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Message-ID: <CALMp9eQ247GCxHnn3VwFatKEswWq9cMaoZCOivC-OQ_asvFHZQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 1 Jun 2023 13:20:40 -0700
From:   Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
To:     Jon Kohler <jon@...anix.com>
Cc:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] KVM: VMX: do not disable interception for
 MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL on eIBRS

On Thu, Jun 1, 2023 at 12:28 PM Jon Kohler <jon@...anix.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Jun 1, 2023, at 1:43 PM, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, May 31, 2023, Jon Kohler wrote:
> >>
> >>> On May 31, 2023, at 2:30 PM, Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On Wed, May 31, 2023 at 11:17 AM Jon Kohler <jon@...anix.com> wrote:
> >>>> Yea, I thought about it. One one hand, simplicity is kingand on the other
> >>>> hand, not having to think about this again is nice too.
> >>>>
> >>>> The challenge in my mind is that on setups where this truly is static, we’d
> >>>> be taking some incremental amount of memory to keep the counter around,
> >
> > Not really.  The vCPU structures are already order-2 allocations, increasing the
> > size by 8-16 bytes doesn't affect the actual memory usage in practice.  Death by
> > a thousand cuts is a potential problem, but we're a ways away from crossing back
> > over into order-3 allocations.
> >
> >>>> just to have the same outcome each time. Doesn’t feel right (to me) unless that is
> >>>> also used for “other” stuff as some sort of general purpose/common counter.
> >
> > ...
> >
> >> Yes, there is places this could be stuffed I’m sure. Still feels a bit heavy
> >> handed for the same-outcome-every-time situations though.
> >
> > There's no guarantee the outcome will be the same.  You're assuming that (a) the
> > guest is eIBRS aware, (b) SPEC_CTRL doesn't get extended for future mitigations,
> > and (c) that if L1 is running VMs of its own, that L1 is advertising eIBRS to L2
> > and that the L2 kernel is also aware of eIBRS.
> >
> >>>> RE Cost: I can’t put my finger on it, but I swear that RDMSR for *this*
> >>>> specific MSR is more expensive than any other RDMSR I’ve come across
> >>>> for run-of-the-mill random MSRs. I flipped thru the SDM and the mitigations
> >>>> documentation, and it only ever mentions that there is a notable cost to
> >>>> do WRMSR IA32_SPEC_CTRL, but nothing about the RDMSR side.
> >>>>
> >>>> If anyone happens to know from an Intel-internals perspective, I’d be quite
> >>>> interested to know why it just “feels” so darn costly. i.e. is the proc also doing
> >>>> special things under the covers, similar to what the processor does on
> >>>> writes to this one?
> >>>
> >>> What do you mean by "feels"? Have you measured it?
> >>
> >> There are plenty of rdmsr’s scattered around the entry and exit paths that get
> >> hit every time, but this is far and away always the most expensive one when
> >> profiling with perf top. I haven’t measured it separately from the existing code,
> >> But rather noted during profiling that it appears to be nastier than others.
> >>
> >> I’m more curious than anything else, but it doesn’t matter all that much going
> >> forward since this commit will nuke it from orbit for the run of the mill
> >> eIBRS-only use cases.
> >
> > As above, you're making multiple assumptions that may or may not hold true.  I
> > agree with Jim, reacting to what the guest is actually doing is more robust than
> > assuming the guest will do XYZ based on the vCPU model or some other heuristic.
> >
> > The code isn't that complex, and KVM can even reuse the number of exits snapshot
> > to periodically re-enable the intercept, e.g. to avoid unnecessary RDMSRs if the
> > vCPU stops writing MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for whatever reason.

Bonus! It's nice to be able to respond to a state change. For
instance, L1 might write IA32_SPEC_CTRL like crazy while running a
certain L2, and then it might go back to not writing it at all.

> > Needs actual testing and informed magic numbers, but I think this captures the
> > gist of what Jim is suggesting.
> Thanks, Sean, Jim. I agree that having something robust and lightweight would be
> real nice here. Thanks, Sean for the suggested code. I’ll take that, do some
> testing, and report back.
> >
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  3 +++
> > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          | 22 ++++++++--------------
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          | 28 ++++++++++------------------
> > arch/x86/kvm/x86.h              | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > index fb9d1f2d6136..3fdb6048cd58 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > @@ -966,6 +966,9 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
> >       /* Host CPU on which VM-entry was most recently attempted */
> >       int last_vmentry_cpu;
> >
> > +     u32 nr_quick_spec_ctrl_writes;
> > +     u64 spec_ctrl_nr_exits_snapshot;
> > +
> >       /* AMD MSRC001_0015 Hardware Configuration */
> >       u64 msr_hwcr;
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > index ca32389f3c36..f749613204d3 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > @@ -2959,21 +2959,10 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
> >                       svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl = data;
> >               else
> >                       svm->spec_ctrl = data;
> > -             if (!data)
> > -                     break;
> >
> > -             /*
> > -              * For non-nested:
> > -              * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
> > -              * it through.
> > -              *
> > -              * For nested:
> > -              * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
> > -              * nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm.
> > -              * We update the L1 MSR bit as well since it will end up
> > -              * touching the MSR anyway now.
> > -              */
> > -             set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
> > +             if (!msr->host_initiated &&
> > +                 kvm_account_msr_spec_ctrl_write(vcpu))
> > +                     set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
> >               break;
> >       case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
> >               if (!msr->host_initiated &&
> > @@ -4158,6 +4147,11 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >
> >       svm_complete_interrupts(vcpu);
> >
> > +     if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL) &&
> > +         !spec_ctrl_intercepted &&
> > +         kvm_account_msr_spec_ctrl_passthrough(vcpu))
> > +             set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0, 0);
> > +
> >       if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
> >               return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > index 44fb619803b8..4f4a2c3507bc 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > @@ -2260,24 +2260,11 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> >                       return 1;
> >
> >               vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
> > -             if (!data)
> > -                     break;
> >
> > -             /*
> > -              * For non-nested:
> > -              * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
> > -              * it through.
> > -              *
> > -              * For nested:
> > -              * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
> > -              * nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
> > -              * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
> > -              * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well
> > -              * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now.
> > -              */
> > -             vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu,
> > -                                           MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
> > -                                           MSR_TYPE_RW);
> > +             if (msr_info->host_initiated &&
> > +                 kvm_account_msr_spec_ctrl_write(vcpu))
> > +                     vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
> > +                                                   MSR_TYPE_RW);
> >               break;
> >       case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
> >               if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> > @@ -7192,6 +7179,7 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > {
> >       struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> > +     unsigned int run_flags = __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx);
> >       unsigned long cr3, cr4;
> >
> >       /* Record the guest's net vcpu time for enforced NMI injections. */
> > @@ -7280,7 +7268,7 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >       kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
> >
> >       /* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */
> > -     vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
> > +     vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, run_flags);
> >
> >       /* All fields are clean at this point */
> >       if (kvm_is_using_evmcs()) {
> > @@ -7346,6 +7334,10 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >       vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(vmx);
> >       vmx_complete_interrupts(vmx);
> >
> > +     if ((run_flags & VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
> > +         kvm_account_msr_spec_ctrl_passthrough(vcpu))
> > +             vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_TYPE_RW);
> > +
> >       if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
> >               return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> > index c544602d07a3..454bcbf5b543 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> > @@ -492,7 +492,31 @@ static inline void kvm_machine_check(void)
> >
> > void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +
> > int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(u64 value);
> > +
> > +static inline bool kvm_account_msr_spec_ctrl_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > +     if ((vcpu->stat.exits - vcpu->arch.spec_ctrl_nr_exits_snapshot) < 20)

I think you mean 200 here. If it's bad to have more than 1
WRMSR(IA32_SPEC_CTRL) VM-exit in 20 VM-exits, then more than 10 such
VM-exits in 200 VM-exits represents sustained badness.

(Although, as Sean noted, these numbers are just placeholders.)

> > +             vcpu->arch.nr_quick_spec_ctrl_writes++;
> > +     else
> > +             vcpu->arch.nr_quick_spec_ctrl_writes = 0;
> > +
> > +     vcpu->arch.spec_ctrl_nr_exits_snapshot = vcpu->stat.exits;
> > +
> > +     return vcpu->arch.nr_quick_spec_ctrl_writes >= 10;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline bool kvm_account_msr_spec_ctrl_passthrough(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > +     if ((vcpu->stat.exits - vcpu->arch.spec_ctrl_nr_exits_snapshot) < 100000)
> > +             return false;
> > +
> > +     vcpu->arch.spec_ctrl_nr_exits_snapshot = vcpu->stat.exits;
> > +     vcpu->arch.nr_quick_spec_ctrl_writes = 0;
> > +     return true;
> > +}
> > +
> > bool __kvm_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
> > int kvm_handle_memory_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int r,
> >                             struct x86_exception *e);
> >
> > base-commit: 39428f6ea9eace95011681628717062ff7f5eb5f
> > --
>

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