linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Track supported ARCH_CAPABILITIES in kvm

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Message-ID: <ff2a97c2-1e8f-4adb-78c2-3cf5037f139f@intel.com>
Date:   Tue, 23 May 2023 03:31:44 +0800
From:   Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Track supported ARCH_CAPABILITIES in kvm_caps

On 5/23/2023 1:43 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>>    6. Performance aside, KVM should not be speculating (ha!) on what the guest
>>>       will and will not do, and should instead honor whatever behavior is presented
>>>       to the guest.  If the guest CPU model indicates that VERW flushes buffers,
>>>       then KVM damn well needs to let VERW flush buffers.
>> The current implementation allows guests to have VERW flush buffers when
>> they enumerate FB_CLEAR. It only restricts the flush behavior when the
>> guest is trying to mitigate against a vulnerability(like MDS) on a
>> hardware that is not affected. I guess its common for guests to be
>> running with older gen configuration on a newer hardware.
> Right, I'm saying that that behavior is wrong.  KVM shouldn't assume the guest
> the guest will do things a certain way and should instead honor the "architectural"
> definition, in quotes because I realize there probably is no architectural
> definition for any of this.
> 
> It might be that the code does (unintentionally?) honor the "architecture", i.e.
> this code might actually be accurrate with respect to when the guest can expect
> VERW to flush buffers.  But the comment is so, so wrong.

The comment is wrong and the code is wrong in some case as well.

If none of ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR, ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO, ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO, 
ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO, ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO and ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO are 
exposed to VM, the VM is type of "affected by MDS".

And accroding to the page 
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/processor-mmio-stale-data-vulnerabilities.html

if the VM enumerates support for both L1D_FLUSH and MD_CLEAR, it 
implicitly enumerates FB_CLEAR as part of their MD_CLEAR support.

However, the code will leave vmx->disable_fb_clear as 1 if hardware 
supports it, and VERW intruction doesn't clear FB in the VM, which 
conflicts "architectural" definition.

> 	/*
> 	 * If guest will not execute VERW, there is no need to set FB_CLEAR_DIS
> 	 * at VMEntry. Skip the MSR read/write when a guest has no use case to
> 	 * execute VERW.
> 	 */
> 	if ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
> 	   ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
> 	    (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
> 	    (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO) &&
> 	    (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO) &&
> 	    (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO)))
> 		vmx->disable_fb_clear = false;