linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 6/9] KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if a vCPU ends up in long mode without PAE enabled

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Message-ID: <ZF7OiYzjkG2cp7Fi@google.com>
Date:   Fri, 12 May 2023 16:40:57 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To:     David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@...gle.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/9] KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if a vCPU ends up in long
 mode without PAE enabled

On Fri, May 12, 2023, David Matlack wrote:
> On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 04:59:14PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > Promote the ASSERT(), which is quite dead code in KVM, into a KVM_BUG_ON()
> > for KVM's sanity check that CR4.PAE=1 if the vCPU is in long mode when
> > performing a walk of guest page tables.  The sanity is quite cheap since
> > neither EFER nor CR4.PAE requires a VMREAD, especially relative to the
> > cost of walking the guest page tables.
> > 
> > More importantly, the sanity check would have prevented the true badness
> > fixed by commit 112e66017bff ("KVM: nVMX: add missing consistency checks
> > for CR0 and CR4").  The missed consistency check resulted in some versions
> > of KVM corrupting the on-stack guest_walker structure due to KVM thinking
> > there are 4/5 levels of page tables, but wiring up the MMU hooks to point
> > at the paging32 implementation, which only allocates space for two levels
> > of page tables in "struct guest_walker32".
> > 
> > Queue a page fault for injection if the assertion fails, as the sole
> > caller, FNAME(gva_to_gpa), assumes that walker.fault contains sane info
> 
> FNAME(page_fault)->FNAME(walk_addr)->FNAME(walk_addr_generic) is another
> caller but I think the same reasoning here applies.

Huh.  No idea what I was doing.  Missed the super obvious use case...  I'll make
sure the call from walk_addr() does something not awful.

> > on a walk failure, i.e. avoid making the situation worse between the time
> > the assertion fails and when KVM kicks the vCPU out to userspace (because
> > the VM is bugged).
> > 
> > Move the check below the initialization of "pte_access" so that the
> > aforementioned to-be-injected page fault doesn't consume uninitialized
> > stack data.  The information _shouldn't_ reach the guest or userspace,
> > but there's zero downside to being paranoid in this case.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 5 ++++-
> >  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > index a3fc7c1a7f8d..f297e9311dcd 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > @@ -338,7 +338,6 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
> >  	}
> >  #endif
> >  	walker->max_level = walker->level;
> > -	ASSERT(!(is_long_mode(vcpu) && !is_pae(vcpu)));
> >  
> >  	/*
> >  	 * FIXME: on Intel processors, loads of the PDPTE registers for PAE paging
> > @@ -348,6 +347,10 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
> >  	nested_access = (have_ad ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0) | PFERR_USER_MASK;
> >  
> >  	pte_access = ~0;
> > +
> > +	if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_long_mode(vcpu) && !is_pae(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
> > +		goto error;
> 
> This if() deserves a comment since it's queueing a page fault for what
> is likely a KVM bug. As a reader that'd be pretty jarring to see.

Will add.