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Message-ID: <1195c4bd-ef54-2f1d-b079-2a11af42c62f@meta.com>
Date: Wed, 10 May 2023 13:20:30 -0700
From: Yonghong Song <yhs@...a.com>
To: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@...il.com>
Cc: Ze Gao <zegao2021@...il.com>, Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>,
Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Ze Gao <zegao@...cent.com>, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] bpf: reject blacklisted symbols in kprobe_multi to avoid
recursive trap
On 5/10/23 10:27 AM, Jiri Olsa wrote:
> On Wed, May 10, 2023 at 07:13:58AM -0700, Yonghong Song wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 5/10/23 5:20 AM, Ze Gao wrote:
>>> BPF_LINK_TYPE_KPROBE_MULTI attaches kprobe programs through fprobe,
>>> however it does not takes those kprobe blacklisted into consideration,
>>> which likely introduce recursive traps and blows up stacks.
>>>
>>> this patch adds simple check and remove those are in kprobe_blacklist
>>> from one fprobe during bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach. And also
>>> check_kprobe_address_safe is open for more future checks.
>>>
>>> note that ftrace provides recursion detection mechanism, but for kprobe
>>> only, we can directly reject those cases early without turning to ftrace.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Ze Gao <zegao@...cent.com>
>>> ---
>>> kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
>>> index 9a050e36dc6c..44c68bc06bbd 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
>>> @@ -2764,6 +2764,37 @@ static int get_modules_for_addrs(struct module ***mods, unsigned long *addrs, u3
>>> return arr.mods_cnt;
>>> }
>>> +static inline int check_kprobe_address_safe(unsigned long addr)
>>> +{
>>> + if (within_kprobe_blacklist(addr))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + else
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int check_bpf_kprobe_addrs_safe(unsigned long *addrs, int num)
>>> +{
>>> + int i, cnt;
>>> + char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN];
>>> +
>>> + for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
>>> + if (check_kprobe_address_safe((unsigned long)addrs[i])) {
>>> + lookup_symbol_name(addrs[i], symname);
>>> + pr_warn("bpf_kprobe: %s at %lx is blacklisted\n", symname, addrs[i]);
>>
>> So user request cannot be fulfilled and a warning is issued and some
>> of user requests are discarded and the rest is proceeded. Does not
>> sound a good idea.
>>
>> Maybe we should do filtering in user space, e.g., in libbpf, check
>> /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/blacklist and return error
>> earlier? bpftrace/libbpf-tools/bcc-tools all do filtering before
>> requesting kprobe in the kernel.
>
> also fprobe uses ftrace drectly without paths in kprobe, so I wonder
> some of the kprobe blacklisted functions are actually safe
Could you give a pointer about 'some of the kprobe blacklisted
functions are actually safe'?
>
> jirka
>
>>
>>> + /* mark blacklisted symbol for remove */
>>> + addrs[i] = 0;
>>> + }
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + /* remove blacklisted symbol from addrs */
>>> + for (i = 0, cnt = 0; i < num; ++i) {
>>> + if (addrs[i])
>>> + addrs[cnt++] = addrs[i];
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + return cnt;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> int bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
>>> {
>>> struct bpf_kprobe_multi_link *link = NULL;
>>> @@ -2859,6 +2890,12 @@ int bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *pr
>>> else
>>> link->fp.entry_handler = kprobe_multi_link_handler;
>>> + cnt = check_bpf_kprobe_addrs_safe(addrs, cnt);
>>> + if (!cnt) {
>>> + err = -EINVAL;
>>> + goto error;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> link->addrs = addrs;
>>> link->cookies = cookies;
>>> link->cnt = cnt;
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