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Message-ID: <c4e8d060-deb5-bce9-cb65-cd0dc9ed7735@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 31 May 2023 08:58:43 -0500
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, x86@...nel.org,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Arjan van de Veen <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Paul McKenney <paulmck@...nel.org>,
Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@...alenko.name>,
Paul Menzel <pmenzel@...gen.mpg.de>,
"Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@...lia.com>,
Piotr Gorski <lucjan.lucjanov@...il.com>,
Usama Arif <usama.arif@...edance.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org,
Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Guo Ren <guoren@...nel.org>,
linux-csky@...r.kernel.org,
Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@...ha.franken.de>,
linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@....de>, linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Sabin Rapan <sabrapan@...zon.com>,
"Michael Kelley (LINUX)" <mikelley@...rosoft.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [patch] x86/smpboot: Fix the parallel bringup decision
On 5/31/23 02:44, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> The decision to allow parallel bringup of secondary CPUs checks
> CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT to detect encrypted guests. Those cannot use
> parallel bootup because accessing the local APIC is intercepted and raises
> a #VC or #VE, which cannot be handled at that point.
>
> The check works correctly, but only for AMD encrypted guests. TDX does not
> set that flag.
>
> As there is no real connection between CC attributes and the inability to
> support parallel bringup, replace this with a generic control flag in
> x86_cpuinit and let SEV-ES and TDX init code disable it.
>
> Fixes: 0c7ffa32dbd6 ("x86/smpboot/64: Implement arch_cpuhp_init_parallel_bringup() and enable it")
> Reported-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Still works for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP with parallel boot properly disabled.
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> ---
> arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 11 +++++++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 3 +++
> arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 19 ++-----------------
> arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 1 +
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> @@ -871,5 +871,16 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
> x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = tdx_tlb_flush_required;
> x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish = tdx_enc_status_changed;
>
> + /*
> + * TDX intercepts the RDMSR to read the X2APIC ID in the parallel
> + * bringup low level code. That raises #VE which cannot be handled
> + * there.
> + *
> + * Intel-TDX has a secure RDMSR hypercall, but that needs to be
> + * implemented seperately in the low level startup ASM code.
> + * Until that is in place, disable parallel bringup for TDX.
> + */
> + x86_cpuinit.parallel_bringup = false;
> +
> pr_info("Guest detected\n");
> }
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> @@ -177,11 +177,14 @@ struct x86_init_ops {
> * struct x86_cpuinit_ops - platform specific cpu hotplug setups
> * @setup_percpu_clockev: set up the per cpu clock event device
> * @early_percpu_clock_init: early init of the per cpu clock event device
> + * @fixup_cpu_id: fixup function for cpuinfo_x86::phys_proc_id
> + * @parallel_bringup: Parallel bringup control
> */
> struct x86_cpuinit_ops {
> void (*setup_percpu_clockev)(void);
> void (*early_percpu_clock_init)(void);
> void (*fixup_cpu_id)(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int node);
> + bool parallel_bringup;
> };
>
> struct timespec64;
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
> @@ -1267,23 +1267,8 @@ void __init smp_prepare_cpus_common(void
> /* Establish whether parallel bringup can be supported. */
> bool __init arch_cpuhp_init_parallel_bringup(void)
> {
> - /*
> - * Encrypted guests require special handling. They enforce X2APIC
> - * mode but the RDMSR to read the APIC ID is intercepted and raises
> - * #VC or #VE which cannot be handled in the early startup code.
> - *
> - * AMD-SEV does not provide a RDMSR GHCB protocol so the early
> - * startup code cannot directly communicate with the secure
> - * firmware. The alternative solution to retrieve the APIC ID via
> - * CPUID(0xb), which is covered by the GHCB protocol, is not viable
> - * either because there is no enforcement of the CPUID(0xb)
> - * provided "initial" APIC ID to be the same as the real APIC ID.
> - *
> - * Intel-TDX has a secure RDMSR hypercall, but that needs to be
> - * implemented seperately in the low level startup ASM code.
> - */
> - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) {
> - pr_info("Parallel CPU startup disabled due to guest state encryption\n");
> + if (!x86_cpuinit.parallel_bringup) {
> + pr_info("Parallel CPU startup disabled by the platform\n");
> return false;
> }
>
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
> @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ struct x86_init_ops x86_init __initdata
> struct x86_cpuinit_ops x86_cpuinit = {
> .early_percpu_clock_init = x86_init_noop,
> .setup_percpu_clockev = setup_secondary_APIC_clock,
> + .parallel_bringup = true,
> };
>
> static void default_nmi_init(void) { };
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
> @@ -501,6 +501,21 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
> x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish = amd_enc_status_change_finish;
> x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = amd_enc_tlb_flush_required;
> x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = amd_enc_cache_flush_required;
> +
> + /*
> + * AMD-SEV-ES intercepts the RDMSR to read the X2APIC ID in the
> + * parallel bringup low level code. That raises #VC which cannot be
> + * handled there.
> + * It does not provide a RDMSR GHCB protocol so the early startup
> + * code cannot directly communicate with the secure firmware. The
> + * alternative solution to retrieve the APIC ID via CPUID(0xb),
> + * which is covered by the GHCB protocol, is not viable either
> + * because there is no enforcement of the CPUID(0xb) provided
> + * "initial" APIC ID to be the same as the real APIC ID.
> + * Disable parallel bootup.
> + */
> + if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED)
> + x86_cpuinit.parallel_bringup = false;
> }
>
> void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void)
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