Message-ID: <CAHk-=wiPjcPL_50WRWOi-Fmi9TYO6yp_oj63a_N84FzG-rxGKQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 25 May 2023 09:07:23 -0700
From:   Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To:     Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@...e.com>
Cc:     Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
        rafael@...nel.org, song@...nel.org, lucas.de.marchi@...il.com,
        lucas.demarchi@...el.com, christophe.leroy@...roup.eu,
        peterz@...radead.org, rppt@...nel.org, dave@...olabs.net,
        willy@...radead.org, vbabka@...e.cz, mhocko@...e.com,
        dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, colin.i.king@...il.com,
        jim.cromie@...il.com, catalin.marinas@....com, jbaron@...mai.com,
        rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com, yujie.liu@...el.com, david@...hat.com,
        tglx@...utronix.de, hch@....de, patches@...ts.linux.dev,
        linux-modules@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, pmladek@...e.com, prarit@...hat.com,
        lennart@...ttering.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] module: add support to avoid duplicates early on load

On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 4:40 AM Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@...e.com> wrote:
>
> kmod normally uses finit_module() only if a module is not compressed,
> otherwise it decompresses it first and then invokes init_module().

Note that it would probably be good to teach Fedora and SuSE to use
the kernel-side decompression, if only because we have it and would
like to try to avoid using the old "load contents from user memory".

Mainly because it allows security modules to actively check for
tampering (ie things like verity etc). Long-term, it would be good to
just deprecate the old init_module() entirely.

But yes:

> It means that these and similarly organized distributions end up using
> init_module(), and adding complexity to optimize finit_module() wouldn't
> actually help in their case.

Yeah, I think the real bug is absolutely in udev, and trying to load
the same module hundreds of times is very very wrong. So I think the
"mitigate it in the kernel" is at most a quick hack to fix user-space
brokenness.

And I don't think 1/2 is acceptable as that "quick hack". Not at all.
It also seems fundamentally buggy, as it uses purely the inode number
as the file identity, which means that it does bad things across
filesystem limits.

That said, I posted an alternate patch that I think _is_ valid as that
quick hack. I don't love it, but it sure is simpler (and avoids the
i_ino bug):

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wgKu=tJf1bm_dtme4Hde4zTB=_7EdgR8avsDRK4_jD+uA@mail.gmail.com/

that patch hasn't seen any testing, and for all I know it won't even
boot because of some thinko, but I think it would be acceptable as a
workaround if it does work.

But no, it's not some kind of "fix" for the bug, and yes, using
init_module() rather than finit_module() will circumvent the quick
hack. The true fix would be for udev to do proper handling of its data
structures instead of randomly spraying duplicate module loading
events.

I don't know why udev does what it does. From what Luis told me,
apparently it's just forking stuff and keeping all its data structures
in memory, and has no actual consistency or locking or memory of what
it has done. Luis pointed me at

    https://lore.kernel.org/all/23bd0ce6-ef78-1cd8-1f21-0e706a00424a@suse.com/T/#u

for some udev background.

It's been about a decade since I looked at udev sources, and none of
this encourages me to take a second look, so all of the above may be
me misunderstanding just exactly what the udev problem is. But for
that 'finit' case, we *could* try that simple hack of mine.

I say "hack", but the patch really is pretty simple, and the concept
of "exclusive special access" certainly is not some hack in itself.
It's just not anything we've ever done before. So the hackishness from
that exclusive_deny_write_access() thing in my patch is mainly that it
shouldn't be needed at all (and that the exclusivity should probably
be set some other way).

Comments welcome.

                  Linus

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