linux-kernel - Re: [GIT PULL] x86/mm for 6.4

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Message-ID: <20230504171032.wk53kzswwugmofhh@box.shutemov.name>
Date:   Thu, 4 May 2023 20:10:32 +0300
From:   "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86/mm for 6.4

On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 08:25:58AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 5/3/23 23:28, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> >> Untagging a kernel address will "corrupt" it, but it will stay a
> >> kernel address (well, it will stay a "high bit set" address), which is
> >> all we care about anyway.
> > The interesting case to consider is untagging kernel pointer when LAM_U48
> > is enabled (not part of current LAM enabling). LAM_U48 would make the
> > untagging mask wider -- ~GENMASK(62, 48). With 5-level paging and LAM_SUP
> > enabled (also not supported yet) untagging kernel may transform it to
> > other valid kernel pointer.
> > 
> > So we cannot rely on #GP as backstop here. The kernel has to exclude
> > kernel pointer by other means. It can be fun to debug.
> 
> Yeah, I have the feeling that we're really going to need a pair of
> untagging functions once we get to doing kernel LAM for a _bunch_ of
> reasons.

There's already arch_kasan_reset_tag() used on ARM64 (and two more helpers
to set/get tag). Don't see a reason to add new.

> Just as a practical matter, I think we should OR bits into the mask on
> the kernel side, effectively:
> 
> unsigned long untag_kernel_addr(unsigned long addr)
> {
> 	return addr | kernel_untag_mask;
> }
> 
> and kernel_untag_mask should have bit 63 *clear*.
> 
> That way the pointers that have gone through untagging won't look silly.
>  If you untag VMALLOC_END or something, it'll still look like the
> addresses we have in mm.rst.
> 
> Also, it'll be impossible to have the mask turn a userspace address into
> a kernel one.
> 
> Last, we can add some debugging in there, probably conditional on some
> mm debugging options like:
> 
> 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!valid_user_address(addr)))
> 		return 0;
> 
> It's kinda like "void __user *" versus "void *".  The __user ones can
> *absolutely* point anywhere, user or kernel.  That's why we can't WARN()
> in the untagged_addr() function that takes user pointers.
> 
> But "void *" can only point to the kernel.  It has totally different rules.
> 
> We should probably also do something like the attached patch sooner
> rather than later.  'untag_mask' really is a misleading name for a mask
> that gets applied only to user addresses.

A bit too verbose to my liking, but okay.

Maybe _uaddr() instead of _user_addr()?

-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov