linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mce: set MCE_IN_KERNEL

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Fri, 2 Jun 2023 09:44:54 +0800
From:   Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@...wei.com>
To:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Youquan Song <youquan.song@...el.com>
CC:     <tony.luck@...el.com>, <naoya.horiguchi@....com>,
        <tglx@...utronix.de>, <mingo@...hat.com>,
        <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <x86@...nel.org>,
        <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, <linux-edac@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        <jane.chu@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mce: set MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN for all MC-Safe Copy



On 2023/5/26 20:18, Kefeng Wang wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2023/5/26 15:09, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>> On Fri, May 26, 2023 at 02:32:42PM +0800, Kefeng Wang wrote:
>>> The best way to fix them is set MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN for MC-Safe Copy,
>>> then let the core do_machine_check() to isolate corrupted page instead
>>> of doing it one-by-one.
>>
>> No, this whole thing is confused.
>>
>>   * Indicates an MCE that happened in kernel space while copying data
>>   * from user.
>>
>> #define MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN
>>
>> This is a very specific exception type: EX_TYPE_COPY which got added by
>>
>>    278b917f8cb9 ("x86/mce: Add _ASM_EXTABLE_CPY for copy user access")
>>
>> but Linus then removed all such user copy exception points in
>>
>>    034ff37d3407 ("x86: rewrite '__copy_user_nocache' function")
>>
>> So now that EX_TYPE_COPY never happens.
> 
> Is this broken the recover when kernel was copying from user space?
> 
> + Youquan  could you help to check it?
> 
>>
>> And what you're doing is lumping the handling for
>> EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE and EX_TYPE_FAULT_MCE_SAFE together and saying
>> that the MCE happened while copying data from user.
>>
>> And XSTATE_OP() is one example where this is not really the case.
>>
> 
> Oh, for XSTATE_OP(), it uses EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE, but I'm focus on 
> EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE, which use copy_mc (arch/x86/lib/copy_mc_64.S),
> like I maintained in changelog, CoW/Coredump/nvdimm/dax, they use 
> copy_mc_xxx function,  sorry for mixed them up.
> 
> 
>> So no, this is not correct.
> 
> so only add MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN for EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE?
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c 
> b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
> index c4477162c07d..6d2587994623 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
> @@ -293,11 +293,11 @@ static noinstr int error_context(struct mce *m, 
> struct pt_regs *regs)
>          case EX_TYPE_COPY:
>                  if (!copy_user)
>                          return IN_KERNEL;
> +               fallthrough;
> +       case EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE:
>                  m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN;
>                  fallthrough;

As mentioned above, I am focus on copy_mc_XXX calling, it will
abort if the exception fires when accessing the source, and we
want to isolate the corrupted src page, maybe we could a new flag
to indicate this scenario, the *Final Goals* is to let core
do_machine_check to deal with the corrupted src page.

Any suggestiong, thanks


> -
>          case EX_TYPE_FAULT_MCE_SAFE:
> -       case EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE:
>                  m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
>                  return IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
> 
> Correct me if I am wrong, thanks for you reviewing.
> 
> 
>>