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Message-ID: <918166a78f5306210b1877107609cbd340f79a67.camel@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 3 May 2023 17:06:57 +0000
From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To: "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
"pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
"Christopherson,, Sean" <seanjc@...gle.com>,
"john.allen@....com" <john.allen@....com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 21/21] KVM:x86: Support CET supervisor shadow stack MSR
access
On Fri, 2023-04-21 at 09:46 -0400, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> @@ -2471,6 +2495,12 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> struct msr_data *msr_info)
> else
> kvm_set_xsave_msr(msr_info);
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP:
> + case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> + if (!cet_is_msr_accessible(vcpu, msr_info))
> + return 1;
> + kvm_set_xsave_msr(msr_info);
> + break;
These are supposed to be canonical too, right?
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