linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v14 1/4] asm-generic,arm64: create task variant of access

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Message-ID: <ZCPOpClZ3hOQCs7a@memverge.com>
Date:   Wed, 29 Mar 2023 01:37:40 -0400
From:   Gregory Price <gregory.price@...verge.com>
To:     Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc:     Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Gregory Price <gourry.memverge@...il.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        Linux-Arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, avagin@...il.com,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, krisman@...labora.com,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, shuah <shuah@...nel.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, tongtiangen@...wei.com,
        Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 1/4] asm-generic,arm64: create task variant of
 access_ok

On Wed, Mar 29, 2023 at 07:13:22PM +0200, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 03/28, Gregory Price wrote:
> >
> > Not sure how I should proceed here,
> 
> Can't we just kill this access_ok() in set_syscall_user_dispatch() ?
> I don't think it buys too much.
> 
> Oleg.
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c b/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c
> index 0b6379adff6b..d2e516ece52b 100644
> --- a/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c
> +++ b/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c
> @@ -43,11 +43,7 @@ bool syscall_user_dispatch(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  		return false;
>  
>  	if (likely(sd->selector)) {
> -		/*
> -		 * access_ok() is performed once, at prctl time, when
> -		 * the selector is loaded by userspace.
> -		 */
> -		if (unlikely(__get_user(state, sd->selector))) {
> +		if (unlikely(get_user(state, sd->selector))) {
>  			force_exit_sig(SIGSEGV);
>  			return true;
>  		}
> @@ -86,9 +82,6 @@ int set_syscall_user_dispatch(unsigned long mode, unsigned long offset,
>  		if (offset && offset + len <= offset)
>  			return -EINVAL;
>  
> -		if (selector && !access_ok(selector, sizeof(*selector)))
> -			return -EFAULT;
> -
>  		break;
>  	default:
>  		return -EINVAL;
> 

The result of this would be either a task calling via prctl or a tracer
calling via ptrace would be capable of setting selector to a bad pointer
and producing a SIGSEGV on the next system call.

It's a pretty small footgun, but maybe that's reasonable?

>From a user perspective, debugging this behavior would be nightmarish.
Your call to prctl/ptrace would succeed and the process would continue
to execute until the next syscall - at which point you incur a SIGSEGV,
and depending on the syscall that could mean anything?

Everything feels bad here lol.

~Gregory