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Message-ID: <20230413160405.h6ov2yl6l3i7mvsj@box.shutemov.name>
Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2023 19:04:05 +0300
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@...cle.com>,
Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
qemu-devel@...gnu.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@....com>,
Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@...wei.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
"Maciej S . Szmigiero" <mail@...iej.szmigiero.name>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>,
Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
luto@...nel.org, jun.nakajima@...el.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
ak@...ux.intel.com, david@...hat.com, aarcange@...hat.com,
ddutile@...hat.com, dhildenb@...hat.com,
Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>, tabba@...gle.com,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, mhocko@...e.com,
wei.w.wang@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM
On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 06:07:28PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 25, 2023, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 12:20:26AM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > On Tue, Jan 24, 2023, Liam Merwick wrote:
> > > > On 14/01/2023 00:37, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Dec 02, 2022, Chao Peng wrote:
> > > > > > This patch series implements KVM guest private memory for confidential
> > > > > > computing scenarios like Intel TDX[1]. If a TDX host accesses
> > > > > > TDX-protected guest memory, machine check can happen which can further
> > > > > > crash the running host system, this is terrible for multi-tenant
> > > > > > configurations. The host accesses include those from KVM userspace like
> > > > > > QEMU. This series addresses KVM userspace induced crash by introducing
> > > > > > new mm and KVM interfaces so KVM userspace can still manage guest memory
> > > > > > via a fd-based approach, but it can never access the guest memory
> > > > > > content.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The patch series touches both core mm and KVM code. I appreciate
> > > > > > Andrew/Hugh and Paolo/Sean can review and pick these patches. Any other
> > > > > > reviews are always welcome.
> > > > > > - 01: mm change, target for mm tree
> > > > > > - 02-09: KVM change, target for KVM tree
> > > > >
> > > > > A version with all of my feedback, plus reworked versions of Vishal's selftest,
> > > > > is available here:
> > > > >
> > > > > git@...hub.com:sean-jc/linux.git x86/upm_base_support
> > > > >
> > > > > It compiles and passes the selftest, but it's otherwise barely tested. There are
> > > > > a few todos (2 I think?) and many of the commits need changelogs, i.e. it's still
> > > > > a WIP.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > When running LTP (https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp) on the v10
> > > > bits (and also with Sean's branch above) I encounter the following NULL
> > > > pointer dereference with testcases/kernel/syscalls/madvise/madvise01
> > > > (100% reproducible).
> > > >
> > > > It appears that in restrictedmem_error_page()
> > > > inode->i_mapping->private_data is NULL in the
> > > > list_for_each_entry_safe(inode, next, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) but I
> > > > don't know why.
> > >
> > > Kirill, can you take a look? Or pass the buck to someone who can? :-)
> >
> > The patch below should help.
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/restrictedmem.c b/mm/restrictedmem.c
> > index 15c52301eeb9..39ada985c7c0 100644
> > --- a/mm/restrictedmem.c
> > +++ b/mm/restrictedmem.c
> > @@ -307,14 +307,29 @@ void restrictedmem_error_page(struct page *page, struct address_space *mapping)
> >
> > spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
> > list_for_each_entry_safe(inode, next, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
> > - struct restrictedmem *rm = inode->i_mapping->private_data;
> > struct restrictedmem_notifier *notifier;
> > - struct file *memfd = rm->memfd;
> > + struct restrictedmem *rm;
> > unsigned long index;
> > + struct file *memfd;
> >
> > - if (memfd->f_mapping != mapping)
> > + if (atomic_read(&inode->i_count))
>
> Kirill, should this be
>
> if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count))
> continue;
>
> i.e. skip unreferenced inodes, not skip referenced inodes?
Ouch. Yes.
But looking at other instances of s_inodes usage, I think we can drop the
check altogether. inode cannot be completely free until it is removed from
s_inodes list.
While there, replace list_for_each_entry_safe() with
list_for_each_entry() as we don't remove anything from the list.
diff --git a/mm/restrictedmem.c b/mm/restrictedmem.c
index 55e99e6c09a1..8e8a4420d3d1 100644
--- a/mm/restrictedmem.c
+++ b/mm/restrictedmem.c
@@ -194,22 +194,19 @@ static int restricted_error_remove_page(struct address_space *mapping,
struct page *page)
{
struct super_block *sb = restrictedmem_mnt->mnt_sb;
- struct inode *inode, *next;
+ struct inode *inode;
pgoff_t start, end;
start = page->index;
end = start + thp_nr_pages(page);
spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
- list_for_each_entry_safe(inode, next, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
+ list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
struct restrictedmem_notifier *notifier;
struct restrictedmem *rm;
unsigned long index;
struct file *memfd;
- if (atomic_read(&inode->i_count))
- continue;
-
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
if (inode->i_state & (I_NEW | I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE)) {
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
--
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
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