linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] docs: security: Confidential computing intro and threat model

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Message-ID: <ZENR3go7UFkd7/0a@debian.me>
Date:   Sat, 22 Apr 2023 10:17:50 +0700
From:   Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@...il.com>
To:     Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@....com>
Cc:     corbet@....net, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, ardb@...nel.org, kraxel@...hat.com,
        dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com, elena.reshetova@...el.com,
        dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, Dhaval.Giani@....com,
        michael.day@....com, pavankumar.paluri@....com,
        David.Kaplan@....com, Reshma.Lal@....com, Jeremy.Powell@....com,
        sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com,
        alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com, thomas.lendacky@....com,
        tglx@...utronix.de, dgilbert@...hat.com, dinechin@...hat.com,
        linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, berrange@...hat.com, mst@...hat.com,
        tytso@....edu, jikos@...nel.org, joro@...tes.org, leon@...nel.org,
        richard.weinberger@...il.com, lukas@...ner.de, jejb@...ux.ibm.com,
        cdupontd@...hat.com, jasowang@...hat.com, sameo@...osinc.com,
        bp@...en8.de, seanjc@...gle.com, security@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] docs: security: Confidential computing intro and threat
 model

On Wed, Mar 29, 2023 at 12:40:24PM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> > +   * - Guest malicious configuration
> > +     - A malicious host modifies one of the following guest's
> > +       configuration:
> > +
> > +       1. Guest firmware or bootloader
> > +
> > +       2. Guest kernel or module binaries
> > +
> > +       3. Guest command line parameters
> > +
> > +       This allows the host to break the integrity of the code running
> > +       inside a CoCo guest and violate the CoCo security objectives.
> 
> So hosts are not allowed to change this?  I don't understand the use of
> "violate" here, sorry.

I think the situation described above is when malicious actors gain
control of a CoCo host.

Thanks.

-- 
An old man doll... just what I always wanted! - Clara

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