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Message-ID: <7edcf2c3-005f-04bd-7ec6-80baee236f40@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2023 10:13:57 -0500
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH kernel v4] KVM: SEV: Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES
On 3/23/23 12:40, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 03, 2023, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>> While at this, move set_/clr_dr_intercepts to .c and move #DB intercept
>> next to DR7 intercept.
>
> Please do non-trivial code movement in separate patches unless the functional change
> is trivial. Moving and changing at the same time makes the patch difficult to review.
>
>> @@ -52,9 +53,14 @@ module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
>> /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
>> static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
>> module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
>> +
>> +/* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
>> +static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
>> +module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0644);
>
> Needs to be 0444, otherwise userspace can turn on the knob after KVM is loaded,
> which would allow enabling the feature on unsupported platforms, amongst many
> other problems.
>
>> void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> index 60c7c880266b..f8e222bee22a 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> @@ -671,6 +671,65 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
>>
>> }
>>
>> +static void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>> +{
>> + struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
>> + bool intercept;
>> +
>> + if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
>> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
>> + struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
>> +
>> + intercept = !(save->sev_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP);
>
> Blech, the VMCB vs. SEV and SEV-ES code is a mess. E.g. init_vmcb() does
>
> /*
> * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
> * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
> * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
> * as VMware does. Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests as KVM can't
> * decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
> */
> if (enable_vmware_backdoor && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
> set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
>
> but then sev_es_init_vmcb() also does:
>
> /* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */
> clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
>
> DR interception is a similar trainwreck. svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs() bails if
> guest_state_protected is true, i.e. is a nop for SEV-ES guests, but only after
> the vCPU has done LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA. IIUC, that's nonsensical because even before
> guest state is encrypted, #DB will be reflected as #VC into the guest. And, again
A guest can't run before the LAUNCH_UPDATE process is complete, so there
can't be a #VC before guest_state_proteced is true.
> IIUC, except for DR7, DRs are never intercepted for SEV-ES guests and so trying
> to debug from the host is futile as the guest can clobber DRs at any time.
>
> Similarly, flowing into dr_interception() on an SEV-ES VMGEXITis just dumb. KVM
> _knows_ it can't give the guest control of DR7, but it mucks with the intercepts
> anyways. That the GHCB spec even allows SVM_EXIT_{READ,WRITE}_DR7 is just asinine,
> but that's a moot point. Anyways, the GHCB spec's "suggestion" effectively says
> KVM's responsibility is purely to make a read of DR7 return the last written value.
That's not KVM's responsibility, that is the responsibility of the guest
#VC handler. So a DR7 read, while intercepted, should never get to KVM.
> And of course KVM's disaster of a flow doesn't even do that unless the host is
> debugging the guest.
>
> Currently, hardware debug traps aren’t supported for an SEV-ES guest. The hypervisor
> must set the intercept for both read and write of the debug control register (DR7).
> With the intercepts in place, the #VC handler will be invoked when the guest accesses
> DR7. For a write to DR7, the #VC handler should perform Standard VMGExit processing.
> The #VC handler must not update the actual DR7 register, but rather it should cache
> the DR7 value being written.
>
> I bring this up because of the subtle dependency that checking SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP
> creates: set_dr_intercepts() needs to be called after sev_init_vmcb(). I believe
> this approach also fails to handle intrahost migration; at the very least, what
> exactly will happen when sev_migrate_from() invokes sev_init_vmcb() is unclear.
> And I really don't want to pile even more gunk on top of the existing mess.
>
> So, can you (and by "you" I really mean "the folks at AMD working on SEV stuff")
> start with the below diff (not intended to be a single patch), disallow
> kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug() entirely for SEV-ES guests (will likely
> take some back and forth to figure out how we want to do this), and then fill
> in the blanks? I.e. get KVM to a state where all the intercept shenanigans for
> SEV and SEV-ES are reasonably contained in sev.c, and then enable the debug_swap
> stuff on top?
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index c25aeb550cd9..ff7a4d68731c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -2968,8 +2968,7 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR4_WRITE);
> svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
>
> - /* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */
> - clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
> + <debug register stuff goes here>
>
> /* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
> svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
> @@ -2996,6 +2995,12 @@ void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
> clr_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
>
> + /*
> + * Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests, e.g. for the VMware backdoor, as
> + * KVM can't decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
> + */
> + clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
> +
> if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
> sev_es_init_vmcb(svm);
> }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index e0ec95f1f068..89753d7fd821 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -1209,10 +1209,9 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
> * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
> * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
> - * as VMware does. Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests as KVM can't
> - * decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
> + * as VMware does.
> */
> - if (enable_vmware_backdoor && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
> + if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
> set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
>
> svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
> @@ -1950,7 +1949,7 @@ static void svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
>
> - if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)))
> return;
>
> get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
> @@ -2681,7 +2680,7 @@ static int dr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> unsigned long val;
> int err = 0;
>
> - if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) {
> + if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0 && !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
This will change the current flow of an SEV-ES guest. With SEV-ES,
vcpu->guest_debug can never be anything other than 0 and currently always
takes this path.
So what is really needed is:
if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) {
if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
...
}
return 1;
}
> /*
> * No more DR vmexits; force a reload of the debug registers
> * and reenter on this instruction. The next vmexit will
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index f44751dd8d5d..7c99a7d55476 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -409,23 +409,25 @@ static inline void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> {
> struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
>
> - if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
> + if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(svm->vcpu.arch.last_vmentry_cpu != -1);
> + return;
> }
>
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
> vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
> vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
>
> @@ -436,13 +438,13 @@ static inline void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> {
> struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
>
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)))
> + return;
> +
> vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
>
> - /* DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest */
> - if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
> - }
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
If we never call clr_dr_intercepts() anymore for an SEV-ES guest, then the
above two lines should be removed. They only were executed for an SEV-ES
guest and now they would be executed for any guest.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> recalc_intercepts(svm);
> }
>
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