linux-kernel - RE: [PATCH v5 04/15] x86/mtrr: support setting MTRR state for software defined MTRRs

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Message-ID: <BYAPR21MB168853F1DD1B76FACC1CFFFBD79A9@BYAPR21MB1688.namprd21.prod.outlook.com>
Date:   Tue, 11 Apr 2023 13:59:36 +0000
From:   "Michael Kelley (LINUX)" <mikelley@...rosoft.com>
To:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
CC:     "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v5 04/15] x86/mtrr: support setting MTRR state for
 software defined MTRRs

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de> Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2023 6:21 AM
> 
> On Sat, Apr 01, 2023 at 08:36:41AM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:

[snip]

> >
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Only allowed for special virtualization cases:
> > +	 * - when running as SEV-SNP guest
> > +	 * - when running as Hyper-V isolated guest
> 
> 	when running as a SEV-SNP guest on a HyperV with vTOM enabled
> 
> that's a single condition.
> 
> > +	 * - when running as Xen PV guest
> > +	 * - when running as TSX guest
> > +	 */
> > +	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) &&
> > +	    !hv_is_isolation_supported() &&
> > +	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) &&
> > +	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST))
> 
> IOW:
> 
> 	if (!(hv_is_isolation_supported() && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP)) &&
> 	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) &&
> 	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST))
> 

That's doesn't work.  Hyper-V guests with vTOM don't have
CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP.   As previously discussed, the SEV-SNP
machinery is handled by the paravisor, and the Linux guest doesn't
see it.  Enabling CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP in a vTOM guest would
trigger Linux to do a bunch of SNP stuff that the paravisor has already
done and would break things.   The standalone hv_is_isolation_supported()
test is sufficient to detect this case.

I really wanted to avoid calls to hv_is_isolation_supported() outside
of Hyper-V specific code in the kernel.  The alternative is to create
another CC_ATTR_ value that is set in the vTOM case, but that reopens
the naming can-of-worms.

Michael