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Message-ID: <20230512110455.GD14461@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 12:04:55 +0100
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Cc: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@...cle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com, ardb@...nel.org,
James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com, luto@...capital.net,
nivedita@...m.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com,
trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch
early measurements
On Tue, May 09, 2023 at 06:21:44PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> SHA-1 is insecure. Why are you still using SHA-1? Don't TPMs support SHA-2
> now?
TXT is supported on some TPM 1.2 systems as well. TPM 2 systems are also
at the whim of the firmware in terms of whether the SHA-2 banks are
enabled. But even if the SHA-2 banks are enabled, if you suddenly stop
extending the SHA-1 banks, a malicious actor can later turn up and
extend whatever they want into them and present a SHA-1-only
attestation. Ideally whatever is handling that attestation should know
whether or not to expect an attestation with SHA-2, but the easiest way
to maintain security is to always extend all banks.
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