linux-kernel - [PATCH] KVM: VMX: remove LFENCE in vmx_spec_ctrl_restore

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Date:   Wed, 31 May 2023 11:01:12 -0400
From:   Jon Kohler <jon@...anix.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
        Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
        Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Jon Kohler <jon@...anix.com>,
        Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: remove LFENCE in vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host()

Remove barrier_nospec(), which translates to LFENCE, in
vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() as RSB-barriers (as defined by [1])
already exist prior to this point.

This LFENCE was added on commit fc02735b14ff ("KVM: VMX: Prevent guest
RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS") in the 5.19 timeframe; however,
commit 2b1299322016 ("x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections") in
6.0 timeframe added a LFENCE for X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE was added
directly in vmx_vmexit, prior to CALL vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host.

For posterity, vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host also will execute WRMSR to
IA32_SPEC_CTRL for X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS or when guest/host MSR value
does not match, which serves as an additional RSB-barrier.

[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/post-barrier-return-stack-buffer-predictions.html

Fixes: fc02735b14ff ("KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS")
Fixes: 2b1299322016 ("x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections")
Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@...anix.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
CC: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>
CC: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
CC: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
CC: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 44fb619803b8..98ca8b79aab1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7130,8 +7130,6 @@ void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
 	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) ||
 	    vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval)
 		native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval);
-
-	barrier_nospec();
 }
 
 static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-- 
2.30.1 (Apple Git-130)