Message-ID: <16830132-f270-5c3d-37ae-6bfbc0e7c13d@amd.com>
Date:   Fri, 2 Jun 2023 17:01:15 -0500
From:   Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Cc:     linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Evgeniy Baskov <baskov@...ras.ru>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@...ras.ru>,
        Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
        Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@...hat.com>,
        Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
        Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@....com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 20/21] x86/efistub: Perform SNP feature test while
 running in the firmware

On 6/2/23 16:29, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Fri, 2 Jun 2023 at 22:39, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com> wrote:
>>
>> On 6/2/23 15:38, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>> On 6/2/23 05:13, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>>> Before refactoring the EFI stub boot flow to avoid the legacy bare metal
>>>> decompressor, duplicate the SNP feature check in the EFI stub before
>>>> handing over to the kernel proper.
>>>>
>>>> The SNP feature check can be performed while running under the EFI boot
>>>> services, which means we can fail gracefully and return an error to the
>>>> bootloader if the loaded kernel does not implement support for all the
>>>> features that the hypervisor enabled.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
>>>> ---
>>>>    arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c          | 74 ++++++++++++--------
>>>>    arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h              |  4 ++
>>>>    drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 17 +++++
>>>>    3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
>>>> b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
>>>> index 014b89c890887b9a..be021e24f1ece421 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
>>>
>>>
>>>> +void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
>>>>        bool snp;
>>>>        /*
>>>> @@ -358,37 +391,14 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>>>>         */
>>>>        snp = snp_init(bp);
>>>> -    /* Check for the SME/SEV support leaf */
>>>> -    eax = 0x80000000;
>>>> -    ecx = 0;
>>>> -    native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>>>> -    if (eax < 0x8000001f)
>>>> -        return;
>>>> -
>>>> -    /*
>>>> -     * Check for the SME/SEV feature:
>>>> -     *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX]
>>>> -     *   - Bit 0 - Secure Memory Encryption support
>>>> -     *   - Bit 1 - Secure Encrypted Virtualization support
>>>> -     *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX]
>>>> -     *   - Bits 5:0 - Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
>>>> -     */
>>>> -    eax = 0x8000001f;
>>>> -    ecx = 0;
>>>> -    native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>>>> -    /* Check whether SEV is supported */
>>>> -    if (!(eax & BIT(1))) {
>>>> +    /* Set the SME mask if this is an SEV guest. */
>>>> +    sev_status = sev_get_status();
>>>> +    if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)) {
>>>>            if (snp)
>>>>                error("SEV-SNP support indicated by CC blob, but not
>>>> CPUID.");
>>>>            return;
>>>>        }
>>>> -    /* Set the SME mask if this is an SEV guest. */
>>>> -    boot_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV, &m);
>>>> -    sev_status = m.q;
>>>> -    if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED))
>>>> -        return;
>>>> -
>>>>        /* Negotiate the GHCB protocol version. */
>>>>        if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED) {
>>>>            if (!sev_es_negotiate_protocol())
>>>> @@ -409,6 +419,14 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>>>>        if (snp && !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
>>>>            error("SEV-SNP supported indicated by CC blob, but not SEV
>>>> status MSR.");
>>>> +    /*
>>>> +     * Check for the SME/SEV feature:
>>>> +     *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX]
>>>> +     *   - Bits 5:0 - Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
>>>> +     */
>>>> +    eax = 0x8000001f;
>>>> +    ecx = 0;
>>>> +    native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>>>
>>> This causes SEV-ES / SEV-SNP to crash.
>>>
>>> This goes back to a previous comment where calling either
>>> sev_es_negotiate_protocol() or get_hv_features() blows away the GHCB value
>>> in the GHCB MSR and as soon as the CPUID instruction is executed the boot
>>> blows up.
>>>
>>> Even if we move this up to be done earlier, we can complete this function
>>> successfully but then blow up further on.
>>>
>>> So you probably have to modify the routines in question to save and
>>> restore the GHCB MSR value.
>>
>> I should clarify that it doesn't in fact cause a problem until the final
>> patch is applied and this path is taken.
>>
> 
> Could we just move the CPUID call to the start of the function?

I tried that and it allowed sev_enable() to complete successfully, but 
then it blew up after that.

But I noticed that the patch to apply the kernel CS earlier is no longer 
part of this series. When I applied the patch to move the setting of the 
kernel CS directly after the call to startup_64_setup_env() in 
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S, everything worked again.

That patch hasn't been pulled into tip, yet, and since you dropped your 
version, the CS value wrong and the IRET from the #VC blows up.

So as long as you pre-req that patch, unless Boris or Dave would prefer it 
to go in with this series, moving the call to native_cpuid() up to just 
before the GHCB protocol version negotiation, works.

Thanks,
Tom

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