.284.g88254d51c5-goog
> >
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