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Message-ID: <20230411125718.2297768-6-aik@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:57:17 +1000
From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>
To: <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <x86@...nel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
"Pankaj Gupta" <pankaj.gupta@....com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>,
"Santosh Shukla" <santosh.shukla@....com>,
Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@....com>,
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>
Subject: [PATCH kernel v5 5/6] KVM: SEV: Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES
Prior to SEV-ES, KVM saved/restored host debug registers upon switching
to/from a VM. Changing those registers inside a running SEV VM
triggered #VMEXIT to KVM.
SEV-ES added encrypted state (ES) which uses an encrypted page
for the VM state (VMSA). The hardware saves/restores certain registers
on VMRUN/VMEXIT according to a swap type (A, B, C), see
"Table B-3. Swap Types" in the AMD Architecture Programmer’s Manual
volume 2.
The DR6 and DR7 registers have always been swapped as Type A for SEV-ES
guests, but a new feature is available, identified via
CPUID Fn8000001F_EAX[14] "DebugSwap for SEV-ES guests", that provides
support for swapping additional debug registers. DR[0-3] and
DR[0-3]_ADDR_MASK are swapped as Type B when SEV_FEATURES[5] (DebugSwap)
is set.
Enable DebugSwap for a VMSA but only do so if CPUID Fn80000021_EAX[0]
("NoNestedDataBp", "Processor ignores nested data breakpoints") is
supported by the SOC as otherwise a malicious SEV-ES guest can set up
data breakpoints on the #DB IDT entry/stack and cause an infinite loop.
Set the features bit in sev_es_sync_vmsa() which is the last point
when VMSA is not encrypted yet as sev_(es_)init_vmcb() (where the most
init happens) is called not only when VCPU is initialized but also on
intrahost migration when VMSA is encrypted.
Eliminate DR7 and #DB intercepts as:
- they are not needed when DebugSwap is supported;
- #VC for these intercepts is most likely not supported anyway and
kills the VM.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
---
Changes:
v8:
* added CPUID's DebugSwap feature
* commit log, comments updated
* redid the whole thing
v4:
* removed sev_es_is_debug_swap_enabled() helper
* made sev_es_debug_swap_enabled (module param) static
* set sev_feature early in sev_es_init_vmcb() and made intercepts
dependend on it vs. module param
* move set_/clr_dr_intercepts to .c
v3:
* rewrote the commit log again
* rebased on tip/master to use recently defined X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP
* s/boot_cpu_has/cpu_feature_enabled/
v2:
* debug_swap moved from vcpu to module_param
* rewrote commit log
---
Tested with:
===
int x;
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
x = 1;
return 0;
}
===
gcc -g a.c
rsync a.out ruby-954vm:~/
ssh -t ruby-954vm 'gdb -ex "file a.out" -ex "watch x" -ex r'
where ruby-954vm is a VM.
With "/sys/module/kvm_amd/parameters/debug_swap = 0", gdb does not stop
on the watchpoint, with "= 1" - gdb does.
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index d9c190cdefa9..3a5eeb178778 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -435,6 +435,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES (19*32+ 3) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
#define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX (19*32+ 9) /* "" Virtual TSC_AUX */
#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
+#define X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP (19*32+14) /* AMD SEV-ES full debug state swap support */
/* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */
#define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0) /* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 770dcf75eaa9..3a422d213010 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_
#define AVIC_HPA_MASK ~((0xFFFULL << 52) | 0xFFF)
#define VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK 0xFFFFFFFFFF000ULL
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5)
struct vmcb_seg {
u16 selector;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index f0885250252d..ba12e7962e94 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <asm/pkru.h>
#include <asm/trapnr.h>
#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include "mmu.h"
#include "x86.h"
@@ -53,9 +54,14 @@ module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
+static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
+module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
#else
#define sev_enabled false
#define sev_es_enabled false
+#define sev_es_debug_swap_enabled false
#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
static u8 sev_enc_bit;
@@ -605,6 +611,9 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
save->xss = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss;
save->dr6 = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6;
+ if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled)
+ save->sev_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
+
pr_debug("Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA):\n");
print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, save, sizeof(*save), false);
@@ -2256,6 +2265,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
out:
sev_enabled = sev_supported;
sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
+ if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) ||
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
+ sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
#endif
}
@@ -2976,14 +2988,20 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
/*
+ * Unless DebugSwap (depends on X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP) is enabled,
* DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest to disallow
* the guest kernel enable debugging as otherwise a VM writing to DR7
* from the #DB handler may trigger infinite loop of #DB's.
*/
vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
- recalc_intercepts(svm);
+ if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) {
+ clr_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
+ /* clr_exception_intercept() called recalc_intercepts() */
+ } else {
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
+ recalc_intercepts(svm);
+ }
/* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
@@ -3048,6 +3066,18 @@ void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
/* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the currnet host value */
hostsa->xss = host_xss;
+
+ /* The DebugSwap SEV feature does Type B swaps of DR[0-3] */
+ if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) {
+ hostsa->dr0 = native_get_debugreg(0);
+ hostsa->dr1 = native_get_debugreg(1);
+ hostsa->dr2 = native_get_debugreg(2);
+ hostsa->dr3 = native_get_debugreg(3);
+ hostsa->dr0_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(0);
+ hostsa->dr1_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(1);
+ hostsa->dr2_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(2);
+ hostsa->dr3_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(3);
+ }
}
void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
--
2.39.1
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