linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] security: keys: perform capable check only on privileged operations

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSbZ5YheAVec5a=Xht85mNu6wRjeYaoqPGSiHjFP2NN6Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 25 May 2023 17:25:01 -0400
From:   Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To:     Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
Cc:     selinux@...r.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security: keys: perform capable check only on privileged operations

On Tue, May 23, 2023 at 2:33 PM Christian Göttsche
<cgzones@...glemail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 19 May 2023 at 23:08, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 8:33 AM Christian Göttsche
> > <cgzones@...glemail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > If the current task fails the check for the queried capability via
> > > `capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)` LSMs like SELinux generate a denial message.
> > > Issuing such denial messages unnecessarily can lead to a policy author
> > > granting more privileges to a subject than needed to silence them.
> > >
> > > Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks after the check whether the operation is
> > > actually privileged.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>
> > > ---
> > >  security/keys/keyctl.c | 11 ++++++++---
> > >  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
> > > index d54f73c558f7..19be69fa4d05 100644
> > > --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
> > > +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
> > > @@ -980,14 +980,19 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
> > >         ret = -EACCES;
> > >         down_write(&key->sem);
> > >
> > > -       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> > > +       {
> > > +               bool is_privileged_op = false;
> > > +
> > >                 /* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
> > >                 if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid))
> > > -                       goto error_put;
> > > +                       is_privileged_op = true;
> > >
> > >                 /* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
> > >                  * than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
> > >                 if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid))
> > > +                       is_privileged_op = true;
> > > +
> > > +               if (is_privileged_op && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > >                         goto error_put;
> > >         }
> >
> > Hmm.  Using braces just to create a new scope is a bit hacky; I'll
> > admit to using it to quickly create new local variables, but I only do
> > so in debug/test situations, not production code.
> >
> > What if you move the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check down into the if-conditional
> > where the code checks to see if CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed when changing
> > the UID?  It should be possible to structure the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check
> > such that it is only executed if needed.  It's a little more
> > complicated in the GID case, but I believe it should be doable.
>
> This complication I exactly wanted to avoid.  For me the inner scope
> encapsulates the all the logic around the capability check just fine
> and is quite readable.  An alternative would be to create a new
> function performing the checks and call it via
>
>     if (!chown_key_capable(key, user, uid, group, gid))
>         got error_put;
>
> A minor inconvenience is the number of needed arguments (and the
> actual code after inlining should be the same to the inner scope in
> the end).

Well, lucky for you, Jarkko and David maintain the keys code, not me,
and Jarkko seems to like your patch just fine :)

Jarkko, I assume you'll be taking this via the keys tree?

-- 
paul-moore.com