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Message-ID: <6cb7df56-0479-30be-5389-b4b819572deb@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 16 May 2023 16:14:47 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: jeffxu@...omium.org, luto@...nel.org, jorgelo@...omium.org,
keescook@...omium.org, groeck@...omium.org, jannh@...gle.com,
sroettger@...gle.com
Cc: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, jeffxu@...gle.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/6] PKEY: Introduce PKEY_ENFORCE_API flag
On 5/15/23 06:05, jeffxu@...omium.org wrote:
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
> @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
> /* Do we need to assign a pkey for mm's execute-only maps? */
> if (execute_only_pkey == -1) {
> /* Go allocate one to use, which might fail */
> - execute_only_pkey = mm_pkey_alloc(mm);
> + execute_only_pkey = mm_pkey_alloc(mm, 0);
> if (execute_only_pkey < 0)
> return -1;
> need_to_set_mm_pkey = true;
In your threat model, what mechanism prevents the attacker from
modifying executable mappings?
I was trying to figure out if the implicit execute-only pkey should have
the PKEY_ENFORCE_API bit set. I think that in particular would probably
cause some kind of ABI breakage, but it still reminded me that I have an
incomplete picture of the threat model.
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