linux-kernel - [PING PATCH v4 28/29] LoongArch: KVM: Implement probe virtualization when loongarch cpu init

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Message-Id: <20230328123119.3649361-29-zhaotianrui@loongson.cn>
Date:   Tue, 28 Mar 2023 20:31:18 +0800
From:   Tianrui Zhao <zhaotianrui@...ngson.cn>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc:     Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@...nel.org>,
        WANG Xuerui <kernel@...0n.name>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        loongarch@...ts.linux.dev, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
        Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>,
        Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@....com>,
        Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>, maobibo@...ngson.cn,
        Xi Ruoyao <xry111@...111.site>, zhaotianrui@...ngson.cn
Subject: [PING PATCH v4 28/29] LoongArch: KVM: Implement probe virtualization when loongarch cpu init

Implement probe virtualization when loongarch cpu init, including guest
gid info, guest fpu info, etc.

Signed-off-by: Tianrui Zhao <zhaotianrui@...ngson.cn>
---
 arch/loongarch/kernel/cpu-probe.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/cpu-probe.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/cpu-probe.c
index 3a3fce2d7..9c3483d9a 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/cpu-probe.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/cpu-probe.c
@@ -176,6 +176,57 @@ static void cpu_probe_common(struct cpuinfo_loongarch *c)
 	}
 }
 
+static inline void cpu_probe_guestinfo(struct cpuinfo_loongarch *c)
+{
+	unsigned long guestinfo;
+
+	guestinfo = read_csr_gstat();
+	if (guestinfo & CSR_GSTAT_GIDBIT) {
+		c->options |= LOONGARCH_CPU_GUESTID;
+		write_csr_gstat(0);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void cpu_probe_lvz(struct cpuinfo_loongarch *c)
+{
+	unsigned long gcfg, gprcfg1;
+
+	cpu_probe_guestinfo(c);
+
+	c->guest.options |= LOONGARCH_CPU_FPU;
+	c->guest.options_dyn |= LOONGARCH_CPU_FPU;
+	c->guest.options_dyn |= LOONGARCH_CPU_PMP;
+
+	c->guest.ases |= LOONGARCH_CPU_LSX;
+	c->guest.ases_dyn |= LOONGARCH_CPU_LSX;
+	gprcfg1 = read_gcsr_prcfg1();
+	c->guest.kscratch_mask = GENMASK((gprcfg1 & CSR_CONF1_KSNUM) - 1, 0);
+
+	gcfg = read_csr_gcfg();
+	if (gcfg & CSR_GCFG_MATP_GUEST)
+		c->guest_cfg |= BIT(0);
+	if (gcfg & CSR_GCFG_MATP_ROOT)
+		c->guest_cfg |= BIT(1);
+	if (gcfg & CSR_GCFG_MATP_NEST)
+		c->guest_cfg |= BIT(2);
+	if (gcfg & CSR_GCFG_SITP)
+		c->guest_cfg |= BIT(6);
+	if (gcfg & CSR_GCFG_TITP)
+		c->guest_cfg |= BIT(8);
+	if (gcfg & CSR_GCFG_TOEP)
+		c->guest_cfg |= BIT(10);
+	if (gcfg & CSR_GCFG_TOPP)
+		c->guest_cfg |= BIT(12);
+	if (gcfg & CSR_GCFG_TORUP)
+		c->guest_cfg |= BIT(14);
+	if (gcfg & CSR_GCFG_GCIP_ALL)
+		c->guest_cfg |= BIT(16);
+	if (gcfg & CSR_GCFG_GCIP_HIT)
+		c->guest_cfg |= BIT(17);
+	if (gcfg & CSR_GCFG_GCIP_SECURE)
+		c->guest_cfg |= BIT(18);
+}
+
 #define MAX_NAME_LEN	32
 #define VENDOR_OFFSET	0
 #define CPUNAME_OFFSET	9
@@ -289,6 +340,8 @@ void cpu_probe(void)
 	if (cpu == 0)
 		__ua_limit = ~((1ull << cpu_vabits) - 1);
 #endif
+	if (cpu_has_lvz)
+		cpu_probe_lvz(c);
 
 	cpu_report();
 }
-- 
2.31.1