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Message-ID: <64336829-60c5-afe1-81ad-91b4f354aef3@amd.com>
Date:   Tue, 30 May 2023 18:57:46 +1000
From:   Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>,
        Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>,
        Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@....com>,
        Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH kernel v5 5/6] KVM: SEV: Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES



On 27/5/23 00:39, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, May 26, 2023, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>
>> On 24/5/23 01:44, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> On Tue, May 23, 2023, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>>>> Actually, can't disabling #DB interception for DebugSwap SEV-ES guests be a
>>>>> separate patch?  KVM can still inject #DBs for SEV-ES guests, no?
>>>>
>>>> Sorry for my ignorance but what is the point of injecting #DB if there is no
>>>> way of changing the guest's DR7?
>>>
>>> Well, _injecting_ the #DB is necessary for correctness from the guest's perspective.
>>> "What's the point of _intercepting_ #DB" is the real question.  And for SEV-ES guests
>>> with DebugSwap, there is no point, which is why I agree that KVM should disable
>>> interception in that case.  What I'm calling out is that disabling #Db interception
>>> isn't _necessary_ for correctness (unless I'm missing something), which means that
>>> it can and should go in a separate patch.
>>
>>
>> About this. Instead of sev_es_init_vmcb(), I can toggle the #DB intercept
>> when toggling guest_debug, see below. This
>> kvm_x86_ops::update_exception_bitmap hook is called on vcpu reset and
>> kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug (which skips this call if
>> guest_state_protected = true).
> 
> KVM also intercepts #DB when single-stepping over IRET to find an NMI window, so
> you'd also have to factor in nmi_singlestep, and update svm_enable_nmi_window()
> and disable_nmi_singlestep() to call svm_update_exception_bitmap().

Uff. New can of worms for me :-/


>> Is there any downside?
> 
> Complexity is the main one.  The complexity is quite low, but the benefit to the
> guest is likely even lower.  A #DB in the guest isn't likely to be performance
> sensitive.  And on the flip side, opening an NMI window would be a tiny bit more
> expensive, though I doubt that would be meaningful either.
> 
> All in all, I think it makes sense to just keep intercepting #DB for non-SEV-ES
> guests.
> 
> Side topic, isn't there an existing bug regarding SEV-ES NMI windows?  KVM can't
> actually single-step an SEV-ES guest, but tries to set RFLAGS.TF anyways. 

Why is it a "bug" and what does the patch fix? Sound to me as it is 
pointless and the guest won't do single stepping and instead will run 
till it exits somehow, what do I miss?

> Blech,
> and suppressing EFER.SVME in efer_trap() is a bit gross,

Why suppressed? svm_set_efer() sets it eventually anyway.

> but I suppose since the
> GHCB doesn't allow for CLGI or STGI it's "fine".

GHCB does not mention this, instead these are always intercepted in 
init_vmcb().

> E.g. shouldn't KVM do this?

It sure can and I am happy to include this into the series, the commit 
log is what I am struggling with :)

> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index ca32389f3c36..4e4a49031efe 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -3784,6 +3784,16 @@ static void svm_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>          if (svm_get_nmi_mask(vcpu) && !svm->awaiting_iret_completion)
>                  return; /* IRET will cause a vm exit */
>   
> +       /*
> +        * KVM can't single-step SEV-ES guests and instead assumes that IRET
> +        * in the guest will always succeed, 

It relies on GHCB's NMI_COMPLETE (which SVM than handles is it was IRET):

         case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
                 ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_IRET);
                 break;


> i.e. clears NMI masking on the
> +        * next VM-Exit.  Note, GIF is guaranteed to be '1' for SEV-ES guests
> +        * as the GHCB doesn't allow for CLGI or STGI (and KVM suppresses
> +        * EFER.SVME for good measure, see efer_trap()).

SVM KVM seems to not enforce EFER.SVME, the guest does what it wants and 
KVM is only told the new value via EFER_WRITE_TRAP. And "writes by 
SEV-ES guests to EFER.SVME are always ignored by hardware" says the APM. 
I must be missing the point here...


> +        */
> +       if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
> +               return;
> +
>          if (!gif_set(svm)) {
>                  if (vgif)
>                          svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);

-- 
Alexey

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