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Message-ID: <20230512161318.GA18400@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 17:13:18 +0100
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@...cle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de,
hpa@...or.com, James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com,
luto@...capital.net, nivedita@...m.mit.edu,
kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com, trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch
early measurements
On Fri, May 12, 2023 at 03:24:04PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, May 12 2023 at 12:28, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > Unless we assert that SHA-1 events are unsupported, it seems a bit odd
> > to force a policy on people who have both banks enabled. People with
> > mixed fleets are potentially going to be dealing with SHA-1 measurements
> > for a while yet, and while there's obviously a security benefit in using
> > SHA-2 instead it'd be irritating to have to maintain two attestation
> > policies.
>
> Why?
>
> If you have a mixed fleet then it's not too much asked to provide two
> data sets. On a TPM2 system you can enforce SHA-2 and only fallback to
> SHA-1 on TPM 1.2 hardware. No?
No, beause having TPM2 hardware doesn't guarantee that your firmware
enables SHA-2 (which also means this is something that could change with
firmware updates, which means that refusing to support SHA-1 if the
SHA-2 banks are enabled could result in an entirely different policy
being required (and plausibly one that isn't implemented in their
existing tooling)
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