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Date:   Sun, 23 Apr 2023 13:37:24 +0800
From:   "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To:     Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
CC:     <seanjc@...gle.com>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>, <peterz@...radead.org>,
        <john.allen@....com>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization


On 4/22/2023 5:54 AM, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Fri, Apr 21, 2023 at 09:45:54AM -0400, Yang Weijiang wrote:
>> [...]
>>
>> [1]: linux-next: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/tree/?h=next-20230420
>> [2]: QEMU patch: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230421041227.90915-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com/
>> [3]: v1 patchset: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220616084643.19564-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com/
>> [4]: Rebase branch: https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux.git, commit: 7b632f72528d (tag: kvm-x86-next-2023.04.14)
>   
> I played a bit with KVM support for shadow stacks on AMD machines and I
> rebased v1 patches along with John's SVM series
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20221012203910.204793-1-john.allen@amd.com/
>
> on top of v6.3-rc4 and Rick's series for host shadow stack support. I've
> put this at
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rppt/linux.git/log/?h=shstk/kvm
>
> if anybody is interested. With this I could successfully run shadow stack
> self test in a guest on an AMD Zen3 machine.
>
> One thing I've noticed while rebasing is that John's patches move
> cet_is_msr_accessible() from vmx/ to x86.c and I also had to make such move
> for cet_is_ssp_msr_accessible().
>
> Would make sense to have them available for both VMX and SVM from the
> start.

Hi, Mike,

Yes, it makes sense to do so. I'll include the change in next version so 
that John's patchset can

omit the work, thanks!

[...]


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