| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-Id: <20230403140605.540512-7-jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2023 22:06:04 +0800
From: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@...group.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
David Kaplan <David.Kaplan@....com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Dirk Hohndel <dirkhh@...are.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@...gle.com>,
Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@...mens.com>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>, Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Mike Stunes <mstunes@...are.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Raj Ashok <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, x86@...nel.org,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@...cle.com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@...ux.alibaba.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 6/7] x86/entry: Use atomic-IST-entry for VC
From: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@...group.com>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@...group.com>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 83 --------------------
arch/x86/entry/ist_entry.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 3 -
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 14 ----
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 1 -
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 8 --
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 108 --------------------------
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 43 ----------
arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 1 -
11 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 266 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index e4ddc793f841..187d42efd288 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -621,89 +621,6 @@ _ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym)
SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
.endm
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
-/**
- * idtentry_vc - Macro to generate entry stub for #VC
- * @vector: Vector number
- * @asmsym: ASM symbol for the entry point
- * @cfunc: C function to be called
- *
- * The macro emits code to set up the kernel context for #VC. The #VC handler
- * runs on an IST stack and needs to be able to cause nested #VC exceptions.
- *
- * To make this work the #VC entry code tries its best to pretend it doesn't use
- * an IST stack by switching to the task stack if coming from user-space (which
- * includes early SYSCALL entry path) or back to the stack in the IRET frame if
- * entered from kernel-mode.
- *
- * If entered from kernel-mode the return stack is validated first, and if it is
- * not safe to use (e.g. because it points to the entry stack) the #VC handler
- * will switch to a fall-back stack (VC2) and call a special handler function.
- *
- * The macro is only used for one vector, but it is planned to be extended in
- * the future for the #HV exception.
- */
-.macro idtentry_vc vector asmsym cfunc
-SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
- UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
- ENDBR
- ASM_CLAC
- cld
-
- /*
- * If the entry is from userspace, switch stacks and treat it as
- * a normal entry.
- */
- testb $3, CS-ORIG_RAX(%rsp)
- jnz .Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@
-
- PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
- UNWIND_HINT_REGS
- ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
-
- /*
- * paranoid_entry returns SWAPGS flag for paranoid_exit in EBX.
- * EBX == 0 -> SWAPGS, EBX == 1 -> no SWAPGS
- */
- call paranoid_entry
-
- /*
- * Switch off the IST stack to make it free for nested exceptions. The
- * vc_switch_off_ist() function will switch back to the interrupted
- * stack if it is safe to do so. If not it switches to the VC fall-back
- * stack.
- */
- movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
- call vc_switch_off_ist
- movq %rax, %rsp /* Switch to new stack */
-
- ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
- UNWIND_HINT_REGS
-
- /* Update pt_regs */
- movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi /* get error code into 2nd argument*/
- movq $-1, ORIG_RAX(%rsp) /* no syscall to restart */
-
- movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
-
- call kernel_\cfunc
-
- /*
- * No need to switch back to the IST stack. The current stack is either
- * identical to the stack in the IRET frame or the VC fall-back stack,
- * so it is definitely mapped even with PTI enabled.
- */
- jmp paranoid_exit
-
- /* Switch to the regular task stack */
-.Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@:
- idtentry_body user_\cfunc, has_error_code=1
-
-_ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym)
-SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
-.endm
-#endif
-
/*
* Double fault entry. Straight paranoid. No checks from which context
* this comes because for the espfix induced #DF this would do the wrong
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/ist_entry.c b/arch/x86/entry/ist_entry.c
index 946b3b537bd5..c0cbd4527033 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/ist_entry.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/ist_entry.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static __always_inline bool identify_ist_##sym_name( \
DEFINE_IDENTIFY_IST(NMI, nmi, true)
DEFINE_IDENTIFY_IST(DB, debug, true)
DEFINE_IDENTIFY_IST(MCE, machine_check, IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_MCE))
-DEFINE_IDENTIFY_IST(VC, vmm_communication, false)
+DEFINE_IDENTIFY_IST(VC, vmm_communication, IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT))
static __always_inline bool identify_ist(
const struct pt_regs *regs, struct cea_exception_stacks *stacks,
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
index a373e8c37e25..618aa698eb82 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@
char MCE_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \
char VC_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
char VC_stack[optional_stack_size]; \
- char VC2_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
- char VC2_stack[optional_stack_size]; \
char IST_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
char IST_stack[IST_MAIN_STKSZ]; \
char IST_top_guard[guardsize]; \
@@ -55,7 +53,6 @@ enum exception_stack_ordering {
ESTACK_DB,
ESTACK_MCE,
ESTACK_VC,
- ESTACK_VC2,
ESTACK_IST,
N_EXCEPTION_STACKS
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index 01f3152ffe82..5f3250e589ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs, \
DECLARE_IDTENTRY(vector, func)
# define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC(vector, func) \
- idtentry_vc vector asm_##func func
+ idtentry_ist vector asm_##func kernel_##func user_##func has_error_code=1 stack_offset=CEA_stacks_VC
#else
# define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_MCE(vector, func) \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index ebc271bb6d8e..ce554b3a818d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -135,18 +135,6 @@ struct snp_secrets_page_layout {
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
extern struct static_key_false sev_es_enable_key;
-extern void __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
-extern void __sev_es_ist_exit(void);
-static __always_inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&sev_es_enable_key))
- __sev_es_ist_enter(regs);
-}
-static __always_inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void)
-{
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&sev_es_enable_key))
- __sev_es_ist_exit();
-}
extern int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh);
extern void __sev_es_nmi_complete(void);
static __always_inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
@@ -198,8 +186,6 @@ bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp);
void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void);
int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, unsigned long *fw_err);
#else
-static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
-static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { return 0; }
static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { }
static inline int sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd) { return 0; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index 47ecfff2c83d..dc0da530f951 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible notrace struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *eregs);
asmlinkage __visible notrace
struct pt_regs *fixup_bad_iret(struct pt_regs *bad_regs);
void __init trap_init(void);
-asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *eregs);
#endif
extern bool ibt_selftest(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
index 3413b23fa9f1..b7ef2685f63b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ static const char * const exception_stack_names[] = {
[ ESTACK_DB ] = "#DB",
[ ESTACK_MCE ] = "#MC",
[ ESTACK_VC ] = "#VC",
- [ ESTACK_VC2 ] = "#VC2",
[ ESTACK_IST ] = "#IST",
};
@@ -89,7 +88,6 @@ struct estack_pages estack_pages[CEA_ESTACK_PAGES] ____cacheline_aligned = {
EPAGERANGE(DB),
EPAGERANGE(MCE),
EPAGERANGE(VC),
- EPAGERANGE(VC2),
EPAGERANGE(IST),
};
@@ -100,7 +98,7 @@ static __always_inline bool in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stac
struct pt_regs *regs;
unsigned int k;
- BUILD_BUG_ON(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS != 7);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS != 6);
begin = (unsigned long)__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks);
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
index 776f4b1e395b..bafd0c7ca5b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -514,12 +514,6 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
}
nmi_restart:
- /*
- * Needs to happen before DR7 is accessed, because the hypervisor can
- * intercept DR7 reads/writes, turning those into #VC exceptions.
- */
- sev_es_ist_enter(regs);
-
this_cpu_write(nmi_dr7, local_db_save());
irq_state = irqentry_nmi_enter(regs);
@@ -544,8 +538,6 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
local_db_restore(this_cpu_read(nmi_dr7));
- sev_es_ist_exit();
-
if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2) != read_cr2()))
write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2));
if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 679026a640ef..74d55786c353 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -122,77 +122,6 @@ struct sev_config {
static struct sev_config sev_cfg __read_mostly;
-static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- unsigned long sp = regs->sp;
-
- /* User-mode RSP is not trusted */
- if (user_mode(regs))
- return false;
-
- /* SYSCALL gap still has user-mode RSP */
- if (ip_within_syscall_gap(regs))
- return false;
-
- return ((sp >= __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(VC)) && (sp < __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC)));
-}
-
-/*
- * This function handles the case when an NMI is raised in the #VC
- * exception handler entry code, before the #VC handler has switched off
- * its IST stack. In this case, the IST entry for #VC must be adjusted,
- * so that any nested #VC exception will not overwrite the stack
- * contents of the interrupted #VC handler.
- *
- * The IST entry is adjusted unconditionally so that it can be also be
- * unconditionally adjusted back in __sev_es_ist_exit(). Otherwise a
- * nested sev_es_ist_exit() call may adjust back the IST entry too
- * early.
- *
- * The __sev_es_ist_enter() and __sev_es_ist_exit() functions always run
- * on the NMI IST stack, as they are only called from NMI handling code
- * right now.
- */
-void noinstr __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- unsigned long old_ist, new_ist;
-
- /* Read old IST entry */
- new_ist = old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
-
- /*
- * If NMI happened while on the #VC IST stack, set the new IST
- * value below regs->sp, so that the interrupted stack frame is
- * not overwritten by subsequent #VC exceptions.
- */
- if (on_vc_stack(regs))
- new_ist = regs->sp;
-
- /*
- * Reserve additional 8 bytes and store old IST value so this
- * adjustment can be unrolled in __sev_es_ist_exit().
- */
- new_ist -= sizeof(old_ist);
- *(unsigned long *)new_ist = old_ist;
-
- /* Set new IST entry */
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], new_ist);
-}
-
-void noinstr __sev_es_ist_exit(void)
-{
- unsigned long ist;
-
- /* Read IST entry */
- ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
-
- if (WARN_ON(ist == __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC)))
- return;
-
- /* Read back old IST entry and write it to the TSS */
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], *(unsigned long *)ist);
-}
-
/*
* Nothing shall interrupt this code path while holding the per-CPU
* GHCB. The backup GHCB is only for NMIs interrupting this path.
@@ -1841,26 +1770,6 @@ static __always_inline void vc_forward_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
}
}
-static __always_inline bool is_vc2_stack(unsigned long sp)
-{
- return (sp >= __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(VC2) && sp < __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC2));
-}
-
-static __always_inline bool vc_from_invalid_context(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- unsigned long sp, prev_sp;
-
- sp = (unsigned long)regs;
- prev_sp = regs->sp;
-
- /*
- * If the code was already executing on the VC2 stack when the #VC
- * happened, let it proceed to the normal handling routine. This way the
- * code executing on the VC2 stack can cause #VC exceptions to get handled.
- */
- return is_vc2_stack(sp) && !is_vc2_stack(prev_sp);
-}
-
static bool vc_raw_handle_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
{
struct ghcb_state state;
@@ -1930,23 +1839,6 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_KERNEL(exc_vmm_communication)
{
irqentry_state_t irq_state;
- /*
- * With the current implementation it is always possible to switch to a
- * safe stack because #VC exceptions only happen at known places, like
- * intercepted instructions or accesses to MMIO areas/IO ports. They can
- * also happen with code instrumentation when the hypervisor intercepts
- * #DB, but the critical paths are forbidden to be instrumented, so #DB
- * exceptions currently also only happen in safe places.
- *
- * But keep this here in case the noinstr annotations are violated due
- * to bug elsewhere.
- */
- if (unlikely(vc_from_invalid_context(regs))) {
- instrumentation_begin();
- panic("Can't handle #VC exception from unsupported context\n");
- instrumentation_end();
- }
-
/*
* Handle #DB before calling into !noinstr code to avoid recursive #DB.
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index d317dc3d06a3..6c697c175f7a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -864,49 +864,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *eregs)
return regs;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
-asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- unsigned long sp, *stack;
- struct stack_info info;
- struct pt_regs *regs_ret;
-
- /*
- * In the SYSCALL entry path the RSP value comes from user-space - don't
- * trust it and switch to the current kernel stack
- */
- if (ip_within_syscall_gap(regs)) {
- sp = this_cpu_read(pcpu_hot.top_of_stack);
- goto sync;
- }
-
- /*
- * From here on the RSP value is trusted. Now check whether entry
- * happened from a safe stack. Not safe are the entry or unknown stacks,
- * use the fall-back stack instead in this case.
- */
- sp = regs->sp;
- stack = (unsigned long *)sp;
-
- if (!get_stack_info_noinstr(stack, current, &info) || info.type == STACK_TYPE_ENTRY ||
- info.type > STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION_LAST)
- sp = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC2);
-
-sync:
- /*
- * Found a safe stack - switch to it as if the entry didn't happen via
- * IST stack. The code below only copies pt_regs, the real switch happens
- * in assembly code.
- */
- sp = ALIGN_DOWN(sp, 8) - sizeof(*regs_ret);
-
- regs_ret = (struct pt_regs *)sp;
- *regs_ret = *regs;
-
- return regs_ret;
-}
-#endif
-
asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *fixup_bad_iret(struct pt_regs *bad_regs)
{
struct pt_regs tmp, *new_stack;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
index 62341cb819ab..7df1301ec343 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
@@ -153,7 +153,6 @@ static void __init percpu_setup_exception_stacks(unsigned int cpu)
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) {
cea_map_stack(VC);
- cea_map_stack(VC2);
}
}
}
--
2.19.1.6.gb485710b
Powered by blists - more mailing lists