Message-ID: <BYAPR21MB168826D6C870542E5BD3372BD74EA@BYAPR21MB1688.namprd21.prod.outlook.com>
Date:   Fri, 2 Jun 2023 16:11:40 +0000
From:   "Michael Kelley (LINUX)" <mikelley@...rosoft.com>
To:     Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
CC:     "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "dave.hansen@...el.com" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>, Dexuan Cui <decui@...rosoft.com>,
        "rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        "seanjc@...gle.com" <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "stable@...r.kernel.org" <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCHv2 2/3] x86/tdx: Fix race between set_memory_encrypted()
 and load_unaligned_zeropad()

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com> Sent: Thursday, June 1, 2023 11:19 AM
> 
> On 5/31/23 15:00, Michael Kelley (LINUX) wrote:
> > From: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
> <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>
> > Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2023 6:22 AM
> >>
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> On 5/30/23 5:57 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> >>> On 5/29/23 19:57, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> >>>> On Fri, May 26, 2023 at 03:10:56PM -0700, Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On 5/26/23 5:02 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> >>>>>> Touching privately mapped GPA that is not properly converted to private
> >>>>>> with MapGPA and accepted leads to unrecoverable exit to VMM.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> load_unaligned_zeropad() can touch memory that is not owned by the
> >>>>>> caller, but just happened to next after the owned memory.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> /s/to/to be ?
> >>>>
> >>>> Yep, my bad.
> >>>>
> >>>>>> This load_unaligned_zeropad() behaviour makes it important when kernel
> >>>>>> asks VMM to convert a GPA from shared to private or back. Kernel must
> >>>>>> never have a page mapped into direct mapping (and aliases) as private
> >>>>>> when the GPA is already converted to shared or when GPA is not yet
> >>>>>> converted to private.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I am wondering whether this issue exist in the AMD code?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> IMO, you can add some info on the window in set_memory_encrypted()
> >>>>> where this race exists.
> >>>>
> >>>> I don't think AMD affected by load_unaligned_zeropad() the same way as
> >>>> Intel does. But I'm not sure.
> >>>>
> >>>> Tom, do you have any comments?
> >>>
> >>> Right, shouldn't be an issue for SNP.
> >>
> >> Thanks for confirming.
> >>
> >
> > Tom -- For my education, could you elaborate on why this problem can't
> > occur in an SEV-SNP guest?  There's still a window where the direct map
> > PTE and the RMP as maintained by the hypervisor are out-of-sync.  If
> > load_unaligned_zeropad() does a read using the direct map PTE during
> > this out-of-sync window, isn't that going to trap to the hypervisor?  How
> > is the scenario is handled from there to provide the zeros to
> > load_unaligned_zeropad()?  I need to make sure Hyper-V is doing whatever
> > is needed. :-)
> 
> Ah, I think I misunderstood this when it was being talked about. The issue
> SNP would have would be between setting the c-bit but before the PVALIDATE
> is issued. Prior to the RMP being updated, referencing the page will
> generate an #NPF and automatically change the RMP over to private (in
> KVM). However, after the guest is resumed, the page will not have been
> validated resulting in a #VC with error code 0x404 being generated,
> causing the guest to terminate itself.
> 
> I suppose, when a 0x404 error code is encountered by the #VC handler, it
> could call search_exception_tables() and call ex_handler_zeropad() for the
> EX_TYPE_ZEROPAD type (ex_handler_zeropad is currently static, though).
> 

Tom -- Does the above sequence *depend* on the hypervisor doing anything
to make it work?  I'm not clear on why KVM would automatically change the
page over to private.  If there's a dependency on the hypervisor doing
something, then it seems like we'll need to standardize that "something"
across hypervisors, lest we end up with per-hypervisor code in Linux to handle
this scenario.  And running SEV-SNP with multiple VMPLs probably makes it
even more complicated.

Kirill -- Same question about TDX.  Does making load_unaligned_zeropad()
work in a TDX VM depend on the hypervisor doing anything?  Or is the
behavior seen by the guest dependent only on architected behavior of
the TDX processor?

Looking at this problem from a slightly higher level, and thinking out loud
a bit, load_unaligned_zeropad() functionality is provided only for certain
architectures:  x86/64, arm, arm64, and PowerPC 64 (little endian).  There are
fallbacks for architectures that don't support it.  With two minor tweaks to
Kconfig files, I've built x86 with load_unaligned_zeropad() disabled. Maybe
with today's processors the performance benefits are past their prime,
and running with it disabled in CoCo VMs is the better solution.  Does
anyone have a sense of whether the perf impact would be measureable?

If doing the load_unaligned_zeropad() enable/disable at build time is too
limiting, maybe it could be runtime based on whether page private/shared
state is being enforced.  I haven't looked at the details.

Thoughts?

Michael

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